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Abstract 
The capital flows from bilateral and multilateral donors to developing countries have 
increased considerably since the start of foreign aid in the 1950s. During the same 
period, the policies of aid allocation have changed, the number of aid donors has 
increased, and multilateral aid organizations have taken a more dominant position in 
the global aid systems. Thus, how donor countries distribute their aid budgets, which is 
paid by their citizens, has received great attention by researchers. The lack of results 
on economic development and welfare in the recipient countries has also contributed 
to the interest in this field.  
This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and three essays on the aid policies of 
donor countries and official lending to developing countries. The main objective has 
been to investigate further how bilateral and multilateral donors behave, focusing on 
their policies on the allocation of loans, concessional or non-concessional, and grants 
as well as the motivation for bilateral donors when delegating the responsibility of aid 
policies to multilateral aid organizations.  
Aid donors choose whether to disburse aid bilaterally, where the donor government 
controls the allocation and implementation of aid projects, or to delegate this 
responsibility to an agent, typically a multilateral aid organization. In the first essay, 
“Poverty aversion and delegation of aid policies”, I address the question naturally 
arising from this behavior: Why do donors delegate the responsibility for aid allocation 
to multilaterals? Using panel data on aid disbursements from 23 Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) donor countries for the period from 1987 to 2011, I test 
a dynamic model for the decision to delegate. Focusing on the predictions from 
theories on the Samaritan’s Dilemma and time inconsistency in aid allocation, I 
analyze how the relative poverty aversion of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies 
affects the share of total aid budgets delegated. The choices donors make when 
allocating aid across countries and deciding whether to delegate the responsibility for 
aid allocation to an agent both reflect the donors’ motivations for aid and influence the 
efficiency of aid, with respect to economic development in the recipient countries. The 
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results show that the share of multilateral aid is negatively related to average income 
and population size, and positively related to the degree of openness. An increase in 
the level of corruption, reflecting the quality of institutions in the donor country, also 
increases the share of aid budgets delegated to multilaterals. While there is some 
support for the prediction that delegation is a convex function of the relative poverty 
aversion of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, the result does not hold once donor 
interests are controlled for. Thus, the results indicate that the characteristics of the 
donor country are more important when donors decide whether or not to delegate, and 
not the possibility to alleviate the commitment problem when donors have a strong or 
weak aversion to poverty.  
In the second essay, “Partner country ownership: Does better governance and 
commitment to development attract general budget support?”, I exploit disaggregated 
data on official development assistance (ODA) commitment from the Creditor 
Reporting System (CRS) to test whether better governed countries and countries with 
stronger commitment to development are more likely to receive general budget 
support. The data used in the analysis cover 23 DAC donor countries and 115 recipient 
countries from 1995 to 2009. Comparing the results using disaggregated and 
aggregated data, I confirm that the results are sensitive to the data used. As expected, I 
find that donors are selective when looking at the allocation of general budget support 
GBS, while the effect of the quality of governance and commitment to development is 
not significant at conventional levels when using data on total program aid. The results 
are in line with existing empirical evidence suggesting that the use of aggregate data 
on aid flows gives an inaccurate picture of the degree of selectivity among donors, and 
shows that donors do follow the recommendation of being more selective when 
allocating budget support than with other types of aid. Still, variables indicating 
political and historical ties between the donor and recipient countries have a strong 
effect on both the probability of receiving GBS and the volume received. 
The third essay, “Lending to developing countries: How do official creditors respond 
to defaults?”, which is co-authored with Cathrin N. Fløgstad, is related to the literature 
on aid allocation as well as the empirical literature on reputational costs of sovereign 
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defaults. The focus in the existing literature on reputational costs is on defaults and 
exclusion from international capital markets. However, most developing countries, and 
especially low-income countries, are not considered to be creditworthy by private 
creditors and therefore mainly rely on grants and loans from official sources. Thus, for 
countries that only rarely have access to international capital markets, the effects of 
sovereign defaults on disbursements of new loans from official creditors are more 
important. We also discuss whether countries defaulting on their sovereign debt can 
turn to official creditors for capital. Using data on 118 low- and lower middle-income 
countries for the period from 1972 to 2011, we analyze the effect of sovereign defaults 
on disbursements of concessional and non-concessional loans from bilateral and 
multilateral creditors. Separating bilateral and multilateral, and concessional and non-
concessional lending, we find that disbursements of new concessional loans and 
bilateral non-concessional loans are negatively related to an increase in arrears on 
principal and/or interest, on average. The effect is robust and significant at 
conventional levels. There is also a negative relationship between arrears and 
disbursements of multilateral non-concessional loans, but the statistical significance of 
this effect depends on how the arrears are measured. While the existing literature has 
found that countries are excluded from international capital markets following 
sovereign defaults, our results show that access to capital from official creditors is also 
reduced. Thus, countries cannot simply turn to official creditors for loans after a 
default. 
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Introduction 
1. Introduction 
A large share of the countries in the world do not have access to private capital 
markets and are therefore dependent on other sources for capital, such as grants and 
concessional and non-concessional loans from official creditors. The countries that are 
excluded from private capital markets are typically low-income countries, as well as 
several middle-income countries that are not considered to be creditworthy. Gelos et 
al. (2011) find that 41% of the 139 countries in their sample have had no market 
access (i.e., are never observed borrowing through a syndicated bank or issuing bonds 
while increasing their indebtedness) from 1980 to 2000, while 47% only have 
occasional access. Reinhart et al. (2003) divide their sample of 102 countries into three 
“debtor clubs”, where 7 countries are defined as having only sporadic access to 
international capital markets, 14 are advanced economies with continuous access, and 
the last 41 countries are somewhere in between. The policies of aid donors have 
therefore received great attention in the aid allocation literature, but the role of official 
creditors is less discussed in the literature on sovereign debt and market access.  
This thesis presents three essays focusing on different aspects of the policies of 
bilateral and multilateral aid donors when providing grants and concessional and non-
concessional loans. The literature on aid allocation and donor behavior is expansive. 
Still, there are several questions that are not addressed. This thesis is an effort to fill 
some of the gaps in the empirical literature on the behavior of aid donors and official 
creditors.  
The rest of the chapter provides an overview of the relevant literature, focusing on aid 
efficiency, aid allocation, multilateral aid, and official lending. I then give a short 
summary of the three essays, focusing on the motivation for addressing the research 
questions in the essays, the methodology used, and the main results from the analyses, 
as well as policy implications and the contributions to the existing literature.  
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2. Literature review 
2.1. Aid effectiveness 
Official development assistance (ODA) is defined by the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC)/OECD as concessional flows from official agencies to low- and 
middle-income countries or multilateral aid organizations, with the objective of 
contributing to economic development and welfare.1 To be defined as concessional, 
there must be a grant element of a minimum of 25%, calculated at a discount rate of 
10%.1 The stated purpose of foreign aid is (by definition) to contribute to economic 
development and welfare, and there is a vast amount of literature analyzing the effect 
of aid on economic development, usually measured by growth in GDP per capita.  
The conclusion that can be drawn from the large number of empirical analyses is that 
there is no clear consensus on whether or not there is a significant positive effect of aid 
on growth, and whether a possible positive effect is diminishing or contingent on 
policy environments or other factors.2 Some often cited contributions to the literature 
on aid effectiveness include Boone (1996), who finds a positive effect of aid on the 
size of the public sector but no effect on investments and indicators for human 
development. Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that foreign aid has a positive effect on 
economic growth if the recipient countries have sound macroeconomic policies— 
results that have later been criticized as several other studies have shown that their 
results are very sensitive to changes in the model specification and the sample used in 
the analysis.3 At the same time, several other studies have found support for the main 
finding by Burnside and Dollar (2000), which is that aid has a positive but diminishing 
effect in a good policy environment.4 Performing a meta-analysis on 68 empirical aid-
growth studies with a total of 541 estimates, Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008) 
                                              
1 Throughout the chapter the word (foreign) aid refers to ODA as defined by the OECD/DAC unless otherwise specified. 
2 Here, I focus on studies from the period called the third and fourth generation of the aid effectiveness literature. The third 
generation was defined by Hansen and Tarp (2000) as the group of empirical studies on aid effectiveness from the early 
1990s, typically including larger samples of countries and years compared to earlier analyses, and where the endogeneity of 
aid is accounted for using different instruments. The fourth generation is defined by Arndt et al. (2010) as the strand of 
literature seeking to explain the small and/or negative effect of aggregated aid flows on economic growth that has emerged in 
the last 6-7 years. 
3 See for instance Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Roodman (2007).  
4 See Collier and Dollar (2002), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Collier and Dehn (2001), among others.  
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conclude that the literature has not been able to establish a positive effect of aid on 
growth.5 Mekasha and Tarp (2012) use the same sample as Doucouliagos and Paldam 
(2008) and reach the conclusion that there is empirical support for a positive effect of 
aid on growth at conventional significance levels.6  
Roodman (2007) tests the robustness of seven aid-growth studies, including the paper 
by Burnside and Dollar (2000), and concludes that the results in the literature are not 
robust. Especially, expansion of the sample changes the results substantially. He 
mentions several possible explanations for the lack of robustness; for example, the fact 
that foreign aid is not homogenous. When using aggregate aid flows in an aid-growth 
regression, one implicitly assumes that all types of aid, from food aid to general budget 
support, have the same effect on economic growth. The effect of aid is also likely to 
depend on the motivation of donors when allocating aid. Bearce and Tirone (2010) 
argue that aid is less effective when the strategic, political, or economic interests of the 
donor are high, because the threat of reducing aid when economic reform is not 
implemented is not credible. Exploiting the reduced importance of political interests 
after the end of the Cold War (Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004), Bearce and Tirone 
(2010) show that foreign aid has promoted economic reform and has demonstrated a 
positive effect on economic growth only in the post-Cold War period. The hypothesis 
that the donors’ motives for allocating aid will influence the outcome has also been 
tested in other empirical studies. The results are mixed, but there tends to be evidence 
that the heterogeneity in motivation for aid is important to understanding the 
relationship between aid and economic development. Kilby and Dreher (2010) test and 
reject the homogeneity assumption that all aid has the same impact on growth. Their 
results show that aid allocated based on recipient needs has a significant positive effect 
on growth, while aid allocated based on donor interests has a significant negative 
effect. Minoiu and Reddy (2010) use results from the literature on aid allocation and 
                                              
5 Doucouliagos and Paldam (2011) do a follow-up study of their meta-analysis from 2008 where they include more recent 
contributions to the aid-effectiveness literature. Their conclusion remains the same as before: the existing empirical results 
together indicate that aid does not generate growth. 
6 Mekasha and Tarp (2008) use a different approach than Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008) by relying on the random effects 
model rather than a fixed effects model, weighting the average effect differently and taking into account the partial effects 
when interaction terms are included in the model; and finally, they recode the data by filling in some of the missing 
observations, increasing the number of observations from 471 to 519. 
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use rankings of donors to separate aid into two groups, developmental and non-
developmental aid. They find evidence that developmental aid contributes positively to 
growth in the long run. Rajan and Subramanian (2008), however, do not find any 
positive effect of aggregate aid on growth, and the result also holds when allowing for 
the effect to differ depending on different geographical environments, different 
policies in the recipient countries, and between different types of aid.7 
Clemens et al. (2012) emphasize the importance of taking into account the fact that the 
growth effect of different aid projects may occur at different times. In other words, 
some projects may affect economic activity in the short run, while others are expected 
to influence economic growth only in the long run. In addition to the problem of 
timing, Clemens et al. (2012) also criticize the instruments used in the most influential 
papers in the aid-growth literature. Allowing for aid to affect growth with a time lag, 
controlling for fixed effects, restricting the aid variable to only include early-impact 
aid, and avoiding the use of weak instruments which could result in biased estimates 
similar to OLS estimates, Clemens et al. (2012) find that the results using the datasets 
from Boone (1996), Burnside and Dollar (2000), and Rajan and Subramanian (2008) 
are quite similar and show a small but positive effect of early-impact aid on economic 
growth, statistically significant at conventional levels. Thus, according to Clemens et 
al. (2012), the lack of robustness is due to poorly specified econometric models; not 
allowing for a lag in the timing of effects, including aid types not likely to affect 
growth in the time period observed, and controlling for country fixed effects, in 
addition to the common use of weak instruments. 
2.2. Aid allocation 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) argue that the inefficiency of foreign aid, on average, is not 
surprising given that bilateral aid donors tend to allocate aid based on self-interests 
rather than on needs or recipient country merits. They find that “An inefficient, 
economically closed, mismanaged non-democratic former colony politically friendly 
                                              
7 Rajan and Subramanian (2008) separate bilateral and multilateral aid, social sector aid and economic aid, and late-impact 
aid and early-impact aid. 
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to its former colonizer, receives more foreign aid than another country with similar 
level of poverty, a superior policy stance, but without a past as a colony” (p. 33). The 
importance of self-interests (favoring trade partners, former colonies, and political 
allies) in explaining the patterns of bilateral aid flows is confirmed by several studies 
during the last decade (Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; Berthélemy, 2006a; Hoeffler and 
Outram, 2011). The importance of political considerations has weakened since the end 
of the Cold War, while recipient merits have become more important (Dollar and 
Levin, 2006). After the War on Terror following the 9/11 terror attack, foreign aid 
from the United States has again become more politicized (Fleck and Kilby, 2010). 
Thus, the evidence suggests that the presence of global conflicts such as the Cold War 
and War on Terror leads to shifts in the aid policies toward allocation patterns, where 
geopolitical objectives become more important and the needs of the recipients are not 
emphasized as strongly. 
While the majority of the studies on bilateral aid allocation focus on the member 
countries of the DAC, there are also analyses of the allocation patterns of aid from 
other bilateral donors and multilateral aid organizations. Multilateral aid organizations 
are more selective on the degree of democracy and the quality of institutions in the 
recipient countries than bilateral donors, on average (Dollar and Levin, 2006). 
However, Berthélemy (2006b) also find that the commercial interests of the US, the 
UK, and Japan also influence multilateral aid flows. Dreher et al. (2009) use data on 
IMF lending programs and whether or not recipient countries temporarily hold a seat 
in the UN Security Council, and find a robust positive relationship between the two 
variables. A similar result for IMF lending and voting in the UN General Assembly is 
found by Dreher and Vreeland (2011). The results indicate that aid allocated by 
multilateral organizations is at least partly determined by political considerations and 
is in line with the literature on the influence of the US on multilateral organizations 
such as the World Bank and the IMF (see for instance McKeown, 2009; Fleck and 
Kilby, 2006; Kilby, 2009).8  
                                              
8 This strand of literature is discussed more thoroughly in the next subsection. 
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Comparing the allocation of aid from the non-DAC donors to DAC donors, Dreher et 
al. (2011) find that they are similar in several aspects, but that non-DAC donors are, on 
average, less concerned with recipient needs. Neumayer (2003) finds that Arab donors 
(both bilateral and multilateral) are also strongly motivated by self-interests, especially 
political and religious allies. 
Even though the results show a low degree of selectivity on variables such as quality 
of governance, on average, there is considerable heterogeneity among the different 
bilateral aid donors—and the degree of selectivity has changed over time.9 Typically, 
the Nordic countries are found to be more responsive to recipient needs as well as 
more selective on variables such as human rights and democracy, and less motivated 
by self-interests (Berthélemy, 2006b; Gates and Hoeffler, 2004).  Dollar and Levin 
(2006) show that both bilateral and multilateral donors were more selective on the 
degree of democracy and the quality of institutions in the recipient countries after 
2000, as compared to the late 1980s.  
An important development in the empirical analyses of aid allocation (as in the 
literature on aid effectiveness) is the increasing use of disaggregated data. As 
emphasized by Radelet (2004), the selectivity of donors should not only be present 
when determining the volume of aid but also when determining the type of aid to 
allocate to different countries. Exploiting data on the aid channel, Dietrich 
(forthcoming) finds that donors tend to bypass the recipient governments when the 
quality of governance is low. Thus, while studies using aggregate data on aid flows 
find that donors are not selective on the level of corruption (e.g., Alesina and Weder, 
2002), Dietrich shows that donors choose other channels when the quality of 
governance (including the level of corruption) is relatively low. Thiele et al. (2007) 
also use disaggregated data to analyze whether donors target sectors in line with the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). With some exceptions, their analysis reveals 
that the sectors targeted by the aid donors deviates from the objectives stated in the 
MDGs.  
                                              
9 By selectivity I mean policies for aid allocation where the donors target countries in which the expected efficiency of aid is 
higher when controlling for recipient needs (e.g., average income). 
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2.3. Multilateral aid  
ODA delegated to multilateral aid organizations accounted for 30% of the total aid 
budgets of the DAC donors in 2012 (OECD, 2013a).10 Given that donors to a large 
extent are motivated by commercial and political self-interests, it is not clear why they 
delegate, on average, close to a third of their total aid budgets, thus reducing the 
possibility of gaining benefits through bilateral aid flows. Rodrik (1995) provides two 
main rationales for the existence of multilateral lending. First, information on the 
debtors is a collective good, and thus multilaterals are better suited for collecting 
information. Second, if multilateral organizations are independent of their member 
governments, they are less politicized and can therefore better exercise conditionality. 
The existence of multilateral aid organizations can also be supported by theories of 
burden sharing. If the objective of the organization is a public good (e.g., poverty 
reduction), an organization may better serve the common interests of the member 
countries (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966).  
A slightly different argument for delegation of aid policies to such organizations is the 
Samaritan’s Dilemma.11 If a donor country is concerned with income inequality and 
consumption smoothing across recipient countries and cannot credibly commit to an 
aid policy ex ante, Svensson (2000) shows that delegation to multilateral aid 
organizations may solve the time inconsistency problem. Hagen (2006) presents a 
similar result but also shows that the same holds for donor countries with a low 
emphasis on income inequality (a strong emphasis on aid efficiency). 
The latter argument of Rodrik (1995) is based on the independence of multilaterals. 
However, existing empirical studies show that the larger member countries have 
significant influence over the policies of multilaterals. Countries like Japan and the 
UK, and especially the US, have been found to influence the allocation aid by 
multilateral aid organizations (Berthélemy, 2006b). Fleck and Kilby (2006) analyze 
the influence of U.S. interests on lending by the World Bank, and find that while the 
                                              
10 The percentage of multilateral aid is calculated based on data for net disbursements. 
11 See Buchanan (1975) for an introduction to the Samaritan’s Dilemma in a general context. 
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US exerts a considerable influence over World Bank lending, the degree varies with 
presidential administrations and is also dependent on economic and political 
circumstances.  
2.4. Official lending and reputational costs of default 
There is a relatively large amount of literature on the existence of sovereign lending in 
the absence of legal rights arguing that there must be some costs for the debtor country 
in the case of defaults for sovereign lending to occur. Empirical studies support the 
hypothesis that there are some reputational costs related to defaults on sovereign debt 
in the sense that future access to capital is reduced (Cruces and Trebesch, 2013; Gelos 
et al., 2011; Richmond and Dias, 2009).12 However, the focus in the literature is 
mainly on the default of loans to, and lending from, private creditors.  
A possibility when being excluded from international capital markets is to turn to 
official creditors and aid donors for capital. In addition to ODA (grants and/or 
concessional loans), official creditors also provide non-concessional loans at market or 
near-market conditions.  
ODA is allocated to low- and middle-income countries for developmental purposes 
(e.g., reducing poverty and improving welfare in the recipient countries). One 
argument for providing grants and concessional loans (i.e., loans with long grace 
periods and/or interest rates below market rates) is that poor countries lack access to 
capital from international capital markets. Thus, in order for developing countries to 
increase economic growth through investments and reforms, they are dependent on 
capital from other sources. Countries not considered to be creditworthy by private 
creditors in the international capital markets therefore rely on loans (either 
concessional or non-concessional) and grants from bilateral and multilateral creditors.  
The empirical literature on the links between access to international commercial 
capital markets and the capital flows from official creditors to developing countries is 
                                              
12 Other types of costs related to defaults include direct sanctions (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989; Fernandez and Rosenthal, 1990; 
Panizza et al., 2009) and domestic costs (Cole and Kehoe, 1998; Kapur et al., 2007; Sandleris, 2008).  
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scarce. One contribution to the literature is Brandt and Jorra (2012), who test how aid 
is related to debt restructuring through the Paris Club. They find that restructurings 
with official creditors increase aid by 6.4 % on average, indicating that, following a 
default on official loans, developing countries can increase capital inflows from aid 
donors.13 Looking at the effect of aid on repayments, Bjørnskov and Schröder (2013) 
show that foreign aid has a negative effect on debt service. Thus, an increase in access 
to capital from donors may have a negative impact on the recipient countries’ 
incentives to repay their sovereign debts.  
3. Chapter summaries 
3.1. Poverty aversion and delegation of aid policies 
Single-authored 
Defining poverty aversion as a donor country’s aversion to income inequality among 
the recipient countries, a strong aversion to poverty will give the recipient countries an 
incentive to lower their efforts in implementing reforms in order to increase average 
income (Svensson, 2000). The reason is simply that recipient governments anticipate 
consumption smoothing across recipient countries; and so, when the donor cannot 
credibly commit to an aid allocation ex ante, donors strongly motivated by poverty 
aversion may lead to a lower efficiency of aid. 14  As a possible solution to the time 
inconsistency problem, Svensson shows that delegation of aid policies to an 
independent aid agency with a relatively lower aversion to poverty will be beneficial 
for both the donor and the recipient country. In a similar model, Hagen (2006) shows 
that if the donor country is strongly motivated by aid efficiency, then the incentives to 
invest in countries with a relatively low productivity of aid will be weakened.15 Thus, 
while aid efficiency is likely to improve if poverty-averse donors delegate to an 
                                              
13 The measure of aid used in their analysis is gross ODA minus debt forgiveness grants and rescheduled debt. 
14 Similarly, Pedersen (2011) shows that the outcome may even be increased inequality if the donor has a strong aversion to 
income inequality within recipient countries. 
15 Donor interests are not included in the model. Thus, donors either care about efficiency, income inequality, or a 
combination of the two. 
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independent agency with a relatively lower aversion to poverty, the same outcome 
holds if donors strongly motivated by efficiency delegate to an agency with a 
relatively lower emphasis on efficiency.  
Even though multilateral aid accounts for about a third of the DAC donors’ aid 
budgets, the empirical literature on the determinants of delegation is limited. Focusing 
on the importance of the relative poverty aversion, I use a dynamic model to test the 
determinants of the delegation decision. The data include 23 DAC donors from 1978 
to 2011. As expected, the share of multilateral aid is highly persistent, which can be 
explained by aid inertia. The results also show that delegation to multilateral 
organizations is negatively related to average income and population size, and 
positively related to the degree of openness and level of corruption. The degree of 
poverty aversion relative to the multilateral aid organizations (either the average of all 
multilaterals or the average of the multilaterals each donor delegates to) does not have 
a statistically significant effect on delegation at conventional significance levels. Thus, 
burden sharing, improving international relations, and exploiting the systems and 
competence present in multilateral organizations are more important for the delegation 
decision than the possibility to reduce the negative incentive effects and, thereby, 
improve aid efficiency.  
In addition to the benefits already exploited by the donor countries, they should 
therefore consider using multilateral organizations when they have difficulties 
committing to an efficient aid allocation ex ante.  
3.2. Partner country ownership: Does better governance and 
commitment to development attract general budget support? 
Single-authored 
Partner country ownership has been stressed in the Paris Agenda in order to improve 
the effectiveness of foreign aid.16 Thus, the donor countries should contribute to 
                                              
16 The Paris Agenda refers to the Paris Declaration for Development, the Accra Agenda for Action, and the Busan 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. 
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including the partner or recipient countries, and the recipient governments should be 
more involved in the decision-making and implementation of projects. As stated in the 
Accra Agenda for Action: “Developing countries determine and implement their 
development policies to achieve their own economic, social and environmental goals” 
(OECD, 2005, 2008, p. 16). General budget support (GBS) is funding which is not 
earmarked for a specific sector or project, but provided as direct financial support to 
the public sector in the recipient country. The use of GBS thus involves delegating the 
responsibility for use of aid flows to the recipient countries’ own financial and 
political systems. While the use of GBS would leave the decision-making and 
implementation of projects to the recipient governments, the results of GBS with 
respect to economic growth and improved welfare for the population in the recipient 
countries depends on the recipient governments’ commitment to development and the 
efficiency of the public institutions within the country.  
Following the recent developments in the aid literature, I exploit aid data 
disaggregated by the type of aid. Using data on GBS from 23 DAC donors to 115 
recipient countries in the period from 1995 to 2009, which is available from the CRS, I 
test the selectivity of the donors with respect to the quality of governance and the 
recipient governments’ commitment to development. The main indicator for the 
quality of governance used in the analysis is government effectiveness from the World 
Governance Indicators (WGI).  
Government effectiveness is included in the baseline model as this is an indicator 
meant to reflect aspects of governance that are relevant for the ability of recipient 
governments to effectively make use of GBS. In addition, a range of other indicators 
for other aspects of the quality of governance is used to test the robustness of the 
result. The results show that donors are selective on the quality of governance in the 
recipient countries, and this finding holds for all variables used except the Polity IV 
indicator for the degree of democracy. However, historical and political ties are still 
important, indicating that there is still room for improvements in order to achieve a 
higher efficiency of aid. A risk when not being selective in allocation of aid, and 
especially GBS, is that the public in the donor countries may become less supportive 
14 
of foreign aid in general. If so, stories of corruption and other difficulties related to the 
quality of governance and commitment to development in the recipient countries may 
result in reduced total aid budgets. 
3.3. Lending to developing countries: How do official creditors 
respond to sovereign defaults? 
Co-authored with Cathrin N. Fløgstad 
The literature on aid allocation focuses on flows of grants and concessional loans. 
However, official creditors also provide non-concessional loans to developing 
countries. The majority of studies looking at patterns of aid flows also disregard the 
link between aid, official non-concessional lending, and lending from private capital 
markets. At the same time, the literature on the reputational costs of default typically 
focus on defaults in, and access to, private capital markets only. In an effort to 
combine the two fields of research and test how official creditors respond to defaults, 
we estimate the effect of sovereign defaults on disbursements of new loans from 
official creditors using data on 118 low- and lower middle-income countries from 
1972 to 2011.  
The results show that defaulting on commercial or official loans is followed by a 
reduction in disbursements of new concessional loans, on average. The effect is not a 
result of substitution from concessional loans to grants, indicating that there is a real 
reduction in access to capital for developing countries in default. There is also 
indication of a negative effect for bilateral and multilateral non-concessional lending, 
but the statistical significance varies depending on the model specification. The lack of 
robustness for non-concessional lending could simply be due to the fact that we focus 
on low- and lower-middle income countries that are not necessarily considered to be 
creditworthy enough for non-concessional loans from official creditors.  
The results for concessional loans are robust to a number of changes in the model 
specifications and sample size. The negative effect could be interpreted as a positive 
effect of clearance of arrears. Both arrears and external debt ratios have declined after 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative started in 1996. Thus, once 
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debtor countries with an unsustainable debt ratio clear their arrears in order to qualify 
for the HIPC initiative, they receive debt relief and may also be rewarded with an 
increase in access to new loans. Controlling for HIPC status and possible contingent 
effects of default on reaching the decision point in the HIPC process, we show that the 
negative effect of arrears remains the same.  
We also show that reputational costs of default are present in the market for official 
loans as well as in the private capital markets.  Thus, developing countries in default 
cannot simply turn to official creditors for capital. 
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Ingvild Nordtveit† 
Abstract 
It can be shown that a strong aversion to poverty among aid donors might result in lower 
levels of investments, and thus reduced growth due to strategic behavior in the recipient 
countries. At the same time, if donors do not care about consumption smoothing, the result 
may also be lower investment levels in the recipient countries. A possible solution to the 
negative incentive effects mentioned is to delegate the responsibility for aid allocation to an 
independent agent (e.g., a multilateral aid organization). If a donor with a strong (weak) 
aversion to poverty delegates to an agent with a relatively weaker (stronger) emphasis on 
income inequality among the recipient countries, the incentives of recipient governments to 
implement reforms in order to generate growth and improve welfare in the country should be 
improved. Using data on aid disbursements from 23 DAC donors from 1978 to 2011, the 
decision to delegate is analyzed in a dynamic panel data model. The empirical results show 
that the donor countries do not use multilateral organizations in order to alleviate the incentive 
effects when they are not able to credibly commit to an allocation policy ex ante. While 
relative poverty aversion does not seem to have an effect on the delegation decision, other 
characteristics of the donors, such as country size, average income, the degree of openness, 
and the size of the public sectors are all significant determinants of the share of multilateral 
aid. 
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1. Introduction 
A major part of the existing empirical literature on the behavior of aid donors focuses on the 
determinants of aid allocation across recipient countries, and the motivation for donating 
aid19. Donors’ decisions to delegate the responsibility for allocating aid to multilateral 
organizations have not received as much attention, even though multilateral aid accounts for a 
considerable share of total aid disbursed from the DAC donors. In the period from 1978 to 
2011, the member countries in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) delegated 35% 
of the total Official Development Assistance (ODA) to multilateral organizations, on average 
(OECD, 2013b). In 2011, the groups of multilateral agencies receiving the largest share of 
multilateral ODA from the DAC donors were the EU institutions (33%), World Bank 
agencies (27%), and UN agencies (16%) (OECD, 2013b). 
One rationale for delegation follows from the time inconsistency problems that arise when 
donor countries are poverty averse. When donors cannot commit to an aid policy, they will try 
to alleviate need in recipient countries, even if this need is partly due to strategic behavior on 
the part of the recipients. This problem, known as the Samaritan's Dilemma, might be reduced 
if there is an aid agency (e.g., a multilateral aid agency) with a relatively lower aversion to 
poverty (i.e., a higher emphasis on aid efficiency). Delegation to this agent might then 
improve the effectiveness of aid, as less redistribution ex post creates greater incentives for 
recipient effort ex ante (Svensson, 2000). When aid impact varies across recipient countries, 
Hagen (2006) shows that a donor with a low aversion to poverty can also benefit from 
delegation as long as the aid agency is relatively more poverty averse (relatively less 
concerned with aid efficiency). In this case, such donors provide strong disincentives for 
governments of countries where aid impact is low. They can therefore benefit from having an 
agent that allocates a greater share of available resources to these recipients. 
In addition to the relative poverty aversion of bilateral aid donors and multilateral aid 
organizations, burden sharing, improving international relations, and exploitation of the 
systems and competence present in multilateral organizations may be important explanations 
for the relatively high share of aid budgets delegated.   
                                              
19 Some important contributions to the literature are Alesina and Dollar (2000), Alesina and Weder (2002), Gates and 
Hoeffler (2004), Neumayer (2003), Berthélemy and Tichit (2004), Dollar and Levin (2006), and Hoeffler and Outram (2011). 
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By estimating an empirical model of the decision to delegate a share of the total aid budgets to 
multilateral organizations, this paper relates to the literature on international organizations and 
aid allocation. The main focus of the analysis is on the link between the relative poverty 
aversion of the donors and the multilateral organizations, and the share of aid budgets 
delegated. To my knowledge there are no existing studies analyzing the effect of relative 
poverty aversion on the decision to delegate.  
The empirical model is a dynamic panel data model using data on ODA from the OECD’s 
International Development Statistics (OECD, 2013a). The data cover ODA from 23 member 
countries of the DAC in the period from 1978 to 2011.20 However, due to missing 
observations on some of the explanatory variables, the actual sample size is reduced and, for 
some model specifications, Switzerland drops out of the sample. The model tested is a 
dynamic panel data model as the share of aid budgets delegated is likely to be highly 
persistent, partly because of bureaucratic inertia, which is usually present in aid policies 
(Fuchs et al., 2014). The fixed effects (FE) model suffers from the short panel bias when the 
lagged dependent variable is included and the number of time periods (T) is not sufficiently 
large. Thus, the bias-corrected least square dummy variable estimator (LSDVC) is also 
applied. However, the results are quite similar, and the FE model performs better in predicting 
the share of multilateral aid. The results indicate that the relative poverty aversion of donors 
has a positive but decreasing effect on the share of aid budgets delegated, but the effect is not 
statistically significant at conventional significance levels. This contradicts the predictions in 
the theoretical literature on delegation as a possible solution to the Samaritan’s Dilemma. One 
possible explanation for this result is that the donors do not perceive multilateral aid 
organizations as independent agents. The results also suggest that donor characteristics are 
more important when donors decide whether or not to delegate the responsibility for 
allocating aid. Given the observed poverty aversion of the multilateral aid organizations, 
many donors could improve the productivity of aid by increasing their share of multilateral 
aid.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief summary of relevant literature 
on the delegation of aid policies, focusing on the theories that constitute the basis for the 
empirical analysis. The empirical model, methodology, and data used in the analysis are 
                                              
20 See Table 1 for an overview of the countries in the sample. 
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presented in Section 3. The results are discussed in Section 4, and the last section provides 
some concluding remarks.  
2. Literature review 
The DAC works to improve development efforts by donor countries, including 
improving the efficiency of foreign aid by collecting data, improving coordination 
between different donors, and making the donors commit to work for development. 
However, empirical evidence shows that, even if the stated purpose of foreign aid is to 
contribute to development and poverty reduction, other objectives in foreign policies 
still explain a substantial share of total aid flows. The main results on aid allocation are 
well established, and there is little debate about the political and strategic motivation 
of many bilateral aid donors.21 Alesina and Dollar (2000) argue that “The allocation of 
bilateral aid across recipient countries provides evidence as to why it is not more 
effective at promoting growth and poverty reduction” (p. 55).  
Based on the empirical results on aid allocation, there are several studies examining 
whether the effect of aid on economic growth differs depending on the main 
motivation of the donors.22 The results are mixed, but the majority of studies find 
evidence that the main objectives when allocating aid are important for the efficiency 
of aid.23 In addition, Collier and Dollar (2002) show that changing the allocation of aid 
towards a more poverty-efficient allocation can increase the number of people lifted 
out of poverty substantially.24 From the literature on aid allocation we know that 
multilateral aid, on average, is more responsive to recipient needs than bilateral aid 
(Berthélemy, 2006). 
                                              
21 This result is mainly driven by the largest donors of bilateral aid, such as the US, France, and Japan, while several small 
donors (particularly the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands) place a larger emphasis on recipient needs when 
allocating bilateral aid (Alesina and Dollar, 2000). 
22 Some relevant contributions are Ram (2003), Rajan and Subramanian (2008), Dreher et al. (2010), Kilby and Dreher 
(2010), and Minoiu and Reddy (2010). 
23 Throughout the paper, the efficiency of aid refers to the effect of aid on economic development, such as growth and 
poverty reduction. 
24 They compare the actual allocation of aid with a poverty-efficient allocation derived by estimating the effect of aid on 
growth, assuming that growth leads to poverty reduction. Their results indicate that aid is more efficient when directing the 
aid towards poorer countries with good policies. 
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Rodrik (1995) argues that there are mainly two rationales for the existence of 
multilateral lending. First, information on the policies and economies in recipient 
countries is a public good; and second, multilaterals that are independent of the donor 
countries are more credible when imposing conditions for lending (they are less 
politicized). Donor countries will often have political or strategic objectives in the case 
of bilateral lending, while an independent multilateral organization can be less 
politicized. However, the assumption that the multilateral aid organizations are fully 
independent of their donors is not supported empirically. In particular, the US has been 
found to have a significant impact on the allocation of loans from multilateral 
organizations.25 This lack of independence may have an effect on the donors’ decision 
to delegate. For instance, Mavrotas and Villanger (2006) show how smaller and less 
influential donors may reduce their contributions to multilaterals when larger countries 
influence the multilateral agencies’ aid policies. As argued by McKeown (2009), less 
influential members will accept the influence on the policies of the multilaterals as 
long as the contributions of the influential members are sufficiently important. 
The empirical analysis is mainly based on the theoretical predictions in Svensson 
(2000) and Hagen (2006). In a principal-agent model, Svensson (2000) analyzes 
incentive problems when the donor is poverty averse. In a two-step game, where the 
donor cannot commit to an aid policy ex ante, the recipients anticipate consumption 
smoothing between the recipient countries and will therefore lower their effort to 
implement reforms to alleviate poverty, agreed upon by the donor and recipients. Ex 
post, a poverty-averse donor will always allocate aid to the poorest recipient(s), even if 
the recipient governments have not fulfilled the conditions of the aid contract agreed 
upon ex ante. Thus, there is a problem with time inconsistency in aid allocation when 
the donor is poverty averse (Svensson, 2000).26 In this setting, delegation of aid 
                                              
25 See for instance Fleck and Kilby (2006b), Kilby (2006, 2009), Dreher et al. (2009), Lim and Vreeland (2011), and Dreher 
and Vreeland (2011). Also see McKeown (2009) for a discussion on how the US influences multilateral organizations. 
26 This result is similar to that derived by Pedersen (2001). He analyzes the time inconsistency problem when the donor has 
an aversion to income inequality within recipient countries rather than between recipient countries. Assuming that the aid 
agency is a Stackelberg follower, and the recipient governments are Stackelberg leaders, he shows that the incentives of the 
recipient governments caused by the donors being inequality averse may actually be counterproductive, leading to an increase 
in income inequality in the recipient countries.  
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policies to a less poverty-averse agency alleviates the time inconsistency problem and 
benefits both the donor and the poor in the recipient country.27  
In his model, Svensson assumes that the recipients are identical ex ante. Hagen (2006) 
relaxes this assumption by allowing recipients to differ in terms of the effect of aid on 
consumption in the recipient countries. In the benchmark version of the model, Hagen 
shows how the allocation of aid depends on the degree of poverty aversion. If the 
donor only cares about efficiency, the recipient with the highest productivity of aid 
would receive the total aid budget of the donor. If the donor has an extreme aversion to 
poverty, it will divide the total aid budget between the recipients so that consumption 
is equal in both countries. However, in the case where the donor only cares about the 
productivity of aid, the incentives to invest in countries with a low productivity of aid 
are weakened. By delegating the aid policies to an agent with a relatively stronger 
aversion to poverty (or income inequality among the recipient countries), the negative 
incentive effects can be reduced. Thus, donors with a high level of poverty aversion 
will benefit from delegating to an agency with a lower level of poverty aversion, while 
donors with a high emphasis on efficiency will benefit from delegating to an agency 
with a lower emphasis on efficiency.28   
Schneider and Tobin (2011) have a different view on the delegation decision of the 
donors. They argue that unless the interests of a donor country coincide with those of 
the multilateral aid agencies, they will reduce their share of multilateral aid, even if 
multilateral aid increases efficiency. As a solution to this problem, they argue that 
donor countries should build a portfolio of multilateral aid in order to both achieve 
their own interests and maximize efficiency, and analyze the determinants of donors’ 
portfolios of multilateral aid. This contradicts the predictions in Svensson (2000) and 
Hagen (2006), where the diverging interests of the donor and the agency are necessary 
for the donor to benefit from the delegation.  
                                              
27 Svensson (2000) also shows how tied aid can mitigate the time inconsistency problem, but this is not discussed here as the 
focus of the analysis is on delegation to multilateral aid agencies. 
28 The results in Svensson (2000) and Hagen (2006) are closely related to discussions of the Samaritan’s Dilemma in the 
context of foreign aid (Pedersen, 1996, 2001). See Buchanan (1975) for a general presentation of the Samaritan’s Dilemma. 
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The literature on burden sharing is also related to the discussion of the delegation of 
aid policies. Addison et al. (2004) analyze the burden sharing in multilateral aid 
organizations based on the model in Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). Using each donor’s 
share of total contributions to an organization as the dependent variable, they do not 
look at the size of multilateral aid budgets relative to bilateral aid budgets, thus 
implicitly assuming that the sizes of the two are independently determined. Looking at 
the burden sharing for all multilateral aid agencies, they find empirical evidence that 
the relative size of the donors’ economy, pro-poor bilateral aid policies, and size of 
government are positively related to the share of funding. The results also show that 
countries with a lower income inequality contribute relatively more to multilateral aid 
agencies, and that right-wing governments are less willing to contribute to UN 
agencies.  
Another strand of literature on the rationale for multilateral aid is models where 
multilateral aid serves as a solution to a domestic principal-agent problem where the 
public supports aid for developmental purposes, while the government wishes to 
achieve political and strategic objectives (Milner, 2006). This argument does not 
explain why countries with a relatively high degree of poverty aversion (e.g., the 
Nordic countries and the Netherlands) delegate, but may be relevant for the decision to 
delegate in countries such as the US, France, and Japan. Milner (2006) argues that a 
country will donate more multilateral aid if the public is more skeptical towards 
foreign aid, because the public is more confident that multilateral aid agencies will 
target the recipient countries based on recipient needs; additionally, it is also difficult 
to observe how multilateral aid is actually allocated due to the pooling of resources 
and lack of transparency. However, it is not clear why countries motivated by strong 
political and/or economic interests would choose to delegate when bilateral aid is 
likely to be a more efficient instrument for achieving these interests. Even the US, 
which has some influence over multilateral aid organizations such as the World Bank, 
is more likely to gain political influence in a country using state-to-state aid, where 
economic interests can be achieved by using, for example, tied aid.  
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3. Analysis 
3.1. Empirical model 
The main focus in the empirical analysis builds on the results derived by Svensson 
(2000) and Hagen (2006). Both models predict delegation of the total aid budgets but, 
as this is never observed in the data, the analysis carried out tests the effect of relative 
poverty aversion on the shares of delegated aid budgets. The former predicts 
delegation if the donor has a relatively high degree of poverty aversion, while the latter 
predicts that the share of aid delegated is a convex function of the relative poverty 
aversion. Following this, two main hypotheses are tested. Hypothesis 1 is used to test 
the predictions from both models: 
ܪଵǣ  An increase in relative poverty aversion is related to a higher share of aid budgets 
delegated to multilaterals, given that the donor has a stronger aversion to poverty 
compared to the multilateral organizations. This hypothesis is tested against: 
 
ܪ଴ǣ The relative poverty aversion is not related to the share of aid budgets delegated to 
multilaterals.  
In addition, Hagen (2006) predicts that it will also be beneficial for donors with a 
relatively low poverty aversion to delegate their aid budgets. Thus, the second 
hypothesis tested is: 
ܪଶǣ  A reduction in relative poverty aversion is related to a higher share of aid budgets 
delegated to multilaterals, given that the donor has a weaker aversion to poverty 
compared to the multilateral organizations. This hypothesis is tested against: 
ܪ଴ǣ  The relative poverty aversion is not related to the share of aid budgets delegated 
to multilaterals.  
Bureaucratic inertia is rarely controlled for within the literature on aid allocation, even 
though the problem with bureaucracy in foreign aid is well known (Easterly, 2002, 
2006). A direct consequence of bureaucratic inertia is that the share of multilateral aid 
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is determined by the share of aid delegated to multilaterals in the past, regardless of the 
relative efficiency of bilateral and multilateral aid with respect to the objectives of the 
donor country (e.g., poverty reduction or political influence). To control for 
persistence in the dependent variable, a dynamic panel data model given in Equation 1 
is used to test the hypotheses: 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߩݕ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଵߛ௜௧ିଷ ൅ ߙଶߛ௜௧ିଷଶ ൅ ߚԢ ௜ܺ௧ିଷ ൅ ݒ௜ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧   (1) 
The dependent variable is ODA delegated to multilateral organizations in percent of 
total ODA.29 The main independent variable ሺߛሻ is a measure of relative poverty 
aversion, and the coefficients of interest are thus ߙଵ and ߙଶ. The squared term is 
included to account for the expected non-linear relationship between relative poverty 
aversion and the share of multilateral aid. ܺ is a vector of control variables, ߚ is a 
vector of the corresponding coefficients, and ߝ is the error term. Time fixed effects ሺߣሻ 
and donor fixed effects ሺݒሻ are also included in the model. 
To test whether there is state dependence, the lagged dependent variable is included in 
the model and is expected to have a positive effect on the share of aid budgets 
delegated due to bureaucratic inertia. When including the lagged dependent variable in 
the model, longer lags of the other independent variables are also indirectly included, 
as shown in Equation 2: 
ݕ௜௧ିଵ ൌ ߩݕ௜௧ିଶ ൅ ߙଵߛ௜௧ିସ ൅ ߙଶߛ௜௧ିସଶ ൅ ߚԢ ௜ܺ௧ିସ ൅ ݒ௜ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ିଵ  (2) 
The timing of commitments versus disbursements is important for the empirical 
analysis. Because it may take several years from when a donor country commits until 
the actual transfers occur, the disbursements in a specific year will depend on the aid 
policies some years ago. Thus, the disbursements of both the share of multilateral aid 
                                              
29 Using a linear model can be a problem when the dependent variable is a compositional variable (always lies 
between 0 and 100), as is the case here. First, prediction of the dependent variables may be outside the restricted 
interval; and second, the estimated effects cannot be constant for all values of the independent variables unless 
the range of the independent variable is restricted. These problems can be solved by using the log-odds ratio as 
the dependent variable (Aitchison, 1982). However, because there are no observations at the upper or lower 
bound it is less problematic. Transforming the dependent variable does not affect the results. Due to difficulties 
with interpreting quantitative effects with the transformed dependent variable, the results are not presented in the 
text, but are available upon request.  
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and the bilateral aid allocation will depend on the lagged independent variables (e.g., 
commitments to LICs and the political orientation of the government when the 
commitments were made). In the baseline model, therefore, the independent variables 
are lagged three years.30 However, the difference in timing for reporting commitments 
and disbursements is uncertain and will differ depending on several conditions, such as 
the type of aid and the time frame of the aid projects.31  
3.2. Data  
Delegated aid 
The dependent variable is the percent of total aid budgets delegated to multilateral aid 
organizations. The data on aid flows are gross disbursements from the OECD 
(2013a).32 In order to be defined as multilateral aid by the DAC, the contributions must 
be made to an international agency, institution, or organization, or to a fund managed 
by such an agency, and in which all donations are pooled, and the main activities are in 
favor of development (OECD, 2010a). Contributions to multilateral organizations can 
be categorized as either non-core or core contributions. Only the latter is reported in 
the data as multilateral aid, while the former is reported as bilateral aid. The main 
differences between the two types of contributions are that, while non-core 
contributions are earmarked (i.e., for a specific purpose or sector), core contributions 
are pooled and their allocation is determined by the multilateral organizations. Core 
contributions are, or are at least supposed to be, independent of the donors’ aid policy. 
Thus, for core contributions, it is not possible to identify both the donor and recipient 
countries at the same time. The allocation of non-core contributions is determined by 
the donor country and should therefore be considered bilateral aid as opposed to 
delegated aid. However, this means that donor countries can take advantage of some 
                                              
30 The results for the relative poverty aversion remain the same when increasing or decreasing the lag by one year. The results 
are not presented due to space limitations, but are available upon request. 
31 See Odedokun (2003) for a discussion on the relationship between commitments and disbursements, and different factors 
that may cause delays in disbursements. 
32 Disbursements are preferred over commitments for two reasons. First, the number of observations is larger for 
disbursements than for commitments. Second, when reporting multilateral commitments, donors report the sum of 
disbursements in the current year, which have not been reported as commitments before, along with the expected 
disbursements for the following year. For bilateral aid, all firm obligations are reported as commitments regardless of the 
time of the disbursement. For disbursements, the procedures for reporting are similar for bilateral and multilateral aid 
(OECD, 2010a).  
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benefits related to multilaterals, such as economies of scale, experience, and 
knowledge about recipient countries, without giving up their possibility to control the 
aid flows. 
Total aid equals the sum of bilateral and multilateral aid. Bilateral aid is defined as aid 
transferred directly from a donor country to a recipient country. Core contributions to 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), other private organizations, public-private 
partnerships (PPPs), and research institutes are also reported as bilateral ODA.33 In the 
same way as for multilateral aid, core contributions to other organizations imply 
delegating the funding, and are therefore subtracted from bilateral and total aid 
flows.34   
A part of the aid delegated to multilateral organizations could be compulsory 
contributions. However, this is not assumed to be a major problem as these types of 
contributions are small and symbolic amounts (OECD, 2009). The number of DAC 
donor countries with an explicit multilateral aid strategy has also increased recently, 
showing that there is an overall strategy followed by the donor countries with regards 
to the share of multilateral aid, non-core vs. core multilateral aid, and the portfolio of 
multilateral aid (OECD, 2010b). 
The average percent of multilateral aid for the 23 DAC donors in the period from 1978 
to 2011 are presented in Table 1.35 Overall, 35% of total ODA from the DAC donors 
were delegated to multilateral organizations. There is, however, great variation among 
the different countries. While the US delegated just above 21% of their total aid 
budgets on average, Greece delegated far more than half of their aid budgets to 
multilateral organizations over the same period. 
                                              
33 From here on, core contributions to NGOs, other private organizations, PPPs, and research institutes are simply referred to 
as core contributions to other organizations. 
34 This is not likely to affect the results much as these types of core contributions only accounted for about 3% of total gross 
disbursements in the period from 1987 to 2011 (OECD, 2013a). 
35 Depending on the model specification, Switzerland sometimes drops out of the sample.  
34 
Table 1 – Average share of multilateral ODA by donor country, 1987-2011 
Portugal 70.14 New Zealand 26.85 
Ireland 65.13 Canada 25.30 
Denmark 44.17 France 23.29 
Belgium 42.05 Korea 21.90 
Norway 38.52 United States 21.61 
Italy 36.72 Germany 20.90 
Finland 36.41 Australia 20.41 
United Kingdom 34.87 Austria 16.21 
Luxembourg 34.16 Japan 14.80 
Switzerland 29.37 Spain 13.57 
Sweden 29.22 Greece 7.13 
Netherlands 27.19     
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the OECD. 
Poverty aversion 
The main independent variable in the model is a proxy of relative poverty aversion. 
This is difficult to measure, but the allocation patterns of bilateral aid commitments 
can be used to find an estimate for the relative importance of recipient needs (e.g., 
average income). As a measure of pro-poor aid, Addison et al. (2004) use the share of 
bilateral aid allocated to countries with an average income below a certain threshold. A 
similar approach is taken here. A natural threshold would be to use the World Bank 
classification for low-income countries (LICs). To obtain a measure of relative poverty 
aversion data on both, bilateral commitments for each of the donor countries and total 
commitments of multilateral aid organizations are used. Thus, the proxy variable is 
simply the ratio of the shares of bilateral and multilateral aid budgets allocated to 
LICs: ௕೔
ಽ಺಴
௠ಽ಺಴, where b indicates the shared bilateral commitments to LICs and m 
indicates the share of multilateral commitments to LICs.  
The main proxy for relative poverty aversion is calculated using commitments, as this 
reflects the aid policies in the time period reported. As argued by Berthélemy and 
Tichit (2004), donors have better control over commitments while disbursements are 
influenced by other factors, such as the cooperation with the recipient governments. 
The average measure of relative poverty aversion for the donor countries in the sample 
are listed in Table 2. Of the 23 donor countries, only four have a stronger aversion to 
35 
 
poverty than the multilateral organizations, on average. 36 Plotting relative poverty 
aversion against the share of multilateral aid in Figure 1, there seems to be a slight 
positive correlation between the two variables, but there are several observations that 
seem to be possible outliers.  
Table 2 – Average ratio of the share of bilateral commitments to LICs to the share of 
multilateral commitments to LICs, 1987-2011 
Portugal 1.74 New Zealand 0.64 
Ireland 1.56 Canada 0.60 
Denmark 1.06 France 0.56 
Belgium 1.01 Korea 0.53 
Norway 0.94 United States 0.52 
Italy 0.89 Germany 0.50 
Finland 0.88 Australia 0.49 
United Kingdom 0.84 Austria 0.39 
Luxembourg 0.81 Japan 0.36 
Switzerland 0.71 Spain 0.33 
Sweden 0.69 Greece 0.18 
Netherlands 0.66     
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the OECD. 
 
Figure 1 – Relative poverty aversion and delegation 
 
                                              
36 Of the 851 observations on the ratio of the shares of aid budgets targeted at LICs, there are 220 observations where the 
donor country is relatively more poverty averse than the average multilateral organization. 
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Using disbursements rather than commitments, imputed multilateral aid can be used to 
obtain a measure of poverty aversion for multilaterals based on the organizations 
delegated to by each of the donor countries.37 In Table 3, the donor countries are 
ranked by the ratio of the shares of disbursements allocated to LICs. The data show a 
very similar ranking of the countries as in Table 2, but Italy moves up in the ranking 
with an average ratio over 1. The share of imputed multilateral aid to LICs is 
calculated based on the donors’ multilateral portfolio (the multilateral organizations 
supported financially by each of the donors). This is in line with the model in Hagen 
(2006), where the donor chooses whether or not to delegate, and which agent 
(multilateral organization) to delegate to. Thus, it is implicitly assumed that a poverty-
averse donor will choose to delegate to a less poverty-averse agent. However, this is 
not essential for the outcome as the share of multilateral aid budgets allocated to LICs 
is quite close to the overall average for all of the aid donors. The results exploiting the 
additional information from the data on imputed multilateral disbursements are still 
presented for comparison in the following section. 
Table 3 – Average ratio of the share of bilateral gross disbursements to LICs to the share of 
imputed multilateral gross disbursements to LICs, 1987-2011 
Portugal 1.88 New Zealand 0.64 
Ireland 1.73 France 0.63 
Denmark 1.07 Korea 0.57 
Italy 1.04 Germany 0.56 
Belgium 1.03 Canada 0.55 
Luxembourg 0.97 Australia 0.48 
Norway 0.97 United States 0.47 
Finland 0.94 Austria 0.46 
United Kingdom 0.91 Japan 0.36 
Sweden 0.81 Spain 0.36 
Netherlands 0.73 Greece 0.21 
Switzerland 0.67     
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the OECD. 
 
                                              
37 Because core contributions to multilateral organizations are pooled, both donor and recipient country for multilateral aid 
flows cannot be identified. Imputed multilateral ODA is therefore calculated based on each multilateral organization’s aid 
allocations and each donor’s contribution to the multilaterals (OECD, 2013c). Data on imputed multilateral aid are not 
available for commitments. 
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Control variables 
One could imagine that smaller countries would be more prone to use multilateral 
organizations due to economies of scale. However, it is possible to exploit economies 
of scale by channeling aid through multilateral aid agencies without giving up the 
control of the aid allocation. Non-core contributions are channeled through multilateral 
organizations, but the funds are earmarked for specific purposes, and are therefore 
reported as bilateral aid in the data. Still, country size may be important for the 
decision to delegate in at least two ways. First, larger countries (e.g., the US, Japan, 
and the UK) are likely to have a stronger interest in exerting influence in the recipient 
countries in order to maintain their global political power. Again, these interests are 
probably better achieved bilaterally. Second, smaller countries are often more 
dependent on international trade, and may be more supportive of multilateral 
organizations in general. Population size and the degree of openness measured by 
trade in percent of GDP are therefore included in the model, with the former expected 
to be negatively related to the share of multilateral aid and the latter positively related 
to the delegation of aid policies. 
Whether the government is conservative or liberal may influence the aid policies of a 
donor country and thus the share of aid delegated to multilateral organizations. It is 
realistic to assume that bilateral aid is more efficient if the donors’ objective is to gain 
political influence and improve the relationship with a recipient country. On average, 
right-wing governments may be less concerned with recipient needs, and thus may 
reduce the share of multilateral aid.38 To control for the ideological orientation of the 
government, data on Chief Executive Party Orientation from the Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI) is used (Beck et al., 2001; World Bank, 2013a). The variable ranges 
from 1 (right-wing) to 3 (left-wing). A possible problem with cross-country 
comparisons using this type of data is that policies that are considered to be left-wing 
policies in one country may be centrist-policies in another (e.g., what are considered to 
be centrist policies in Scandinavia are likely to be considered (far) left in the US). 
                                              
38 E.g., Fleck and Kilby (2006a) find that with a conservative President and Congress, the US puts a stronger emphasis on 
commercial interests in bilateral aid allocation.  
38 
Thus, the model is also tested using general government final consumption, measured 
in percent of GDP, as a proxy for the political orientation of the government rather 
than data from the DPI.39 
Corruption levels in the donor countries may affect the share of multilateral aid in at 
least two ways. If the donor country has a higher level of corruption, the country may 
delegate a larger share of their aid budgets to reduce the losses related to corrupt 
bureaucrats in the bilateral aid agencies. However, corrupt politicians may also wish to 
donate more aid bilaterally as it might be easier for national politicians and bureaucrats 
to extract resources from bilateral aid. The level of perceived corruption is measured 
using the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), available from the PRS Group 
(2013).40The ICRG index ranks countries from 0 (high level of corruption) to 6 (low 
level of corruption). Corruption is a measure of institutional quality.41 Thus, when 
interpreting the estimated effect of corruption, it is important to acknowledge that it 
may reflect more than just the level of corruption in a donor country. Donor countries 
with better country systems are better equipped for monitoring the use of bilateral aid 
funds. In the opposite event, the donor may find it beneficial to delegate this task to 
multilaterals.  
GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2005 USD is used to control for average 
income. The average income may affect a donor country’s ability to finance bilateral 
aid agencies, and relatively poorer countries may therefore prefer to delegate the 
responsibility for aid allocation to multilateral aid organizations. Even though the 
sample is restricted to high-income countries, the variation in average income in the 
sample is considerable.42  
                                              
39 Switzerland drops out of the sample when including data on the political orientation of the Chief Executive Party. 
40 An alternative measure is also tested using the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International 
(2013). However, using the CPI rather than the ICRG data shortens the time period by ten years, and thus reduces the number 
of observations substantially. Using the CPI reduces the statistical significance of some of the control variables, but the main 
results also remain similar. Therefore, the ICRG index is preferred. 
41 North (1990) defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, […] the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction” (p. 3). 
42 The average income in Luxembourg (52175 USD) is more than five times that of Korea (9849 USD), 
measured in constant 2005 USD for the period from 1969 to 2011. The Czech Republic (11182 USD), Portugal 
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In the model derived by Hagen (2006), a lower aversion to poverty is related to a 
stronger emphasis on aid efficiency. However, as already mentioned, empirical 
evidence shows that even if the stated purpose of foreign aid is to contribute to 
development and poverty reduction, other objectives in foreign policies still explain a 
substantial share of total aid flows. Thus, it is essential to control for other interests or 
objectives in foreign aid, as well as in country characteristics that may affect the 
decision to delegate, in order to avoid an omitted variables bias. Thus, exports to non-
OECD countries in percent of total exports and military expenditures in percent of 
GDP are included, to control for economic interests outside the OECD and 
international conflicts, respectively. 
Finally, dummy variables for different time periods and country fixed effects are 
controlled for. Time dummies capture changes from one period to another that may 
affect the aid policies of all donors, such as the end of the Cold War and fluctuations in 
the global economy. The country fixed effects will capture unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity between the donor countries. For instance, the US has a strong influence 
on the World Bank and the IMF (McKeown, 2009), which is likely to have a positive 
effect on the share of multilateral aid. Being a former colonial power is also controlled 
for with country fixed effects. Possible advantages of multilateral aid agencies, such as 
better access to information and improved credibility when imposing conditionality 
(because they are independent from the donors), will also be captured by the fixed 
effects, as argued by Rodrik (1998).  
3.3. Methodology 
The dataset includes 23 DAC donor countries over 25 years, but due to missing 
observations the number of observations varies depending on the model specification. 
With unobserved heterogeneity and a lagged dependent variable, OLS estimates will 
be biased. An LSDV estimator, or fixed effects estimator (FE), controls for the 
unobserved country fixed effects, but will result in biased estimates of the coefficients 
                                                                                                                                             
(13194 USD), and Greece (16296 USD) also have relatively low average incomes, while Switzerland (47839 
USD), Ireland (46852 USD), and Norway (46791 USD) are located at the upper end of the scale. 
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as the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term (Nerlove, 1967; 
Nickell, 1981). The bias (often called the short panel bias or dynamic panel bias) is 
especially severe in short panels, and will go to zero when T goes to infinity (Nickell, 
1981).43 Several different methods have been proposed in order to deal with the short 
panel bias in dynamic models when T is low. If T is high, fixed effects estimators 
provide consistent estimates. 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) suggest using internal instruments, thereby instrumenting 
the lagged dependent variable using longer lags (e.g., the dependent variable lagged 
two periods). The data is transformed using first-differencing to remove fixed effects, 
and the model can be estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS). Using longer 
lags as additional instruments may improve efficiency, but at the cost of reducing the 
sample size (Roodman, 2009b). Difference generalized method-of-moments (GMM) 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) and system GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) use all valid 
lags as instruments, but because missing observations are substituted by zero, the 
sample size is not reduced. Both the lagged dependent variable and other endogenous 
variables can be instrumented for using internal instruments in this setup. Difference 
and system GMM is suitable for dynamic panel data models with fixed effects when N 
is large and T is small. With N = 22 and T ranging from 25 to 34 depending on the 
model specification, the estimates from GMM are not reliable due to too many 
instruments (Roodman, 2009a, 2009b).  
Instead of instrumenting for the lagged dependent variable, Bruno (2005b) introduces 
a method that corrects for the bias of the LSDV.44 The bias-corrected LSDV (LSDVC) 
performs better than the GMM for small samples (low N and T), and allows 
unbalanced panels (Flannery and Hankins, 2013).45  
                                              
43 An approximation of the size of the short panel bias, depending on T, can be found in Bruno (2005a). 
44 Kiviet (1995) also presents an approach for correcting the bias in LSDV. This method is not applied here as it 
assumes that the panel data is balanced. 
45 Using a Monte Carlo analysis, Bruno (2005b) shows that for an unbalanced panel with N equal to 10 or 20, the 
bias-corrected LSDVC estimator outperforms the GMM estimators.  
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LSDVC is preferred over difference and system GMM because of the problems with 
too many instruments for panel data with low N. The main problem with the LSDVC 
as compared to the difference and system GMM is that the independent variables are 
assumed to be exogenous. Controlling for both country- and time fixed effects, the 
problem with the possible omission of variables is reduced. Comparing alternative 
estimators when some of the independent variables are endogenous, Flannery and 
Hankins (2013) find that both FE and LSDVC actually perform quite well (when T = 
12). However, the precision of FE estimates is reduced when the data are unbalanced 
(T ranging from 6 to 18) and the estimated coefficient for the lagged dependent 
variable is biased. If the lagged dependent variable is of interest, the system GMM 
(BB) is preferred. Thus, for small samples the bias caused by endogenous variables 
seems to be relatively small. When T increases, the short panel bias for the lagged 
dependent variable in the FE model will also be reduced.46 
4. Results 
4.1. Baseline results 
Based on the discussion of alternative estimators above, the results from FE estimation 
are presented in Table 4; and from LSDVC in Table 5. As already discussed, the FE 
model is likely to suffer from the short panel bias, especially when the number of years 
included in the sample is low, as is the case here (T = 25). However, the FE model 
performs considerably better in predicting the percentage of multilateral aid, and as the 
lagged dependent variable is not the variable of interest here, the FE results are also 
presented and discussed.  
Due to the timing issues already discussed, the independent variables are all lagged by 
three years. The LSDVC model is estimated with a bias-correction up to order O(1/T), 
                                              
46 Flannery and Hankins (2013) show that if T is sufficiently large, or if the assumptions of the dynamic panel models are 
violated, FE may be the best choice for estimation. Judson and Owen (1999) find that even though the bias can be up to 20% 
of the true value of the coefficient when T = 30, the LSDV model (which is equivalent to the FE model) performs well 
compared to OLS, difference GMM, and the Anderson-Hsiao estimator (AH). 
42 
bootstrapped standard errors with 500 repetitions, and the Blundell-Bond as the initial 
estimator.47 The standard errors for the FE model are clustered at country level. 
Table 4 – FE results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  FE FE FE FE FE 
Multilateral ODA, % of total ODA (t-1) 0.441*** 0.446*** 0.361*** 0.368*** 0.370*** 
  (0.072) (0.066) (0.075) (0.068) (0.066)    
Ratio, share of commitments to LICs (t-3) 0.547 -0.575 2.219 1.170 -2.269    
  (3.123) (3.112) (3.463) (3.573) (1.732)    
Ratio, share of commitments to LICs sq. (t-3) -0.926 -0.653 -1.732 -1.465           
  (1.302) (1.319) (1.297) (1.297)           
Population, millions (t-3) -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.208*** -0.232*** -0.226*** 
  (0.030) (0.031) (0.035) (0.043) (0.042)    
GDP per capita, thousands (t-3) -0.251** -0.258** -0.282 -0.402* -0.406*   
  (0.101) (0.115) (0.183) (0.205) (0.208)    
Total commitments, % of GDP (t-3) 0.499 1.363 0.715 1.699 1.498    
  (3.106) (3.058) (2.599) (2.568) (2.512)    
General gov. final consumption, % of GDP (t-3) -0.426 -0.492 -0.368 -0.507 -0.487    
  (0.359) (0.364) (0.578) (0.557) (0.542)    
Corruption (t-3) -1.449** -1.521** -1.018 -1.057* -1.055*   
  (0.575) (0.558) (0.644) (0.520) (0.519)    
Trade, % of GDP (t-3) 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.062 0.062 0.055    
  (0.031) (0.032) (0.044) (0.047) (0.048)    
Right-wing chief executive party (t-3)   0.902   1.735 1.612    
    (1.389)   (3.348) (3.269)    
Left-wing chief executive party (t-3)   -0.540   0.641 0.485    
    (1.236)   (3.334) (3.247)    
Exports to non-OECD countries, % of tot. exp. (t-3)     -0.094 -0.126 -0.104    
      (0.097) (0.099) (0.087)    
Military expenditures, % of GDP (t-3)     1.558 1.416 1.216    
      (1.898) (1.800) (1.726)    
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 within 0.31 0.34 0.27 0.30 0.30 
Observations 513 488 419 398 398 
Countries 23 22 23 22 22 
Years 87-11 87-11 91-11 91-11 91-11 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is multilateral ODA in percent of total ODA. Clustered 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
                                              
47 The bias of order O(1/T) is derived by Nickell (1981). Kiviet (1995) and Bun and Kiviet (2001) also derive the 
inconsistency, but using the alternative bias corrections does not affect the main results. The results are also robust to 
alternative initial estimators and increasing the number of repetitions in the bootstrapping up to 1000. The results for these 
robustness tests are not reported, but are available upon request. 
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Table 5 – LSDVC results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC 
Multilateral ODA, % of total ODA (t-1) 0.514*** 0.519*** 0.457*** 0.466*** 0.468*** 
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.052) (0.054) (0.055)    
Ratio, share of commitments to LICs (t-3) 0.999 -0.097 1.968 0.980 -2.286    
  (3.339) (3.489) (3.473) (3.566) (1.612)    
Ratio, share of commitments to LICs sq. (t-3) -1.021 -0.754 -1.639 -1.390           
  (1.303) (1.277) (1.274) (1.351)           
Population, millions (t-3) -0.103 -0.101 -0.212* -0.236** -0.231**  
  (0.080) (0.082) (0.110) (0.111) (0.111)    
GDP per capita, thousands (t-3) -0.242* -0.246* -0.227 -0.334 -0.338    
  (0.134) (0.136) (0.256) (0.265) (0.264)    
Total commitments, % of GDP (t-3) 0.634 1.546 1.025 1.983 1.791    
  (2.452) (2.431) (2.756) (2.971) (2.968)    
General gov. final consumption, % of GDP (t-3) -0.386 -0.479 -0.349 -0.498 -0.480    
  (0.381) (0.374) (0.463) (0.469) (0.469)    
Corruption (t-3) -1.301* -1.389* -1.001 -1.050 -1.048    
  (0.693) (0.721) (0.808) (0.816) (0.812)    
Trade, % of GDP (t-3) 0.092* 0.092* 0.058 0.056 0.050    
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.059) (0.055) (0.055)    
Right-wing chief executive party (t-3)   0.398   1.326 1.209    
    (2.272)   (2.061) (2.054)    
Left-wing chief executive party (t-3)   -0.894   0.317 0.169    
    (2.165)   (2.075) (2.063)    
Exports to non-OECD countries, % of tot. exp. (t-3)     -0.090 -0.120 -0.099    
      (0.121) (0.127) (0.124)    
Military expenditures, % of GDP (t-3)     1.511 1.387 1.198    
      (2.137) (2.143) (2.130)    
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Initial estimator BB BB BB BB BB 
Bias correction O(1/T) O(1/T) O(1/T) O(1/T) O(1/T) 
Observations 513 488 419 398 398 
Countries 23 22 23 22 22 
Years 87-11 87-11 91-11 91-11 91-11 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is multilateral ODA in percent of total ODA. Bootstrapped 
standard errors (500 rep.) are reported in parentheses. 
 
The results in Table 4 indicate persistency in the share of total aid budgets delegated to 
multilaterals. This is not very surprising and is likely to be, at least partly, a result of 
bureaucratic inertia. Comparing the size of the coefficient for the lagged dependent 
variable in Table 5, the results indicate that the coefficient for the lagged dependent 
variable is downward biased in the FE model, as expected. Overall, the estimated 
coefficients are very similar whether the FE or LSDVC estimator is applied, but the 
standard errors are smaller using the FE model. 
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From the models by Svensson (2000) and Hagen (2006), we expect delegation to be a 
convex function of relative poverty aversion, all else equal. However, the results 
indicate a positive and decreasing effect of relative poverty aversion, once the donors’ 
self-interests are controlled for. Thus, there does not seem to be any empirical support 
for the theories predicting that donor countries will delegate their aid policies in order 
to alleviate the commitment problem. However, the variables for relative poverty 
aversion are never statistically significant at the 10% level. Omitting the squared term 
in column 5 in Tables 4 and 5, there seems to be a negative relation between poverty 
aversion and delegation, but again the effect is insignificant evaluated at the 10% 
significance level.  
The model controls for other possible determinants of delegation, such as burden 
sharing, donor interests, political orientation of donor governments, and unobserved 
fixed effects. Thus, the results may indicate that the DAC donors do not perceive 
multilateral aid organizations as independent agents. As has already been discussed in 
the literature review, it is well known that larger donors—and especially the US—have 
a great influence on the major multilateral aid organizations.  
Population size has a statistically significant negative effect on the share of multilateral 
aid. Thus, an increase in population size is related to a decrease in the share of 
multilateral aid. According to the model on burden sharing by Olson and Zeckhauser 
(1966), the larger members of an alliance or international organization will bear a 
disproportionally large share of the costs. Here, the dependent variable is each donor’s 
share of aid budgets delegated to multilateral aid organizations and does not, therefore, 
measure the donors’ share of total costs of multilaterals versus the benefits. Thus, the 
results are not comparable to the results in Addison et al. (2004), who find a positive 
effect of population size on the share of total transfers to multilateral aid organizations. 
The negative estimated coefficient for population size is likely to be related to the 
effect of the degree of openness measured by trade in percent of GDP. The coefficient 
for trade is always positive, but is only significant at conventional levels in columns 1 
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to 3 for both FE and LSDVC. Population size and trade are likely to capture some of 
the same effects, as small countries are typically more dependent on trade.48 This result 
suggests that multilateral aid is used as a part of the foreign policies of smaller 
countries; for example, to gain “goodwill” in the global economy and possibly 
improve their access to international markets. The effect may be weakened by the 
influence of major economies in the policies of international organizations, as 
suggested by Mavrotas and Villanger (2006), but that effect is not dominant here.  
Neither the political orientation of the chief executive party nor the size of the public 
sector in a donor country seems to be of importance to the share of multilateral aid. 
Both the left-wing and right-wing dummies have a positive coefficient, suggesting that 
the average share of multilateral aid is lower when a country has a centrist government 
compared to either a right-wing or left-wing government. However, the effect is not 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  
The variables meant to capture political and economic interests of the donor countries, 
such as military expenditures and the share of exports going to countries outside the 
OECD, are never statistically significant at conventional levels. While the latter has a 
negative coefficient as expected, an increase in military expenditures is positively 
related to the share of multilateral aid. Even though the effect is not significant at 
conventional levels, the result is unexpected. Because bilateral aid is likely to be more 
efficient in influencing recipient governments, a higher level of conflict as proxied by 
military expenditures was expected to be negatively related to the share of aid 
budgets.49  
4.2. Outliers 
Plotting the relative poverty aversion against the share of multilateral aid in Figure 1, 
there appear to be some potential outliers in the sample, which may lead to unreliable 
                                              
48 Population size and trade are negatively correlated with a correlation coefficient of -0.4. 
49 Adding the variables for donor interests to the model restricts the data sample to the post-Cold War period. The changes in 
the other explanatory variables are not due to the reduced sample size but the inclusion of additional variables, indicating an 
omitted variables bias in columns 1 and 2. 
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results. Rousseeuw and Leroy (2003) separate outliers into three groups: bad leverage 
points, good leverage points, and vertical outliers. Leverage points are observations 
that are outliers with respect to the values of the independent variables. Good leverage 
points do not have an unusually large residual in a robust regression and will therefore 
not distort the estimated coefficients. Bad leverage points, on the other hand, are of 
great concern as they have outlying values for the independent variables as well as 
large residuals (i.e., bad leverage points have a major influence on the regression line). 
Vertical outliers have high residuals, but as the independent variables have values 
close to the mean, these outliers will not “pull” the regression line and are therefore 
easier to detect using non-robust regression methods (methods with low breakdown 
points). Both vertical outliers and bad leverage points influence the estimates (Hubert 
et al., 2008), and a robust estimation method should therefore be applied when they are 
present.  
Different diagnostics and robust regressors are available in order to identify and reduce 
the influence of outliers. Bramati and Croux (2007) argue that the MS-estimator 
introduced by Maronna and Yohai (2000) is well suited in fixed effects panel data 
models with both continuous and categorical independent variables. In order to detect 
and classify outliers, the model is estimated using the MS-estimator, and the robust 
distance and standardized residuals are plotted in Figure 2. An alternative estimator, 
which also has a high breakdown point, is the MM-estimator (Yohai, 1987); but 
because there are several dummy variables in the model, the MS-estimator is preferred 
(Verardi and Croux, 2009).50 The robust estimation is not available for the bias-
corrected LSDV, but as has already been shown, the FE model performs very well in 
estimating the model, with the exception of the coefficient for the lagged dependent 
variable.  
                                              
50 A high breakdown point means that the estimators can have a relatively high fraction of outliers without the estimates 
being distorted (Yohai, 1987).  
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Figure 2 – Detecting outliers (MS-estimator) 
 
 
The outliers identified based on the model specification in Table 4, column 4 are 
plotted in Figure 2. There are a large number of vertical outliers, with large robust 
standardized residuals in absolute terms. This means that there is a rather large group 
of observations where the model predicts quite well the share of multilateral aid, even 
though the values for the characteristics of the country differ from the rest of the 
sample. There are also a few observations that are classified as bad leverage points. 
The outliers are identified in Table 6. 
78
84
85
86
114
121
124
196
203204
207
212
239
241
244
299
379
422
423
424
25
4 6
427
428429
430
453
455456
458
460
463466
467
469
471
472
547
554
593
594
595
5967598
599
600
601
714
716
717
718
757
758
759
760 761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
772
937
940
970
971
981
985
98688
989
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
0 50 100 150
Robust distance
48 
Table 6 – Vertical outliers and bad leverage points 
Australia 1991 France 2010 Korea 2005 
Austria 2000 Germany 2004 Korea 2006 
Austria 2003 Germany 2005 Korea 2010 
Austria 2004 Germany 2009 Luxembourg 2002 
Austria 2005 Greece 2003 New Zealand 2009 
Austria 2009 Greece 2007 Portugal 1996 
Austria 2010 Italy 1991 Portugal 1999 
Austria 2011 Italy 1992 Portugal 2004 
Belgium 2002 Italy 1993 Portugal 2005 
Belgium 2003 Italy 1994 Portugal 2009 
Belgium 2006 Italy 1996 Spain 2011 
Canada 1997 Italy 1998 Sweden 1998 
Canada 2001 Italy 1999 Sweden 2002 
Denmark 2010 Italy 2001 Sweden 2005 
Finland 1991 Italy 2004 Sweden 2007 
Finland 1992 Italy 2006 Sweden 2009 
Finland 1993 Italy 2007 Sweden 2010 
Finland 1994 Italy 2009 United Kingdom 1999 
Finland 1999 Italy 2010 United Kingdom 2002 
France 2001 Japan 1996 United Kingdom 2004 
France 2004 Japan 2000 United Kingdom 2005 
France 2007 Korea 1999 United States 1992 
France 2008 Korea 2002 United States 2003 
France 2009 Korea 2004 United States 2005 
 
 
Results from robust regression using the MS-estimator are presented in Table 7. Once 
the influence of outliers is reduced, the results for the relative poverty aversion change 
substantially. The positive and decreasing effect is now statistically significant in 
columns 1 to 3. Thus, there is still no empirical support for donors’ using delegation in 
order to alleviate negative incentive effects from the problem of credibly committing 
to an allocation policy ex ante. The results presented so far are more in line with the 
predictions of Schneider and Tobin (2011), namely that the donors delegate more 
when their aversion to poverty is aligned with that of the multilaterals. However, once 
both the orientation of the chief executive party and the variables controlling for donor 
interests are included, the p-values increase to 0.76 and 0.45, respectively. Comparing 
the results in column 4 with columns 6 and 7, the sample is held constant, but the 
effect is again positive and decreasing (the p-value for the linear term in column 6 is 
0.103). Thus, the insignificance of the proxies for relative poverty aversion in column 
4 is not due to the reduction in observations when including additional variables.  
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For the preferred model specification (in column 4), the results for some of the control 
variables also change. One notable difference using the robust MS-estimator is the 
estimated coefficient for military expenditures. In Table 7, there is a negative effect 
significant at the 1% level. An increase in military expenditures of one percentage 
point is related to a decrease in the share of multilateral aid by 5.7 percentage points. 
In addition, the size of the public sector, proxied by general government final 
consumption measured in percent of GDP, is now positively related to the share of 
multilateral aid. Thus, an increase in government consumption of one percentage point 
is related to an increase in the share of total aid budgets delegated to multilaterals by 
0.6 percentage points.  
Table 7 – Results from robust regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Multilateral ODA,  0.449*** 0.524*** 0.443*** 0.349*** 0.397* 0.547*** 0.445*** 
% of total ODA (t-1) (0.028) (0.063) (0.026) (0.048) (0.209) (0.035)    (0.032) 
Ratio, share of commitments  6.378*** 4.911* 7.383*** 0.791 -1.143 3.919    6.045** 
to LICs (t-3) (1.351) (2.925) (2.082) (2.556) (2.454) (2.398)    (3.031) 
Ratio, share of commitments  -2.898*** -2.785** -2.975*** -0.655   -2.382*** -2.647*** 
to LICs sq. (t-3) (0.514) (1.201) (0.734) (0.858)   (0.668)    (0.904) 
Population, millions (t-3) -0.067** -0.045 -0.125*** -0.068* -0.006 -0.097    -0.130** 
  (0.027) (0.040) (0.044) (0.036) (0.111) (0.061)    (0.060) 
GDP per capita,  0.131 -0.114 -0.368 -0.309*** -0.240 -0.192    -0.408** 
thousands (t-3) (0.101) (0.319) (0.240) (0.094) (0.517) (0.289)    (0.191) 
Total commitments,  1.598 1.067 -0.415 1.866 3.321 -0.488    -0.514 
% of GDP (t-3) (1.078) (3.572) (2.159) (1.154) (2.632) (1.886)    (2.503) 
General gov. final cons.,  0.217 0.011 -0.115 0.603** 0.676 -0.530*   -0.102 
% of GDP (t-3) (0.213) (0.290) (0.422) (0.271) (0.692) (0.276)    (0.443) 
Corruption (t-3) -1.023* -1.016** -0.123 -0.450 -0.415 -1.204**  -0.376 
  (0.551) (0.447) (0.793) (0.536) (0.734) (0.561)    (1.129) 
Trade, % of GDP (t-3) 0.137*** 0.132** 0.014 0.093*** 0.083*** 0.031    0.021 
  (0.025) (0.061) (0.034) (0.019) (0.024) (0.034)    (0.028) 
Right-wing chief executive    -0.897   -0.172 -1.713 -5.264***   
party (t-3)   (2.375)   (0.868) (1.457) (1.766)      
Left-wing chief executive    -0.904   -0.994 -2.982 -5.433***   
party (t-3)   (2.118)   (0.738) (1.971) (1.645)      
Exports to non-OECD      -0.188*** -0.010 -0.113           -0.185** 
countries, % of tot. exp. (t-3)     (0.062) (0.054) (0.126)           (0.072) 
Military expenditures,      -0.410 -5.688*** -4.464**           -0.571 
% of GDP (t-3)     (1.296) (1.557) (1.754)           (1.172) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 513 488 419 398 398 398 398 
Countries 23 22 23 22 22 22 22 
Years 87-11 87-11 91-11 91-11 91-11 91-11 91-11 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is multilateral ODA in percent of total ODA. The model 
is estimated using an MS-estimator controlling for country fixed effects. 
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Table 8 provides robust results when using disbursements rather than commitments to 
calculate the proxy for relative poverty aversion. The estimated coefficients for the 
control variables are mostly the same compared to the results in Table 7. For the 
independent variable of interest, the results again suggest that the share of multilateral 
aid is a concave function of relative poverty aversion, but only the squared term is 
statistically significant at the 10% level when including the full set of control 
variables.  
Table 8 – Results using imputed multilateral disbursements 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Multilateral ODA, % of total ODA (t-1) 0.549*** 0.333*** 0.429**  
  (0.186) (0.061) (0.202)    
Ratio, share of gross disbursements to LICs (t-3) 0.737 2.476 0.109    
  (5.628) (2.908) (3.974)    
Ratio, share of gross disbursements to LICs sq. (t-3) -1.332 0.486 -1.711*   
  (2.535) (0.741) (0.977)    
Population, millions (t-3) -0.063 -0.056** -0.048    
  (0.085) (0.025) (0.223)    
GDP per capita, thousands (t-3) -0.082 -0.035 -0.412    
  (0.142) (0.168) (0.804)    
Total commitments, % of GDP (t-3) 1.369 0.911 2.832    
  (2.050) (1.239) (9.023)    
General gov. final consumption, % of GDP (t-3) -0.230 0.624*** 0.431    
  (0.208) (0.227) (0.439)    
Corruption (t-3) -1.025** -0.844 -1.108    
  (0.513) (0.848) (1.190)    
Trade, % of GDP (t-3) 0.029 0.160*** 0.095    
  (0.022) (0.024) (0.088)    
Right-wing chief executive party (t-3) -1.146   0.604    
  (1.753)   (3.812)    
Left-wing chief executive party (t-3) -1.149   -0.119    
  (1.105)   (4.425)    
Exports to non-OECD countries, % of tot. exp. (t-3)   -0.020 -0.063    
    (0.053) (0.089)    
Military expenditures, % of GDP (t-3)   -4.830*** -4.587    
    (1.069) (5.521)    
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 487 422 401 
Countries 22 23 22 
Years 87-11 91-11 91-11 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is multilateral ODA in percent of total ODA. The model 
is estimated using an MS-estimator controlling for country fixed effects. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
The results presented confirm that donor characteristics such as population size, 
average income, degree of openness, and size of the public sector are significant 
determinants of the share of aid budgets delegated. Relative poverty aversion, on the 
other hand, does not have a significant effect on the share of aid budgets delegated to 
multilaterals, as evaluated at conventional significance levels. Thus, there is no 
empirical support for the predictions that donor countries with a relatively stronger or 
weaker aversion to poverty will use multilateral organizations to alleviate the incentive 
effects when they are not able to credibly commit to an allocation policy ex ante.  
Controlling for outliers by employing an estimator with a high breakdown point, the 
results indicate that delegation is a concave function of relative poverty aversion. This 
result is in line with the findings in Schneider and Tobin (2011), who find that donors 
delegate to multilaterals with similar aid allocations as themselves and argue that, in 
this way, donors better achieve their own interests. However, once both the political 
orientation of the chief executive party and the donors’ political and economic 
interests are controlled for, the relative poverty aversion is again insignificant at 
conventional levels.  
One possible explanation for the result could be that donors do not perceive 
multilateral organizations as independent agents. As a relatively large amount of 
literature has shown, the bigger donor countries, especially the US, have considerable 
influence over the policies in organizations like the IMF and the World Bank. Still, 
given the observed poverty aversion of the multilateral aid organizations, many donors 
could improve the productivity of aid by increasing their share of multilateral aid.
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Appendix 
Table A.1. List of variables and sources 
Variable Source Accessed (date) 
Multilateral ODA, % of total ODA OECD (2013a) 4.17.13 
Bilateral ODA to LICs, % of total bilateral 
ODA OECD (2013b) 4.17.13 
Population (mill.) World Bank (2013b) 4.19.13 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 USD, in 
thousands) World Bank (2013b) 4.19.13 
Total ODA commitments, % of GDP OECD (2013b) 4.17.13 
Political orientation of chief executive party World Bank (2013a)/ Beck et al. (2001) 4.19.13 
ICRG Corruption PRS Group (2013) 4.19.13 
Trade (% of GDP) World Bank (2013b) 4.19.13 
General gov. final consumption expenditure 
(% of GDP) World Bank (2013b) 4.19.13 
Military expenditure (% of government 
expenditure) World Bank (2013b) 4.19.13 
Exports to non-OECD countries, % of total 
exports. OECD (2013d) 4.19.13 
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Table A.2. Summary statistics 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Percent of multilateral aid, gross disbursements 580 34.28 12.77 8.24 93.81 
Ratio, share of commitments to LICs 529 0.73 0.42 0.01 3.06 
Ratio, share of disbursements to LICs (using imputed multilateral aid) 554 0.80 0.49 0.03 3.03 
Ln population 600 16.41 1.57 12.43 19.56 
Ln GDP per capita (constant 2005 USD) 586 10.34 0.43 8.95 11.38 
Total commitments, % of GDP 530 0.57 0.35 0.01 2.16 
Right-wing chief executive party 576 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Left-wing chief executive party 576 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Corruption (ICRG) 595 4.72 1.06 2 6 
Trade, % of GDP 597 79.29 48.80 15.92 333.53 
Exports to non-OECD countries, % of total exports 564 21.97 12.54 4.02 67.03 
Military expenditures, % of GDP 569 1.87 0.90 0.05 5.79 
General gov. final consumption, % of GDP 597 19.53 3.88 10.37 29.79 
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Partner country ownership: 
Does better governance and commitment to development 
attract general budget support?* 
Ingvild Nordtveit† 
Abstract 
General budget support (GBS) is funding which is not earmarked for a specific sector or 
project, but is provided as direct financial support to the public sector in the recipient country. 
This type of aid is argued to have a positive effect on aid efficiency if it is targeted at 
countries with good governance and a strong commitment to development. In this study, data 
on commitments of official development assistance (ODA) from 23 DAC donors to 115 
recipient countries in the period from 1995 to 2009 is used to estimate the probability of 
receiving GBS. The results show that the DAC donors are selective with respect to the quality 
of governance, and there is some support for the notion that the recipient governments’ 
commitment to development is a significant determinant for the allocation of GBS. Empirical 
evidence showing that DAC donors are more selective when allocating GBS than with 
program aid in total is also presented, underlining the importance of using disaggregated data 
when analyzing aid allocation.  
Keywords: aid allocation, general budget support, good governance, commitment to 
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1. Introduction 
In the Paris Agenda (the Paris Declaration for Development, the Accra Agenda for 
Action and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation), recipient 
country ownership and involvement are emphasized as necessary in order to increase 
the efficiency of aid.1 General budget support (GBS) is funding which is not 
earmarked for a specific sector or project, but provided as direct financial support to 
public budgets in the recipient country. Thus, GBS is a type of aid where the donor, in 
practice, delegates the responsibility for the distribution and use of aid funds to the 
recipient government. In that way, GBS is an instrument the donors that have 
committed to the Paris Agenda could use in order to increase the involvement of the 
recipient. However, aid donors have often been accused of not following up on their 
rhetoric when allocating aid, and the actual allocation of aid may not be in line with 
the commitments made in the Paris Agenda.  
Looking at the data for commitments of GBS from 1995 to 2009, only 8% of all 
commitments of project and program aid consist of or include GBS, and the 
development during that period has been slightly negative.2 The use of GBS versus 
project aid involves a trade-off between the loss of control and possible benefits, such 
as lower transaction costs and recipient country involvement. Thus, descriptive 
statistics indicate that the DAC donors prefer aid types where the possibility of control 
and surveillance is larger than with GBS. The low use of GBS could also indicate that 
the donors are more selective when allocating GBS as compared to other aid 
modalities, where selectivity refers to targeting of countries in which the expected 
efficiency of aid is higher, controlling for recipient needs (e.g., average income). 
                                              
1 The Paris Declaration states that “Donors commit to: Respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity 
to exercise it” (OECD, 2005/08, p. 3). In the Accra Agenda for Action, the importance of recipient country ownership is 
repeated: “Developing countries determine and implement their development policies to achieve their own economic, social 
and environmental goals. We agreed in the Paris Declaration that this would be our first priority” (OECD, 2005/08, p. 16). 
Also see Bigsten and Tengstam (2012) for a more thorough discussion of the Paris Agenda. 
2 The data on aid commitments are from the OECD database CRS (OECD, 2012), and descriptive statistics for GBS are 
provided in Figure 1. See Table 1 for a classification of different aid types. 
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The main objective of the empirical analysis is to test the degree of selectivity in the 
allocation of GBS. In particular, the importance of the quality of governance and 
commitment to development in the recipient countries for the probability of receiving 
GBS is estimated.3 The analysis is carried out exploiting information on aid type or aid 
modality in the data available from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS). The data are 
on commitments of official development assistance (ODA) from 23 DAC donors to 
115 recipient countries in the period 1995-2009. By analyzing the allocation of GBS, I 
seek to answer two main questions. First, do the DAC donors target countries where 
funding in the form of GBS is likely to have a stronger positive effect on economic 
development in the recipient countries? The emphasis on recipient ownership in the 
Paris Agenda is based on an objective of improving aid efficiency, and the donors 
should therefore allocate GBS to countries where the funds are expected to have the 
strongest positive effect on economic development. A second question is how recipient 
countries can attract GBS. This is an important question, as GBS improves recipient 
ownership and lowers the transaction costs of aid, and thus has some advantages over 
alternative aid types.4 GBS is also very likely the preferred type of aid by the recipient 
government, and it is therefore useful to know whether policy reforms can increase the 
probability of receiving this type of aid.  
Therefore, the paper contributes to the literature on aid allocation by using 
disaggregated data to investigate the degree of selectivity among the DAC donors. In 
order to promote the use of GBS among taxpayers in the donor countries, it is crucial 
that there is clear empirical support for a high degree of selectivity, as the donors’ 
ability to control the use of the aid funds is limited compared to, say, project aid. To 
my knowledge, there are no other empirical papers focusing on the allocation of GBS 
from bilateral donors. The paper also relates to the discussion on recipient ownership 
and aid effectiveness in the Paris Agenda. Unless the donors follow up on their 
commitments in the Paris Agenda, it has limited use. 
                                              
3 Kaufmann et al. (2004) define governance as “the exercise of authority through formal and informal traditions and 
institutions for the common good, thus encompassing: (1) the process of selecting, monitoring, and replacing governments; 
(2) the capacity to formulate and implement sound policies and deliver public services, and (3) the respect of citizens and the 
state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.” (p. 254).  
4 See for instance Koeberle and Stavreski (2006). 
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The main results from a pooled time-series cross-section analysis confirm the 
hypotheses that the DAC donors are selective with respect to the quality of governance 
in the recipient countries and, to some extent, in their commitment to development. 
The results are robust in adding additional variables and the choice of governance 
indicator. However, the quantitative effect of governance varies depending on the 
aspect of governance captured by the proxy variables. For the commitment to 
development, the result is sensitive to the choice of proxy variable and does not hold 
when restricting the sample to donors with former colonies among the recipient 
countries.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of the relevant 
literature and presents the main hypotheses tested in the analysis. Section 3 presents 
the empirical model, methodology, and data. The results from the baseline model, as 
well as several extensions and robustness tests, are presented and discussed in Section 
4. In the last section, I make some concluding remarks. 
2. Related literature and main hypotheses 
There is vast empirical literature analyzing the allocation of aid and, implicitly, the 
behavior of aid donors, focusing on their main motivations for aid. Some important 
contributions to the literature include Alesina and Dollar (2000), Alesina and Weder 
(2002), Berthélemy and Tichit (2004), and Neumayer (2003). A common feature of 
the majority of the empirical studies is that they normally use data on total bilateral or 
multilateral aid commitment. Recently, more disaggregated data have been exploited 
to test for the possible heterogeneity of aid. Thiele et al. (2007) use sectoral data to 
compare the actual targeting of different sectors to the objectives given in the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and find that “there is a considerable gap 
between donor rhetoric and actual aid allocation” (p. 622). Clist et al. (2012) use 
disaggregated data to look at the allocation of GBS from the World Bank and the 
European Commission, and Dietrich (forthcoming) disaggregates the data by an aid 
channel to test whether donors tend to bypass recipient governments in countries with 
a low quality of governance. The studies carried out by Alesina and Weder (2002) and 
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Dietrich (forthcoming) give a nice illustration of why it can be essential to employ 
disaggregated aid data. The main result in the former study is that corruption does not 
reduce aid flows to a country, while the latter shows that when the quality of 
governance is low (e.g., the level of corruption is high), donors tend to use non-state 
actors such as NGOs to implement aid projects in the country. Thus, aggregated data 
conceal a lot of information, and the conclusions drawn may give an inaccurate picture 
of what is really driving the behavior of aid donors. While the existing empirical 
evidence does not indicate selectivity among donors in allocation of total bilateral aid 
(Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Alesina and Weder, 2002; Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004), it 
is possible that the degree of selectivity differs between different aid modalities.  
A highly relevant question regarding the choice of aid modality (e.g., project aid or 
budget support) is whether the efficiency of aid with respect to growth and poverty 
reduction is likely to differ, and how. In the empirical literature on aid effectiveness, 
the results vary between studies. Roodman (2007) tests the robustness of seven 
important aid-growth studies,5 concluding that most results are not robust to changes 
in the sample, length of time periods, and model specifications. One of the 
explanations provided by Roodman for the lack of robustness is that aid is 
heterogeneous.6 Data on aid disaggregated by type, sector and purpose is only 
available for commitments, and only from 1995 onwards. The limited data available 
makes it difficult to estimate the effect of different types of aid on an outcome variable 
such as economic growth. First, one has to construct an estimate for disbursements 
based on aid commitments. Second, the time period is quite short for running 
regressions for the long-term effect of aid on, for example, economic growth. There 
are, however, some empirical studies trying to estimate the effect of aid disaggregated 
by type on growth, including Clemens et al. (2012), Rajan and Subramanian (2008), 
and Outtara and Strobl (2008). While Clemens et al. find a significant positive effect 
of short-impact aid (such as budget and balance of payment support), the results of 
                                              
5 Burnside and Dollar (2000), Collier and Dehn (2001), Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Collier 
and Dollar (2002), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Dalgaard et al. (2004). 
6 The other two explanations provided by Roodman (2007) are that aid is not as important as other factors in increasing 
growth and that much aid is poorly used. 
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Outtara and Strobl show a significantly negative effect on financial program aid 
(budget support) and a significant and positive effect on project aid. Rajan and 
Subramanian do not find evidence of any significant effects on growth, regardless of 
the type of aid.  None of the mentioned papers investigate possible heterogeneity 
between different recipient countries, with the exception of including interaction 
variables between policy variables and aid variables (following the model specification 
in Burnside and Dollar, 2000). It is realistic to assume that different types of aid will 
have different effects on the economy depending on other characteristics of the 
recipient countries. Thus, if donors do not target the “right” recipients with different 
types of aid, this may explain some of the lack of robustness of the results. 
When donors determine whether or not a country is eligible for GBS, there are some 
factors that have been emphasized as important in the literature on budget support. 
First, the efficiency or ability of the recipient country to effectively spend the aid (the 
quality of recipient country systems) is relevant. Koeberle and Stavreski (2006) 
emphasize that donors should be selective with respect to the capacity to allocate the 
aid flows efficiently when allocating budget support. Thus, the institutions and quality 
of governance is important when choosing between project aid and budget support. 
Dietrich (forthcoming) argues that if the quality of governance in the recipient country 
is poor, it might be more efficient to avoid costs related to corruption, bureaucracy, 
etc., by bypassing state actors. This is in line with the arguments made by Radelet 
(2004), who highlights the importance of donors being more selective with respect to 
average income and governance measures, and suggests that the aid modality chosen 
should be dependent on the quality of governance in order to improve aid 
effectiveness. Thus, the research question addressed in the analysis is whether the 
donors are selective with respect to the quality of governance: 
Is the probability of receiving GBS higher for countries with better governance? 
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The governance indicators are positively correlated with average income.7 Thus, the 
poorest countries are normally also the countries with a low quality of governance. 
Even if aid should be targeted for the poorest countries, donors can be selective with 
respect to the quality of governance. If donors target recipient countries with a quality 
of governance above the expected level given its average income, the probability of 
receiving GBS should increase with the measure of governance, controlling for 
average income. As concluded by Radelet (2004, p. 19): 
Poorly governed countries should not only receive less money, they should 
receive more of it as project aid, it should come with a shorter time commitment, 
should be focused on a narrower set of activities, and much of it should be 
distributed through NGOs. 
Koeberle and Stavreski (2006), on the other hand, highlight possible benefits of GBS 
on the quality of governance in the recipient countries. Providing financial assistance 
to the budgets of the recipient government, rather than using earmarked project aid, 
could lead to improvements in country ownership, transparency, and efficiency in 
budget spending, as well as government accountability.8 If GBS does have a 
significant positive effect on governance measures in the long run, using it as an 
“investment” in better governance requires that the donors take a long-run perspective. 
However, as most donor countries are dependent on a certain level of support among 
the public, they might be more concerned with results in the short run. It is also 
unlikely that simply providing GBS will improve governance in a country unless there 
is already a certain level of human capital and quality of governance. GBS might just 
as well lead to an increase in corruption, especially if the recipient government is 
already relatively corrupt, as the spending of GBS is more difficult for a donor to 
monitor than funds for specific projects. Thus, the argument of Koeberle and Stavreski 
will, at best, hold if the donor has a long-run perspective and targets the “right” 
                                              
7 See correlation matrix in the Appendix. 
8 Eifert and Gelb (2005) also argue that budget support is an investment to improve the budget and financial systems in the 
recipient countries. 
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countries. In the short run, to improve the efficiency of aid, donors should target 
recipient countries with better governance when controlling for income levels.  
The majority of empirical studies analyzing the effect of foreign aid on the quality of 
governance in the recipient countries conclude that there does not seem to be a 
significant positive effect. Alesina and Weder (2002) find that an increase in ODA will 
lead to an increase in corruption, but the authors emphasize that the results must be 
interpreted with caution due to the way corruption is measured and the problems with 
determining the direction of causality.9 Djankov et al. (2008) test the effect of aid on 
democracy and political institutions in the recipient countries, instrumenting for 
foreign aid to deal with the endogeneity problem.10 They conclude that aid reduces the 
quality of political institutions, and the negative effect is stronger than the effect of oil 
rents. However, as emphasized before, aid is not homogenous, and different types of 
aid might influence the quality of governance in recipient countries differently. Both 
Alesina and Weder (2002) and Djankov et al. (2008) use aggregate aid data in their 
analyses.11 Focusing only on the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), Öhler, 
Nunnenkamp, and Dreher (2012) find that rewarding recipients who fight corruption 
ex post does have a positive effect on the level of corruption in the recipient 
countries.12 
In addition to the quality of governance, Koeberle and Stavreski (2006) also 
emphasize the importance of the level of commitment to development. Assuming that 
development is (one of) the objectives of the donor, a higher commitment to 
development by the recipient government implies alignment in the preferences of the 
donor and recipient. Alignment in preferences increases the probability that the 
recipient country allocates the funds in line with the donor’s intentions, and thus 
reduces the cost of monitoring the use of aid. A stronger commitment to development 
in the recipient government should therefore increase the probability of receiving GBS 
                                              
9 Other studies with similar results include Knack (2004) and Rajan and Subramanian (2007). 
10 They instrument for aid using initial income, population, and the standard variables for strategic interests in the aid-
allocation literature, and also test the model using system GMM. 
11 Alesina and Weder (2002) use ODA per capita and Djankov et al. (2008) use ODA in percent of GDP. 
12 The MCC is a U.S. aid agency targeting their aid at well-performing poor countries with respect to the quality of 
governance, economic freedom, and commitment to investing in their citizens. 
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(Koeberle and Stavreski, 2006; Cordella and Dell’Arricia, 2007; Clist et al., 2012), and 
is the basis for the second research question: 
Does a stronger commitment to development by the recipient government increase the 
probability of receiving GBS? 
3. Data and methodology 
The empirical model tested is given in Equation 1. 
ܲݎ൫ݕ௜௝௧ ൌ ͳ൯ ൌ ߚԢ ௜ܺ௝௧ିଵ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ݑ௜௝௧,     (1) 
where i indexes the donor country, j the recipient country, and t the time period. 13 The 
dependent variable in the model given in Equation 1 is a binary variable equal to one if 
GBS is larger than zero.  X is a vector of regressors (either dyadic or recipient-
specific), tO  represents time dummies, iD  is donor fixed effects, and ijtu  is the error 
terms.14 The baseline model is estimated using both pooled OLS and Probit models 
with standard errors clustered by group (donor-recipient).15  
In addition to the binary dependent variable model in Equation 1, a Tobit model is 
estimated to test the effect on the volume of GBS.  The Tobit model is used because 
the dependent variable is censored, and it is likely that the variables determining the 
probability of receiving GBS will also have an effect on the size of GBS.  
The model estimated is given in Equation 2, where the dependent variable ൫ݕ௜௝௧כ ൯ is 
observed only when the true value ൫ݕ෤௜௝௧כ ൯ is larger than zero. The dependent variable is 
                                              
13 In a more general form, the probability of receiving general budget support is  
®¯­  p
p
ijty 1 prob. with 0
 prob. with 1
 , where    E'|1Pr ijtXFXijtyp   { . 
14 An overview of all the variables included in the baseline model is provided in Appendix A. 
15 Angrist and Pischke (2009) argue that marginal effects in the Probit model will often be very similar to a linear 
probability model using OLS regression. Interpreting the empirical results from an OLS model is 
straightforward, and would therefore be preferred if the results were similar.  
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measured as GBS in percent of total program and project aid. tP  and ia  represents time 
and donor fixed effects, respectively, and ijte  is the error terms. 
ݕ௜௝௧כ ൌ ߜԢ ௜ܺ௝௧ିଵ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ܽ௜ ൅ ݁௜௝௧, ݕ௜௝௧כ ൌ ൜
ݕ෤௜௝௧ݕ෤௜௝௧ ൐ Ͳ
െݕ෤௜௝௧ ൑ Ͳ   (2) 
The data on GBS and total program and project aid used to construct the dependent 
variables are annual aid commitments for the period from 1995 to 2009 from the CRS 
(OECD, 2012).16 Commitments are used for two reasons. First, aid data disaggregated 
by aid modality are not available for disbursements; and second, commitments are 
considered to better reflect the aid policies of the donors in the literature on aid 
allocations (i.e., the supply of foreign aid) (Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976; 
McGillivray and White, 1993). An overview of the classification of aid modalities in 
the CRS is provided in Table 1. As the focus in the paper is on the countries receiving 
GBS given that they are aid recipients, the analysis tests the probability that a country 
receives GBS given that they receive program and/or project aid during the same 
period.17 Aid types classified as “other” in Table 1 are therefore excluded from the 
data. Thus, if a country only receives humanitarian aid, it is not included in the 
sample.18 
                                              
16 “A commitment is a firm written obligation by a government or official agency, backed by the appropriation 
or availability of the necessary funds, to provide resources of a specified amount under specified financial terms 
and conditions and for specified purposes for the benefit of a recipient country or a multilateral agency.” (OECD, 
2012). 
17 Only including observations where program and/or project aid are positive could lead to a selection bias. 
However, using a Heckman selection model, the null hypothesis that the selection of countries receiving GBS is 
independent of the selection process for receiving aid cannot be rejected, and the results are not sensitive to 
controlling for selection.  
18 Throughout the paper, the term aid will refer to the sum of project and program aid, and is the equivalent to 
ODA, excluding humanitarian aid, administrative costs of donors, refugees in donor countries, and unspecified 
aid. 
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Table 1 – Classification of aid modalities 
Program aid  
Commodity aid and general program 
assistance 
General budget support 
Dev. food aid 
Other commodity assistance 
Actions related to debt Actions related to debt 
Project aid Project aid 
Social infrastructure and services 
Economic infrastructure and services 
Production sectors 
Multi-sector 
Other Other 
Administrative costs of donors 
Humanitarian aid 
Refugees in donor countries 
Unspecified 
 
One possible problem with annual data on aid commitments is the timing of reporting 
and the time horizon for GBS committed. A positive observation of commitments of 
GBS in year t followed by no commitments of GBS in year t+1 does not necessarily 
mean that GBS is to be disbursed in only one year. It could also reflect that the 
committed amount of GBS in year t is meant to be disbursed in year t+1 to t+s, where 
1ts . Thus, if a donor country commits, for example, to provide a certain amount of 
general support over the next three years, this will only lead to one positive 
observation in the data on commitments. This generates a problem when estimating 
the model as it looks like GBS is only provided in one year. Therefore, the annual data 
are used to construct three-year averages for all variables in the model. In addition to 
dealing with the timing of commitments, it also removes “noise” in the data, and the 
results can more easily be compared to results for the allocation of aggregate aid 
commitments, where averaging across time periods is quite common. 
Other types of program aid, such as actions related to debt, can be argued to have 
similar effects on the recipient economy as GBS. However, there is one crucial 
difference between GBS and debt relief. GBS can be used by the recipient government 
to repay debt or increase public spending in any sector, while debt relief does not leave 
the decision to reduce sovereign debt or increase spending to the recipient country. 
Thus, while debt support, as GBS, improves the financial situation for the recipient 
government, the donor does not delegate the responsibility of allocating the funds to 
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the recipient country and so the problem with control is not present. While donors 
should always be selective when allocating any type of aid, the degree of selectivity 
should be considerably higher for GBS than for other types of program aid and project 
aid. However, the model is also estimated using program aid as the dependent variable, 
in order to compare the degree of selectivity. This will be discussed more thoroughly 
in Section 4. 
The development in GBS in the time period from 1995 to 2009, using averages over 
three-year periods, is illustrated in Figure 1. In the period from 1995 to 97, almost 10% 
of all positive commitments of aid included, or consisted of, GBS. For the following 
three-year periods, the share has remained close to 8%. Looking at GBS in percent of 
project and program aid, there has been a similar trend, with a slight decrease from 
1995-97 to 2004-06. In the period from 2007 to 09, GBS on average accounted for 
28% of total project and program aid. Thus, positive commitments of GBS are not 
often reported by the DAC donors but, for the positive observations, GBS accounts for 
a considerable share of aid committed. GBS is likely to be the preferred type of aid 
from the recipient government, and the transaction costs related to this type of aid are 
lower for both the donor and recipient. The low use of GBS could then indicate that 
the DAC donors are highly selective. 
Figure 1 – Development in GBS over time 
 
Source: OECD (2012) 
 
Looking at the donors and recipients with the highest frequency of observations where 
GBS is larger than zero, some interesting patterns emerge. Table 2 lists the ten donors 
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and recipients with the highest frequency of GBS, measured as the share of all positive 
observations of commitments of aid where GBS is larger than zero. Mozambique and 
Tanzania have the highest share among the recipient countries. Of all positive 
commitments of project and/or program aid to Mozambique, 52% include or consist of 
GBS. Seven of the top ten recipients are located in Sub-Saharan Africa (eight are 
located in Africa), and they are all former colonies of France, Portugal, Spain, or the 
UK. The majority of the recipients only rarely receive GBS, while a few countries 
have a relatively high number of positive observations reported in the period from 
1995 to 2009. Of the 115 recipient countries in the sample used in the analysis, there 
are no positive observations of commitments of GBS for 23 countries.19  
Table 2 – The ten most frequent donors and recipients of general budget support 
Donor Frequency  Recipient Frequency 
Japan 0.23  Mozambique 0.52 
France 0.17  Tanzania 0.42 
Netherlands 0.16  Vietnam 0.32 
Ireland 0.16  Ghana 0.30 
United Kingdom 0.16  Burkina Faso 0.29 
Sweden 0.10  Uganda 0.27 
Canada 0.09  Mali 0.24 
Italy 0.08  Nicaragua 0.23 
Belgium 0.08  Benin 0.20 
Denmark 0.08   Zambia 0.19 
Source: OECD (2012) 
 
Japan, France, and the Netherlands are the donors most frequently committing to 
allocate GBS. Of all the positive observations for aid from Japan, 23% either include 
or consist of GBS. Based on the results in the literature on bilateral aid allocation, we 
know that Japan and France are strongly motivated by self-interests, while the 
Netherlands allocates aid mostly based on recipient needs (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; 
Berthélemy, 2006). Thus, both self-interested and more altruistic donors use this type 
                                              
19 Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Botswana, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Dominican Rep., Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Iran, Korea, 
Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Montenegro, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Syria, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Venezuela. 
76 
of aid. South Korea is the only donor that has never reported any commitments of 
GBS. 
The main proxy variable for the quality of governance used is the government 
effectiveness (GE) indicator from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The 
WGI also provide five other indicators capturing different aspects of governance: 
voice and accountability (VA), control of corruption (CC), political stability and 
absence of violence (PV), regulatory quality (RQ), and rule of law (RL) (Kaufmann et 
al., 2010).20 Government effectiveness is included in the baseline model as this is an 
indicator meant to reflect aspects of governance that are relevant for the ability of 
recipient governments to effectively make use of GBS. In addition, Clist et al. (2012) 
find that government effectiveness is significant for the allocation of GBS from the 
World Bank and the EC. However, the different indicators are highly correlated, and 
the effect of government effectiveness can therefore be interpreted as the effect of an 
overall improvement in the quality of governance; additionally, when testing the 
robustness of the results, alternative measures of governance are used. The indicators 
range from -2.5 to 2.5, where a higher score reflects a higher quality of governance, 
but the variation within each country is relatively small. 21 To avoid problems with 
reverse causality, the governance is lagged one period when included in the model.  
Alignment of the objectives of the governments of the donor and recipient countries 
makes GBS preferable to project aid (Cordella and Dell’Arricia, 2007). Assuming that 
at least one of the objectives of the donors when allocating aid is to reduce poverty and 
improve the welfare of the poor, a higher commitment to development in the recipient 
country should have a positive impact on the probability of receiving GBS. The 
recipient governments’ commitment to development is not possible to measure 
directly. Two different groups of proxies that can be used are outcome variables, such 
as child mortality or life expectancy, or public expenditures in the social sectors. 
Public spending in social sectors would reflect the interest of the current government 
                                              
20 See Williams and Siddique (2008) for a discussion of possible issues related to the use of different types of governance 
indicators. 
21 The overall variation for GE is 0.59, but the within variation is only 0.16 for the sample used in the analysis. 
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to improve welfare in the country, while outcome variables depend to a larger extent 
on the effort of governments in the past. Gomanee et al. (2005a) argue that countries 
with higher expenditures in social sectors (sanitation, education, and health) increase 
the benefits for the poor share of the population, on average. Outcome variables are 
also likely to depend on other factors, such as whether a country has a problem with 
HIV or malaria. Based on the relatively high number of observations, expenditures in 
the health sector in percent of total expenditures lagged one period is included as a 
proxy for the commitment to development in the baseline model. However, alternative 
proxies are tested in the robustness section.  
The degree of aid dependency should also be controlled for, but the expected effect is 
ambiguous. Clist et al. (2012) argue that more aid-dependent countries have higher 
transaction costs (if the aid is allocated from several different donors) related to project 
aid, and thus budget support would be preferable. Cordella and Dell’Arricia (2007) 
emphasize that when the projects funded by foreign aid are larger relative to domestic 
resources, it reduces the possibility for the recipient government to reallocate their 
own resources. When the problem of fungibility is reduced, project aid will be 
relatively more efficient. This is consistent with the results produced by Hagen (2006), 
which show that when the objectives of the donor and recipient differ, an increase in 
the share of available resources controlled by the donor will reduce the problem of 
fungibility. On the other hand, Moss et al. (2006) argue that when a relatively larger 
share of public revenues comes from abroad, the governments’ incentives to invest in 
public goods are lower and the governments will be less accountable to their citizens. 
Aid dependency is usually measured as net ODA in percent of GDP. Alternative 
measures available from the World Bank include net ODA in percent of gross capital 
formation, central government expenditure, or imports of goods and services. The 
number of observations for net ODA in percent of gross capital formation is 
considerably higher than for net ODA in percent of GDP. Thus, the former is included 
in the baseline model and is also lagged one period.22  
                                              
22 The correlation between the two variables is 0.81.  
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GBS is financial support to the recipient government, and it is therefore possible that 
allocating GBS is a way for donors to assist countries with balance of payment 
problems. Whether or not a recipient country has an IMF lending program (either 
Extended Credit Facility, Standby Arrangement or Extended Fund Facility) is 
therefore included as a proxy for balance of payment problems, and is expected to 
provide a positive effect on the probability of receiving GBS. The data are from the 
IMF (2012b). In addition, policy conditions are (always) attached to IMF lending,23 
and donors might perceive the information that a country is borrowing from the IMF 
as an indicator that the recipient country will implement policy reforms in order to 
improve economic stability and growth.24 Consequently, a positive effect of this 
variable may also indicate that the IMF serves as a “gatekeeper” for flows from 
official capital sources, as well as for private creditors.25  
Donor-recipient relationships are significant determinants for the allocation of total 
bilateral aid.26 To control for the economic, colonial, and political ties between the 
donor and recipient, three different proxy variables are included. These are bilateral 
exports from the donor to the recipient measured in percent of total exports from the 
donor, a dummy variable indicating whether or not the donor and recipient country has 
ever had a colonial relationship, and an index variable ranging from -1 (least similar) 
to 1 for the similarity on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). 
GDP per capita is included to control for average income, and the effect is expected to 
be negative because richer countries are less likely to receive aid. However, since the 
observations included in the sample are restricted to countries receiving aid (either 
program or project aid) at time t, the effect is likely to be weaker compared to the 
results if all observations were included. Adding average income to the model is 
important for the interpretation of other effects. For example, GDP per capita and 
                                              
23 The nature of the conditions following an IMF lending arrangement varies, but they are often related to economic policies 
meant to improve the macroeconomic condition of the country (IMF, 2012c). 
24 There are several papers analyzing the catalytic effect of lending from international financial institutions in general, and the 
IMF specifically. See for instance Rodrik (1995), Bird and Rowlands (1997, 2002) and Bauer et al. (2012). 
25 See for instance Lombardi and Woods (2008) and Hagen (2009, 2012). 
26 E.g., colonial history, geographic proximity, bilateral trade relationships, and donors’ strategic interests in the recipient 
countries. 
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governance indicators are positively correlated, and controlling for average income is 
therefore necessary to avoid a spurious effect.27 Population is also added to account for 
differences in country size. While the larger countries in the sample (e.g., Brazil or 
Indonesia) may receive GBS from a large number of donors, smaller countries (e.g., 
Guyana or Solomon Islands) are less likely to receive GBS from all donors. Both 
population size and average income are in logs.  
The variables included as regressors are either recipient-specific or dyadic. However, 
the donors differ with respect to the frequency of GBS, indicating that policies vary on 
whether GBS is a preferred aid modality. For example, Korea has not reported any 
commitments for GBS in the period from 1995 to 2009 while the Netherlands, Japan, 
Ireland, France, and the UK have a relatively high frequency of GBS.28 Differences in 
the use of GBS may reflect donor characteristics, such as the support for aid among the 
public in the donor countries. Dummy variables for the donor countries are therefore 
included to control for differences between donors in the use of GBS. Variations 
across time—for example, shocks in the global economy and the geographic region 
where the recipient countries are located—are also controlled for using dummy 
variables.  
4. Results 
4.1. Baseline model 
The results from OLS and Probit regressions of the baseline model can be found in 
Table 3. In order to interpret the quantitative effects from the Probit estimations, only 
the marginal effects evaluated at the means (MEMs) are presented. In columns 1 and 
4, only the control variables and main independent variables are included. In columns 
2 and 5, the dummy variable for IMF programs is added to control for balance of 
payment problems, and variables controlling for the donor-recipient relationship are 
included in columns 3 and 6. All time-varying regressors, with the exception of 
                                              
27 A correlation matrix is provided in the appendix. 
28 See Table 2 for descriptive statistics on the frequency of GBS. 
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population, are lagged to reduce problems with reverse causality. However, the timing 
of the regressors and the outcome variable is not sufficient to establish a causal 
relationship. The results should therefore be interpreted with caution regarding the 
direction of causality. 
Table 3 – Baseline model 
  OLS Probit (MEMs) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
GE 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    
Health spending 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002**  
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Aid dependency 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
IMF (b)   0.052*** 0.051***   0.039*** 0.037*** 
    (0.007) (0.007)   (0.006) (0.005)    
Bilateral exports     -0.008     -0.005    
      (0.005)     (0.006)    
UNGA     0.056*     0.060**  
      (0.031)     (0.025)    
Colonial link (b)     0.248***     0.224*** 
      (0.036)     (0.041)    
Population 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Average income -0.049*** -0.039*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.032*** -0.035*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    
SSA (b) 0.036** 0.033** 0.031* 0.011 0.009 0.006    
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)    
LAC (b) 0.007 -0.009 -0.010 0.011 -0.003 -0.001    
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012)    
ECA (b) -0.018 -0.028* -0.030** -0.018* -0.020** -0.023*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)    
MENA (b) 0.018 0.021 0.028 0.011 0.013 0.019    
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020)    
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Donor dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7611 7611 7452 7413 7413 7258 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.23 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for time and donor 
dummies not reported. (b) dy/dx is the discrete change from the base level (from 0 to 1) in the Probit models. 
All time-varying regressors except population are lagged one period. 
 
The results from the OLS regressions are similar to the estimated marginal effects 
from the Probit model, but the size of the marginal effects from the Probit model are 
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consistently weaker than the conditional probabilities from the OLS regression.29 In 
order to avoid overestimating the effects, the MEMs from the Probit model are 
referred to when discussing the results, and only results using the Probit model are 
presented when testing the robustness of the results. The Probit model also performs 
better when predicting the probability of receiving GBS. Adding variables indicating 
balance of payment problems and proxies for the donor-recipient relationship greatly 
improves the fit of the model. Thus, the preferred model specification is the model in 
column 6, which is the baseline model for further analysis and robustness testing in the 
following subsections.  
An increase in government effectiveness is related to a higher probability of GBS 
being larger than zero. Based on the results in column 6, an increase in the indicator 
for government effectiveness of one standard deviation (0.59) would increase the 
probability of GBS being committed by 2.1 percentage points. The predicted 
probability of receiving GBS is 7.1%, illustrating that an increase of 2.1 percentage 
points is a considerable effect. However, this only shows the marginal effects 
evaluated at the means. In order to explore marginal effects at different values of GE, 
the average marginal effects (AMEs) are graphed with 90% confidential intervals in 
Figure 2. The graphs are based on the model specification in column 6 with the AMEs 
on the probability that GBS > 0 on the vertical axis.  
The AMEs are higher for larger values on the GE indicator. While an increase of one 
standard deviation evaluated at a score on the GE indicator of -2.15 has a positive 
average marginal effect of 1.5 percentage points, an equivalent increase evaluated at a 
score of 1.1 is related to an average marginal effect of 5.4 percentage points. Thus, the 
donors are more selective among recipient countries with a higher level of government 
effectiveness. However, the estimated AME is also less precise for higher values. This 
                                              
29 The number of observations is lower when using the Probit model because the dummy variable for Korea predicts failure 
perfectly (as Korea has never reported a commitment of GBS in the period from 1995 to 2009), and the observations for 
Korea are therefore dropped from the sample. Running the OLS without Korea, the results are almost identical to the OLS 
results for the full sample.  
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is as expected as the majority of the observations in the sample are in the lower 
ranges.30  
Figure 2 – AMEs for government effectiveness 
 
 
The proxy for commitment to development in the recipient countries is both positive 
and statistically significant at the 10% level. An increase in public spending in the 
health sector of one standard deviation (4.1 percentage points) is related to an increase 
in the probability of receiving GBS of 0.8 percentage points. Thus, the donors do not 
seem to be as selective on the recipient governments’ commitment to development. 
The AMEs evaluated at different values of spending in the health sector is graphed in 
Figure 3. 
                                              
30 For government effectiveness, only 18% of the 7258 observations in column 6 are higher than zero. 
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Figure 3 – AMEs for health expenditures 
 
 
The variation in the marginal effects depending on the value of health expenditures is 
much smaller than for the GE. Still, the size of the AMEs is somewhat higher for 
larger values of spending in the health sector, and the marginal effects are also less 
precise. Thus, the donors seem to be selective on both the quality of governance and 
the commitment to development in the recipient countries. However, the marginal 
effect is considerably stronger for governance than commitment to development and, 
looking at the AMEs, the donors seem to be more selective among countries with a 
relatively high score on government effectiveness.  
Countries with an IMF program are also more likely to receive GBS from the DAC 
donors. The estimated marginal effect evaluated at the means show that the probability 
of receiving GBS is 3.7 percentage points higher for countries with an IMF program. 
Thus, the results indicate that GBS is used by the DAC donors as financial support to 
developing countries with a balance of payment problem. In addition, countries 
accepting the terms for IMF programs signal a commitment to improving economic 
stability and growth, which may also be part of the explanation as to why donors seem 
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to favor countries with an IMF program.31 The marginal effect of aid dependency 
evaluated at the means is equal to zero in all three model specifications, and is 
therefore not a significant determinant of the probability of receiving GBS. 
Overall, the variables controlling for different aspects of the relationship between the 
donor and recipient countries are important in determining the probability of receiving 
GBS.  
The binary variable indicating whether the donor and recipient have or have had a 
colonial relationship has by far the strongest effect on the probability of GBS being 
committed. Having a colonial link increases the probability that GBS is larger than 
zero by 22.4 percentage points. As expected, recipient countries with similar voting 
patterns in the UNGA are also more likely to receive GBS. The importance of colonial 
history and political alliances is in line with results in the empirical literature on 
aggregated bilateral aid.32 Bilateral trade (proxied by the percentage of total exports 
from donor i going to recipient j) does not have a statistically significant marginal 
effect on the probability of receiving GBS.  
Dreher et al. (2008) argues that program aid, including GBS, is more likely to be 
determined by political interests of the donors than other types of aid. This argument is 
based on the fact that GBS is preferred by the recipient countries and, therefore, 
politically motivated donors should use program aid to achieve the wanted political 
influence. This could explain the importance of colonial history for the allocation of 
GBS, where former colonial powers may use GBS to maintain political influence, and 
similar voting patterns in the UNGA, but it does not hold for bilateral exports. 
The probability that the DAC donors commit to disbursing GBS to a recipient country 
increases when average income is reduced or the population size increases. Thus, 
poorer countries are more likely to receive GBS when controlling for the quality of 
                                              
31 Using variables such as current account and cash surplus/deficit instead of the IMF dummy as a proxy for macroeconomic 
management supports the result that GBS is allocated to countries with a balance of payment problem. Other macroeconomic 
indicators, such as inflation and the degree of openness, are not statistically significant. These results are not reported in the 
paper, but are available upon request. 
32 See for instance Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Dreher et al. (2008). 
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governance. Average income is measured as the logarithm of GDP per capita, and an 
increase of 1% is related to a reduction in the probability of receiving GBS of 3.5 
percentage points. Similar to the results for aggregate aid in the literature on aid 
allocation, larger countries are also more likely to receive GBS. The geographic 
location of the recipient countries does not seem to be very important. Only countries 
in Europe and Central Asia are less likely to receive GBS (the base group is East Asia 
and the Pacific).  
The results from a Tobit model are presented in Table 4. As before, only observations 
where the total commitments of program and project aid are larger than zero are 
included in the model. The results show that the variables with a positive (negative) 
effect on the probability of GBS in Table 3 also have a positive (negative) effect on the 
share of GBS.  Thus, the selectivity of donors when allocating GBS is not only based 
on which countries receive GBS but also on the volume of GBS in percent of total 
project and program aid allocated. 
 The average amount of GBS committed in the data sample is 27 million 2011 USD. 
There is great variation in the volume of GBS, with a standard deviation of 70. An 
increase of one standard deviation in the indicator for government effectiveness (0.59) 
is related to an increase of almost 12 million USD in GBS committed. The effect is 
weaker for the proxy variable for the degree of commitment to development. An 
increase in health expenditures in percent of total expenditures by 4.08 percentage 
points, which corresponds to one standard deviation, is related to an increase in GBS 
of almost 5 million USD. Compared to the effect of having a colonial relationship, 
these effects are relatively modest. Still, the results provide support for the hypothesis 
that donors are selective on both the quality of governance and the recipient 
governments’ commitment to development when allocating GBS.  
The results presented in Table 3 and 4 show that the DAC donors are selective on the 
quality of governance, and that there is a small positive effect of an increase in the 
recipients’ commitment to development. This differs from the results in the literature 
on allocation of aggregate bilateral aid and thus underlines the importance of using 
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disaggregate data when analyzing aid commitments. Even if the DAC donors do not 
tend to be selective on governance when allocating total bilateral aid, they do in fact 
take the effectiveness of government into account when allocating general budget 
support. In the following subsection, the robustness of the main independent 
variables—the quality of governance and commitment to development—is tested for 
using the Probit model.  
Table 4 – Tobit results 
   (1) (2) (3) 
GE 21.101*** 18.063*** 20.309*** 
  (3.807) (4.037) (3.987)    
Health spending 1.608*** 1.361*** 1.208*** 
  (0.474) (0.457) (0.463)    
Aid dependency 0.038 0.047* 0.043*   
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)    
IMF    24.847*** 24.452*** 
    (3.970) (4.002)    
Bilateral exports     -2.123    
      (3.476)    
UNGA     38.314**  
      (15.474)    
Colonial link      49.912*** 
      (5.862)    
Population 3.097*** 3.688*** 4.655*** 
  (1.111) (1.158) (1.218)    
Average income -23.046*** -17.213*** -20.043*** 
  (2.787) (2.757) (2.921)    
SSA  7.153 6.188 4.361    
  (5.627) (5.503) (5.725)    
LAC 2.552 -4.963 -3.908    
  (6.974) (7.052) (7.241)    
ECA  -6.797 -9.142 -13.023**  
  (6.363) (6.095) (6.206)    
MENA 8.370 9.205 13.467    
  (8.202) (8.076) (8.938)    
Donor dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Sigma constant 53.527*** 52.684*** 51.716*** 
  (2.436) (2.378) (2.404)    
N 7611 7611 7452 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.09 0.10 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The model is estimated using a Tobit model. The dependent variable is GBS 
in percent of the sum of program and project aid. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. All time-
varying regressors except population are lagged one period. 
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4.2. Robustness testing 
Quality of governance 
In Table 3, the GE indicator from the WGI is used to test how the DAC donors take 
the quality of governance into account when allocating GBS. This indicator is only one 
of several indicators that are available. In order to test if the results are robust to the 
choice of indicator, a number of alternative measures of the quality of governance are 
used to replace the GE, and the MEMs are presented in Table 5. There may also be 
some aspects of governance in the recipient countries that are more important than 
others, and the possible heterogeneity in the effect of governance is therefore also 
discussed in this subsection.33 The full baseline model specification in Table 3 is used, 
dropping government effectiveness and adding one of the alternative indicators at the 
time. The marginal effects for the other variables in the model remain approximately 
the same as in the baseline model, and are therefore not reported.34 All variables are 
coded so that an increase reflects an improvement in the quality of governance. 
With the exception of the democracy index Polity IV, all the governance indicators 
have positive and statistically significant marginal effects, at least at the 5% level. 
Comparing the MEMs of an increase equal to one standard deviation in the 
governance indicators, the estimates range from 0.5 to 1.9 percentage points. Thus, all 
the alternative indicators provide a lower estimate of the marginal effects compared to 
the results in the baseline model. Consequently, the estimated effect of quality of 
governance using the indicator for government effectiveness can be interpreted as an 
upper bound. However, the difference in MEMs depending on the indicator included 
can, at least to some extent, be explained by the fact that the indicators capture 
different aspects of the quality of governance. While the strongest marginal effects are 
found when including indicators for regulatory quality (1.9 pp.) and political risk (1.9 
pp.) the marginal effects are considerably weaker for the different indicators for 
corruption in the public sector as well as the Polity IV.  
                                              
33 To see how the different indicators correlate with each other, a correlation matrix for the different governance indicators 
can be found in Appendix A.  
34 The full results are available upon request. 
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Both the control of corruption (CC) from the WGI and the corruption perception index 
(CPI) from Transparency International have an estimated positive marginal effect of 
0.8 percentage points from an increase equal to one standard deviation. An equivalent 
increase in the corruption index from the ICRG is related to an increase in the 
probability of receiving GBS of 0.5 percentage points. All three corruption measures 
are meant to capture corruption in the public sector. While the CPI and WGI measures 
are based on perceptions of corruption, the ICRG indicator is based on political 
information and financial and economic data, which may explain the low correlation 
between COR and the other two indicators for corruption, as well as the weaker 
marginal effect.1 One would expect donors to have an aversion to allocating GBS to 
countries with a low score on corruption in the public sector, but after analyzing the 
allocation of GBS, it seems as though other aspects of governance are more important. 
Voice and accountability (VA) is an indicator reflecting the perceptions of freedom of 
a country’s citizens2 and their ability to influence the composition of the government. 
Naturally, this indicator is highly correlated with the Polity IV measuring the degree of 
democracy. Unlike the Polity IV, though, VA has a positive marginal effect on the 
probability of GBS, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. An increase in the 
index of one standard deviation (0.72) is related to an increase in the probability of 
GBS of 1.4 percentage points.  
The marginal effects of political risk (PR), absence of political violence/terrorism 
(PV), and the state fragility index (SFI) are all positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. An increase of one standard deviation is related to an increase in the 
probability of receiving GBS by 1.9, 1.7, and 1.6 percentage points, respectively. RL 
also has a positive marginal effect on the probability of receiving GBS of 1.3 
percentage points. Overall, the results confirm the positive effect of the quality of 
governance on the probability of receiving GBS. However, the effect is considerably 
                                              
1 The CPI measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption, and is based on information from independent 
organizations. The control of corruption index is also a measure of perceived corruption, where corruption is the exercise of 
public power for private gain. 
2 Freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
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weaker when looking at the effect of corruption, and the effect of democracy is not 
statistically significant. 
Commitment to development 
In Table 6, the results when using alternative proxy variables for the recipient 
governments’ commitment to development are presented. Alternative proxy variables 
for the commitment to development include public spending in other social sectors as 
well as outcome variables. Alternative measures include child mortality, measured as 
the mortality rate per 1000 children younger than five years old, and public spending 
on education in percent of GDP. For comparison, the results measuring spending in the 
health sector measured in percent of GDP and the sum of spending in the two sectors 
are also presented.3 In addition, a binary variable for whether or not the recipient 
country has an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP) or a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is used to indicate the commitment to reduce 
poverty, following Clist et al. (2012).4 
As discussed previously, proxy variables like child mortality will depend on the efforts 
made to educate health personnel, invest in health institutions, and so on, decades ago, 
and it is also likely to depend on other factors, such as whether a country has a 
problem with HIV or malaria. Thus, this type of outcome variable may be a poor 
proxy for the governments’ current commitment to development, and so the lack of 
any significant effect on the probability of receiving GBS is not very surprising. 
The MEMs for the commitment to development are still positive and significant at the 
5% level for public spending in the health sector. Using data on education spending, 
the marginal effect is negative and significant at the 10% level. As spending in the two 
sectors has the opposite effect on the probability of receiving GBS, it is not surprising 
that the effect of the two combined is insignificant. The number of observations is 
reduced by close to a third when including data for spending on education. The 
                                              
3 Spending in education is measured in percent of GDP rather than total expenditures due to data availability.  
4 The main objective of an (I)PRSP is long-term poverty reduction through national strategies with the 
(financial) support of development partners. The strategy papers are prepared by the governments, but the 
process also involves multilateral organizations such as the IMF and World Bank (IMF, 2012a).  
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positive effect of spending in the health sector is robust to reducing the sample size 
equivalently. It is difficult to see why donors would target countries based on public 
spending in the health sector but not take spending in education into account. 
However, the positive effect for the health sector may be driven by a focus on health-
related issues (e.g., HIV and mother and child health). This would be consistent with 
the results in Thiele et al. (2007), where they find that the MDGs have not shaped the 
allocation of aid, with the exception of the fight against HIV/AIDS, using data 
disaggregated by sectors. 
The variable indicating whether the country has a PRSP is a binary variable, and is 
therefore evaluated for a discrete change from zero to one for the Probit model, and 
not at the mean. The results in column 3 show that the probability of receiving GBS is 
3 percentage points higher if the country has an IPRSP or PRSP. Thus, the effect is 
much stronger than when using health expenditures as a proxy. One possible 
explanation for this is that an (I)PRSP is prepared by the recipient government, but the 
process also involves other parties, including the World Bank and the IMF. It is not 
just a strategy paper for social policies in order to improve growth and reducing 
poverty; it also includes macroeconomic policies (IMF, 2012a). In that way, the 
preparation of an (I)PRSP does not only signal that the recipient country is focusing on 
poverty reduction but also that it cooperates with the World Bank and the IMF to 
improve economic development in the country. The (I)PRSP dummies both then 
indicate a commitment by the recipient governments to improving macroeconomic 
policies. This effect can be compared to the signaling effect of having an IMF 
program, even though the latter might have a larger component of pressure from 
others, such as the IMF and foreign creditors. Comparing the results for the IMF 
dummy in Table 6 with Table 3, the marginal effect of having an IMF program is 
reduced from 3.7 to 2.6 percentage points. Thus, it could reflect that the (I)PRSP and 
IMF dummies both capture a commitment to policy reforms by the recipient 
governments.  
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Table 6 – Commitment to development 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (3) 
GE 0.040*** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)    
Child mortality 0.000                   
  (0.000)                   
Health spending, % of GDP   0.007**       
    (0.003)       
Education spending, % of GDP     -0.002*     
      (0.001)     
Sum of spending in health and edu., % of GDP       -0.000   
        (0.001)   
IPRSP/PRSP         0.030*** 
          (0.007)    
Aid dependency 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000**  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
IMF (b) 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.026*** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    
Bilateral exports -0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.004    
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)    
UNGA 0.072*** 0.059** 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.073*** 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)    
Colonial link (b) 0.221*** 0.224*** 0.250*** 0.251*** 0.224*** 
  (0.041) (0.040) (0.047) (0.047) (0.041)    
Population 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Average income -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.029*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    
SSA (b) 0.003 0.005 0.015 0.014 0.004    
  (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)    
LAC (b) 0.008 0.001 0.026 0.025 0.006    
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012)    
ECA (b) -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.014 -0.015 -0.025*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007)    
MENA (b) 0.020 0.014 0.051* 0.043 0.021    
  (0.021) (0.019) (0.030) (0.028) (0.021)    
Donor dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7280 7258 5198 5198 7280 
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The model is estimated using a Probit model with clustered standard errors 
in parentheses. All time-varying regressors except population are lagged one period. 
4.3. Colonizers vs. non-colonizers 
The results for the baseline model in Table 3 show that even though the DAC donors 
are selective on the quality of governance and, at least to some extent, the commitment 
to development in the recipient countries, colonial history still has the strongest 
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predicative power on the probability of receiving GBS. It is well known from the aid 
allocation literature that former colonizers, and France in particular, favor their former 
colonies (Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004). All the top ten recipients of GBS, listed in 
Table 2, are former colonies. Thus, it would be interesting to know whether the 
selectivity in allocation of GBS differs between donors with former colonies among 
the recipient countries and other donors.  
In Table 7, the sample is divided based on whether or not the donor has had at least 
one colony among the recipient countries in the sample. As expected, former colonial 
powers are less selective when allocating GBS.5 The quantitative effect of government 
effectiveness is reduced from a marginal effect evaluated at the mean of 2.1 percentage 
points for the full sample to 1.8 percentage points when only including donors with 
former colonies among the recipients. For the subsample only including donors 
without a colonial link to any of the recipient countries in the sample, the marginal 
effect is 2.4 percentage points. Health expenditure, as a proxy for commitment to 
development, is positive in both columns, but only statistically significant at the 10% 
level in column 2.  
In addition to favoring their former colonies, donors with a colonial history with one 
or more of the recipient countries in the sample also favor countries with similar 
voting patterns in the UNGA, and the positive marginal effect of having an IMF 
program is stronger, while bilateral exports is not a significant determinant. Thus, 
political alliances seem to be more important for this group of donor countries, as well 
as alleviation of balance of payment problems.  
Surprisingly, the effect of bilateral trade is negative and statistically significant at the 
5% level in column 2. An increase in bilateral exports equal to one standard deviation 
(0.66) is related to a reduction in the probability of receiving GBS by 4.2 percentage 
points. Thus, countries that hold a larger share in the donors’ exports, given that the 
donor is not a former colonizer, are less likely to receive GBS.  
                                              
5 Running the model for the full sample with interaction effects confirms the higher emphasis on GE of donors without 
colonial ties to any of the recipient countries, while there is no support for the effect of health expenditures being contingent 
on colonial links.  
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Table 7 – Former colonizers vs. donors without former colonies in the sample 
Subsample Donors with colonial links Donors without colonial links 
  (1) (2) 
GE 0.030*** 0.041*** 
  (0.009)    (0.008)    
Health spending 0.001    0.002**  
  (0.001)    (0.001)    
Aid dependency 0.000    0.000    
  (0.000)    (0.000)    
IMF (b) 0.041*** 0.023*** 
  (0.007)    (0.006)    
Bilateral exports -0.000    -0.064**  
  (0.006)    (0.027)    
UNGA 0.069**  0.027    
  (0.032)    (0.032)    
Colonial link (b) 0.223***   
  (0.040)      
Population 0.007**  0.015*** 
  (0.003)    (0.003)    
Average income -0.037*** -0.026*** 
  (0.006)    (0.007)    
SSA (b) 0.001    0.009    
  (0.014)    (0.011)    
LAC (b) -0.011    0.016    
  (0.015)    (0.018)    
ECA (b) -0.023**  -0.019*** 
  (0.011)    (0.007)    
MENA (b) 0.027    -0.010    
  (0.028)    (0.013)    
Donor dummies Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes 
N 4616 2642 
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.25 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The model is estimated using a Probit model with clustered standard errors 
in parentheses. MEMs for time and donor dummies not reported. (b) dy/dx is the discrete change from the base 
level (from 0 to 1) in the Probit models. All time-varying regressors except population are lagged one period. 
4.4. Within variation 
For the recipient governments it may be more interesting to see how variations within 
the countries are related to changes in the dependent variable. Thus, the more relevant 
question to address would be whether or not recipient governments, by implementing 
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reforms and improving policies, can increase the probability of receiving GBS. In 
order to address this question, the model is estimated using a fixed effects logit, and 
the results are provided in Table 8. The main problem with this approach is that only 
observations where the dependent variable changes over time (donor-recipient pairs 
where there are both observations where no GBS is committed and where the donor 
has committed to disbursing GBS) are included. Thus, the total number of 
observations is reduced substantially, which leads to less precise estimates. In addition, 
the variation in government effectiveness is low as changes in governance rarely 
change much in the short or medium run. Thus, selection based on governance is likely 
to be across countries and not within countries.  
Table 8 – Fixed effects logit 
  (1) (2) (3) 
GE 0.129 0.149 0.277    
  (0.399) (0.402) (0.410)    
Health spending -0.074** -0.074** -0.075**  
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)    
Aid dependency 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
IMF (b)   -0.129 -0.009    
    (0.256) (0.267)    
Bilateral exports     -0.620    
      (0.899)    
UNGA     -0.512    
      (1.080)    
Population 10.170*** 10.254*** 9.666*** 
  (2.262) (2.268) (2.365)    
Average income 3.315*** 3.312*** 3.431*** 
  (0.884) (0.883) (0.918)    
N 1140 1140 1122 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The model is estimated using a FE logit model. The odds-ratios are reported 
with clustered standard errors. All time-varying regressors except population are lagged one period. 
The estimated coefficients in Table 8 are odds-ratios and can be interpreted as semi-
elasticities. Government effectiveness still has a positive coefficient, but the p-value is 
now 0.3. Spending in the health sector is still statistically significant, but the sign of 
the effect is now negative. A one-unit increase in public spending in the health sector 
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decreases the odds ratio by 0.07.6 An improvement in observable characteristics 
indicating a stronger commitment to development has a negative effect on the relative 
probability of receiving GBS over time. The direction of the effect also changes for 
average income, where an increase reduces the probability of receiving GBS.  
Using a fixed effects logit model, there is no support for the DAC donor being 
selective with respect to governance and commitment to development. Thus, the 
selectivity seems to be a result of variation across countries rather than within them. 
This is relevant, as it indicates that improvements over time are not rewarded with an 
increase in the probability of receiving GBS. However, the variation within countries 
for the quality of governance is very low, and this may also explain the lack of 
statistical significance when controlling for fixed effects. 
4.5. GBS and program aid 
The use of disaggregated data to focus on the allocation of GBS implicitly builds on an 
assumption that the allocation of GBS is different than for other types of aid. As has 
been discussed in the literature review, there are several arguments as to why the 
allocation pattern of GBS should be different from the allocation of project aid. 
However, other types of program aid (e.g., debt relief and food aid) are also not 
included in the dependent variable. One reason for this is that debt relief and food aid 
do not improve recipient country ownership, as they do not (necessarily) involve a 
delegation of the responsibility for the distribution and use of aid funds to the recipient 
governments. Thus, one would expect donors to be less selective on the quality of 
governance and the level of commitment to development. Estimating the baseline 
model with a dummy variable equal to one if the sum of commitments of program aid 
is positive, the empirical results confirm that donors are selective when allocating 
GBS, but not if we look at total program aid.7 This underlines the importance of using 
                                              
6 Here, the odds-ratio is the probability that the commitments of GBS are larger than zero relative to the probability that the 
commitments of GBS are zero. 
7 The full results referred to here are reported in Appendix B. 
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disaggregated aid data in these types of analyses, as different types of aid are allocated 
based on other criteria. 
Table 9 – GBS vs. program aid 
Dependent variable GBS Program aid 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
GE 0.040*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.024 0.003 0.008    
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)    
Health spending 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.003 0.002 0.000    
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Aid dependency 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000    
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
IMF (b)   0.039*** 0.037***   0.122*** 0.128*** 
    (0.006) (0.005)   (0.014) (0.014)    
Bilateral exports     -0.005     -0.010    
      (0.006)     (0.015)    
UNGA     0.060**     0.079    
      (0.025)     (0.064)    
Colonial link (b)     0.224***     0.351*** 
      (0.041)     (0.049)    
Population 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)    
Average income -0.044*** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.167*** -0.139*** -0.149*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)    
SSA (b) 0.011 0.009 0.006 0.154*** 0.151*** 0.149*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)    
LAC (b) 0.011 -0.003 -0.001 0.176*** 0.130*** 0.136*** 
  (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)    
ECA (b) -0.018* -0.020** -0.023*** -0.052* -0.067** -0.082*** 
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)    
MENA (b) 0.011 0.013 0.019 0.069 0.076* 0.094*   
  (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.042) (0.043) (0.048)    
Donor dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7413 7413 7258 7611 7611 7452 
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.28 0.30 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for time and donor 
dummies not reported. (b) dy/dx is the discrete change from the base level (from 0 to 1) in the Probit models. All 
time-varying regressors except population are lagged one period. 
 
While an improvement in the quality of governance and the commitment to 
development is related to an increase in the probability of receiving GBS, it is not 
significant when analyzing the probability of receiving program aid. This could be 
driven by the fact that, for example, debt relief is an alternative to GBS in poorly 
governed countries, as that can also be a way to alleviate balance of payment 
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problems. At the same time, the marginal effect of colonial history and aid share is 
stronger for program aid, while similar voting patterns in the UNGA are not 
statistically significant at the 10% level for total program aid.  
5. Conclusion 
In the Paris Agenda, the DAC donors have committed to improving recipient 
ownership as a part of a strategy to increase the efficiency of aid. One way to follow 
up on this commitment is to increase the use of GBS. During the period from 1995 to 
2009, there has been a slight negative trend in both the frequency and share of GBS 
(see Figure 1). Thus, it may seem as though the emphasis on recipient ownership is 
rhetorical and not followed by changes in the aid commitments made by the DAC 
donors. However, the low use of GBS could also be a result of selectivity among the 
donors. The donors delegate the responsibility to the recipient governments when they 
allocate GBS, and it therefore involves a trade-off between the loss of control and 
possible benefits (e.g., reduced transaction costs), and so a higher degree of selectivity 
when allocating GBS rather than other types of aid would therefore be expected.  
Using data on commitments of GBS, the results from a Probit model show that the 
DAC donors are selective on the quality of governance, and the result is robust to 
changes in the model specification. However, the size of the effect depends on the 
choice of governance indicators. While government effectiveness has a relatively 
strong effect on the probability of receiving GBS, the results indicate that aspects of 
governance, such as the level of corruption in the public sector, are not equally 
important for the allocation of GBS. There is also some support that the DAC donors 
target countries with a stronger commitment to development. Both countries with 
higher public expenditures in the health sector and with an (Interim) Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper are more likely to receive GBS, but the result does not hold 
for public expenditures in education or child mortality. Thus, the DAC donors do, at 
least to some extent, target countries that are likely to use the funding from GBS more 
efficiently. Countries with balance of payment problems (proxied either by having an 
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IMF program or macroeconomic indicators such as the current account or cash 
surplus/deficit) are also more likely to be supported financially with GBS. 
Even though the quality of governance and commitment to development are 
significant determinants of the probability of receiving GBS for the full sample of 
DAC donors, the degree of selectivity is considerably weaker, and political alliances 
have a significant and positive effect for the group of donors with former colonies 
among the recipient countries. In addition, a colonial link between a donor and 
recipient country has the strongest predicative power for the probability of receiving 
GBS, and also has a strong quantitative effect on the volume of GBS. Thus, while 
donors without colonial links to any of the recipient countries put a strong emphasis on 
the quality of governance on average, former colonizers strongly favor their former 
colonies and other countries with similar voting patterns in the UNGA. As the 
allocation of GBS is determined to a large extent by colonial history, there is only 
limited support for stating that the low use of GBS is due to a high degree of 
selectivity among the donors. For former colonial powers, the historical ties and 
political influence with former colonies seem to be more important than the 
commitments made in the Paris Agenda. Still, compared to the results for aggregate 
bilateral aid in the literature on aid allocation, and when looking at program aid, the 
results must be considered as encouraging.  
Comparing the degree of selectivity in the allocation of GBS and total program aid 
also underlines the importance of using disaggregated data when analyzing the 
allocation of aid. While the DAC donors on average are selective when allocating 
GBS, the allocation of program aid is not dependent on the quality of governance or 
commitment to development in the recipient countries. This also indicates that the 
donor countries are more selective when allocating direct financial funds, and thus in 
delegating the responsibility for the distribution and use to the recipient governments. 
For the donor countries, and especially the former colonial powers, the emphasis on 
the quality of governance and the degree of commitment to development should be 
more important when GBS is allocated across recipient countries. The results, when 
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using the level of corruption in the public sector in particular, demonstrate that there is 
room for improvement. For the recipients, it is of interest to know how one may attract 
GBS rather than other types of aid, and the results presented here give some pointers 
as to what the donors are affected by. In addition to better governance, public 
expenditures in health are rewarded, while spending on education is not. The degree of 
democracy is the only governance indicator not statistically significant at conventional 
levels, indicating that democratic elections and processes in the recipient countries are 
less important than, for example, political stability. Committing to IMF programs and 
fighting poverty through preparing an (I)PRSP also signals a dedication to improving 
policies in order to promote economic development.  
The term “donor darlings” has been used for the countries receiving the majority of aid 
flows. The possibility of herd behavior among the donors, where herd behavior, or 
“herding”, is the tendency to converge to similar behaviors as others (Bikhchandani et 
al., 2011), is not pursued here. The joint targeting of some countries, such as 
Mozambique and Tanzania, may be a result of herd behavior among donors. Thus, an 
interesting extension to the analysis would be to test whether donors tend to disregard 
private information, and simply follow each other when allocating GBS.
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Appendix 
Table A.1. List of recipient countries 
Albania Cuba Laos Rwanda 
Algeria Djibouti Lebanon Saudi Arabia 
Angola Dominican Republic Lesotho Senegal 
Argentina Ecuador Liberia Serbia 
Armenia Egypt Libya Sierra Leone 
Azerbaijan El Salvador Macedonia, FYR Slovenia 
Bahrain Equatorial Guinea Madagascar Solomon Islands 
Bangladesh Eritrea Malawi South Africa 
Belarus Ethiopia Malaysia Sri Lanka 
Benin Fiji Mali Sudan 
Bhutan Gabon Mauritania Swaziland 
Bolivia Gambia Mauritius Syria 
Botswana Georgia Mexico Tajikistan 
Brazil Ghana Moldova Tanzania 
Burkina Faso Guatemala Mongolia Thailand 
Burundi Guinea Montenegro Togo 
Cambodia Guinea-Bissau Morocco Tunisia 
Cameroon Guyana Mozambique Turkey 
Central African Rep. Haiti Namibia Turkmenistan 
Chad Honduras Nepal Uganda 
Chile India Nicaragua Ukraine 
China Indonesia Niger Uruguay 
Colombia Iran Oman Uzbekistan 
Comoros Jamaica Pakistan Venezuela 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Jordan Panama Vietnam 
Congo, Rep. Kazakhstan Papua New Guinea Yemen 
Costa Rica Kenya Paraguay Zambia 
Cote d'Ivoire Korea Peru Zimbabwe 
Croatia Kyrgyz Republic Philippines   
Bold: Drops out of the sample when using the preferred model specification. 
Italic: Never received GBS in the period 1995-2009. 
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Table A.2. Variables included in the baseline model 
Group Variable94 Description Source 
Dependent 
variable 
GBS A binary variable equal to 1 when GBS > 0, zero 
otherwise. Missing if total commitments are equal to 
zero. Dyadic variable. 
OECD (2012) 
Quality of 
governance 
GE Government effectiveness, ranging from -2.5 (low 
government effectiveness) to 2.5, recipient country. 
World Bank 
(2012a) 
Commitment to 
development 
Health 
spending 
Public spending on health (% of total expenditures), 
recipient country. 
World Bank 
(2012b) 
Aid dependency Aid dependency 
Net total ODA in % of gross capital formation or GDP, 
recipient country. 
World Bank 
(2012b) 
Macroeconomic 
management 
IMF A binary variable equal to one for IMF lending 
arrangements (Extended Credit Facility, Standby 
Arrangement or Extended Fund Facility), recipient 
country. 
IMF (2012b) 
Donor-recipient 
relationship 
Bilateral 
exports 
Export from donor to recipient, % of exports from 
donor to the world. Dyadic variable. 
OECD (2010) 
UNGA Index for similarity in voting in the UN General 
Assembly ranging from -1 (least similar) to 1 (most 
similar), dyadic data. 
Gartzke (2010) 
Colonial link A dummy variable equal to 1 if the donor and recipient 
have ever had a colonial relationship. Dyadic variable. 
CEPII (2010) 
Additional 
controls 
Population The logarithm of total population, recipient country. World Bank 
(2012b) 
Average 
income 
The logarithm of GDP per capita, constant 2000 USD, 
recipient country. 
World Bank 
(2012b) 
Regional 
dummies 
Binary variables for countries located in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), South Asia (SA), East Asia & Pacific 
(EAP), Europe & Central Asia (ECA), Latin America 
& Caribbean (LAC), and Middle East & North Africa 
(MENA), recipient country. 
World Bank 
(2012b) 
 
                                              
94 All variables from the World Bank are accessed using the World Bank Open Data in Stata (Azevedo, 2011). 
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Table A.3. Alternative variables for governance and commitment to development95 
Group Variable Description Source 
Quality of 
governance 
Voice and accountability (VA) 
Political stability and absence of 
violence (PV) 
Regulatory quality (RQ) 
Rule of law (RL) 
Control of corruption (CC) 
Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) 
 
Political risk (PR) 
Corruption (COR) 
State Fragility Index (SFI) 
 
Polity IV 
 
Index, -2.5 – 2.5. 
Index, -2.5 – 2.5. 
 
Index, -2.5 – 2.5. 
Index, -2.5 – 2.5. 
Index, -2.5 – 2.5. 
Index, 0 – 10. 
 
 
Index, 0 – 100. 
Index, 0 – 5. 
Index, 0 – 25. 
 
Index, -10 – 10. 
 
World Bank (2012a) 
World Bank (2012a) 
 
World Bank (2012a) 
World Bank (2012a) 
World Bank (2012a) 
Transparency 
International (2011) 
 
PRS Group (2011) 
PRS Group (2011) 
Center for Systemic 
Peace (2011b) 
Center for Systemic 
Peace (2011b) 
Commitment to  
development 
IPRSP/PRSP Binary variable equal to one 
for either an IPRSP or a 
PRSP. 
IMF (2012a) 
Health spending, % of GDP Public spending on health, 
% of GDP. 
World Bank (2012b) 
Education spending, % of GDP Public spending on 
education (% GDP). 
World Bank (2012b) 
Sum of spending in health and 
edu., % of GDP 
Sum of public spending in 
health and education (% of 
GDP). 
World Bank (2012b) 
 Mortality Mortality rate, under 5 years (per 1,000). 
World Bank (2012b) 
 
                                              
95 All variables from the World Bank are accessed using the World Bank Open Data in Stata (Azevedo, 2011). 
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Table A.4. Descriptive statistics  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
GBS 775 27.04 70.13 0.00 1028.55 
GBS dummy 9303 0.08 0.28 0 1 
GE 9292 -0.49 0.59 -2.15 1.28 
Health spending 9254 9.90 4.08 0 27.11 
Aid dependency 9072 40.43 67.54 -0.48 609.59 
IMF 9303 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Bilateral exports 9171 0.15 0.66 0.00 22.53 
UNGA 9135 0.41 0.27 -0.80 0.99 
Colonial link 9182 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Population 9303 16.27 1.50 12.81 21.00 
Average income 9298 6.78 1.14 4.37 9.59 
SSA 9303 0.39 0.49 0 1 
LAC 9303 0.20 0.40 0 1 
ECA 9303 0.20 0.40 0 1 
MENA 9303 0.10 0.30 0 1 
EAP 9303 0.11 0.32 0 1 
VA  9303 -0.52 0.72 -2.13 1.32 
PV 9299 -0.55 0.80 -2.83 1.23 
RQ 9296 -0.45 0.65 -2.26 1.64 
RL 9292 -0.59 0.61 -2.21 1.26 
CC 9296 -0.52 0.57 -2.06 1.45 
CPI 7038 3.08 1.09 0.97 7.47 
COR 7294 2.32 0.83 0 5 
PR 7294 61.57 9.26 28.36 80.71 
SFI 9254 12.57 5.24 1 25 
Polity IV 9207 2.15 5.90 -10 10 
Mortality 9303 76.21 56.78 5 262.7 
Health spending, % of GDP 9254 2.70 1.42 0 10.47 
Education spending, % of GDP 6799 4.13 1.95 0.59 13.97 
Sum of spending in health and edu., % of GDP 6799 6.85 2.91 1.75 23.48 
IPRSP/PRSP 9303 0.54 0.50 0 1 
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Table A.6. Correlation matrix for governance indicators 
  GE VA PV RQ RL CC CPI COR PR SFI 
VA 0.60                   
PV 0.50 0.43                 
RQ 0.85 0.69 0.47               
RL 0.86 0.58 0.61 0.80             
CC 0.85 0.60 0.60 0.76 0.86           
CPI 0.82 0.52 0.56 0.73 0.81 0.92         
COR 0.49 0.44 0.37 0.52 0.53 0.61 0.54       
PR 0.73 0.54 0.79 0.72 0.73 0.71 0.68 0.51     
SFI 0.67 0.51 0.62 0.62 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.31 0.70   
Polity IV 0.32 0.83 0.14 0.45 0.26 0.30 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.32 
N = 6013                     
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Lending to developing countries:  
How do official creditors respond to sovereign defaults?* 
Cathrin N. Fløgstad† and Ingvild Nordtveit‡  
Abstract 
How is lending to developing countries from bilateral and multilateral creditors affected by 
sovereign defaults? The existing empirical literature on reputational costs of defaults focuses 
on lending from private creditors. Many developing countries, however, mostly rely on 
grants and loans from official creditors as they are often excluded from international capital 
markets. Using a panel dataset covering 118 developing countries in the period from 1972 to 
2011, we estimate the effect of sovereign defaults on disbursements of concessional and non-
concessional loans from official creditors. Following a default, we find that concessional 
lending from bilateral and multilateral creditors is reduced. For non-concessional lending, 
the results depend on the measure of defaults and model specification. Thus, the reputational 
costs of default are not only caused by exclusion from commercial capital markets but also 
are present when looking at official lending.  
 
Keywords: bilateral lending, multilateral lending, reputational costs of default 
JEL classification: F34; F35; H63 
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1. Introduction 
Capital inflows can be used to insure against income shocks, and to overcome 
shortages of domestic savings and foreign exchange. Developing countries can attract 
foreign capital from official sources in the form of bilateral or multilateral flows and 
from private capital sources. Bilateral capital flows include loans and grants from 
governments or official export credit agencies, while multilateral flows mostly refer to 
loans and grants from International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Private capital flows 
include bank lending, bonds, portfolios, foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
remittances. 
The literature on sovereign debt normally focuses on lending from private creditors. 
The empirical literature on exclusion as a cost of default is restricted to exclusion from 
private capital markets following defaults on outstanding debt with private creditors. 
However, many developing countries rely on official creditors as a source for capital. 
Thus, we contribute to the literature on sovereign debt and the cost of default by 
estimating the effect of defaults on lending from bilateral and multilateral creditors. 
We test the effect of defaults proxied by arrears on principal and interest with both 
private and official creditors, controlling for access to capital from private creditors 
and grants. Thus, we include data on lending from both private and official creditors in 
our dataset, and distinguish between concessional and non-concessional lending, and 
bilateral and multilateral creditors. In that way, we provide an insight into the 
dynamics between private and official lending. This contributes to improving our 
understanding of the sovereign debt market as a whole. 
The data used in the analysis cover 118 low- and middle-income countries in the 
period from 1972 to 2011.99 We estimate the effect of arrears on lending controlling 
for a large number of relevant variables, as well as country and time fixed effects. The 
                                              
99 The classification of countries by income group is made using the thresholds for average income in 2011 USD used by the 
World Bank: Low-income countries: < 1026 USD and lower middle-income countries: 1026 – 4035 USD. We refer to lower 
middle-income countries as middle-income countries for simplicity. The classification is based on data on GDP per capita in 
constant 2011 USD from the World Bank. Thus, countries can drop out of the sample or move from one income group to 
another over time. 
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results show that concessional and bilateral non-concessional lending is reduced when 
a debtor country defaults on its sovereign debt. The negative effect is robust and 
indicates that a debtor country in default cannot simply turn to bilateral and 
multilateral creditors for new loans. We also find some support for a negative effect of 
defaults on non-concessional lending, but the results are not robust to changes in the 
model specification and measure of default. 
The paper is set out as follows: An overview of the related literature is given in 
Section 2, and descriptive statistics for lending to developing countries during the last 
four decades is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the data and 
methodology used in the analysis.  The main results are provided in Section 5, together 
with a discussion of the robustness of the results. Some concluding remarks are 
provided in the final section.  
2. Literature overview 
2.1. The cost of default  
In the market for sovereign debt, creditors have few legal rights. In contrast, if a 
domestic firm becomes bankrupt, creditors have a definite right to the company’s 
assets. Those legal rights are necessary for the private debt to exist. So why do foreign 
creditors lend to sovereigns in the absence of legal rights? There is a broad consensus 
in the economic literature that there need to be some costs following a default to make 
sovereign debt possible. There is much less consensus on what the costs of default 
actually are, and also on what their scope is (Borensztein and Panizza, 2009). 
Traditionally, the literature has focused on direct sanctions100 and reputational costs, 
                                              
100 Direct sanctions are usually understood as interference with a country’s current transactions, either through seizure of 
foreign assets or denial of trade credit. See for instance Bulow and Rogoff (1989), Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990), and 
Sachs and Cohen (1982). Panizza et al. (2009) argue that the legal protection of sovereign assets in foreign jurisdiction has 
weakened over time.  
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but lately more attention has been paid to the costs of default for the domestic 
economy.101  
Reputational costs imply that governments repay their loans because they are worried 
that they will be excluded from the capital market if they default, as this would prevent 
them from smoothing consumption across time and possibly lead to the loss of 
valuable investment opportunities (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Cole and Kehoe, 1998; 
Eaton, 1996; Kletzer and Wright, 2000). Here, we focus on reputational costs in the 
sense that sovereign defaults reduce access to loans in the future.  
The empirical results on the duration of market exclusions vary depending on the data, 
time period and methodology applied. Gelos et al. (2011) and Panizza et al. (2009) 
conclude that a default is easily forgiven, while Richmond and Dias (2009) and Cruces 
and Trebesch (2013) find that the defaulting countries are excluded for a relatively 
long period. Richmond and Dias (2009) find that it takes, on average, 5.7 years to 
regain partial market access, and 8.4 years to regain full market access in the period 
from 1980 to 2005, where partial access is defined as the first year in which there are 
positive net private creditor debt transfers to the public or private sector, and full 
market access as the first year of positive net private creditor debt transfers to the 
private or public sector greater than 1.5% of GDP. Gelos et al. (2011) show that, while 
countries were excluded from the market after settling the debt for an average of 4 
years in the 1980s, the duration of exclusion decreased to 2 years in the 1990s.  
While Gelos et al. (2011) use a binary variable to indicate a default, Cruces and 
Trebesch (2013) exploit a comprehensive dataset on creditor losses or haircuts. In their 
study, higher creditor losses are associated with longer periods of market exclusion, 
which is more consistent with the theory on reputational costs. By using a binary 
default variable instead of a continuous one, the large variation in restructuring 
                                              
101 The idea is that default causes broad “collateral damage” on the debtor country’s government or its economy. 
See for instance Cole and Kehoe (1998), Catão and Kapur (2006), Kapur et al. (2007), and Sandleris (2008). 
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outcomes is ignored.102 However, Richmond and Dias (2009) do not find a significant 
effect of haircuts on the length of exclusion after a default.103  
2.2. Official lending 
An alternative to loans from private creditors in the international credit market as a 
source for capital inflows are loans and grants from official creditors (either 
governments or IFIs). Lending from official creditors differs from private lending in 
several aspects, including the objectives of the creditors when providing loans to 
sovereigns. Concessional loans are more generous than market loans, with lower 
interest rates, relatively long grace periods, or a combination of the two. Non-
concessional lending refers to loans or export credits with market interest rates. 
The literature on lending from official creditors is usually restricted to the allocation of 
official development assistance (ODA).104 ODA is defined by the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) as official flows to countries on the DAC list of 
recipients with a grant element of 25% or more, where the objective is to promote 
economic development and welfare in the recipient countries. There is a vast amount 
of literature analyzing the determinants of the sum of concessional loans and grants 
defined as ODA, but non-concessional lending and loans from private creditors are 
usually not included in the analyses. Capital flows from governments or IFIs that do 
not fulfill the criteria for ODA are referred to as other official flows (OOF). 
To our knowledge, there are no empirical studies looking at how official non-
concessional and concessional lending to developing countries is affected by debt 
                                              
102 Creditors can also penalize defaulting countries through higher future borrowing costs, but the results from the empirical 
literature are mixed. See for instance Özler (1993), Borensztein and Panizza (2009), and Cruces and Trebesch (2013).  
103 It has been argued that whether or not a default leads to exclusion differs between excusable and inexcusable defaults 
(Grossman and van Huyck, 1988). The former is defaults that are justified since they are contingent on the state of the world, 
and because these defaults are consistent with the lenders’ expectations, they will not lead to exclusion from private capital 
markets. This is supported by Richmond and Dias (2009), who find that countries defaulting after a natural disaster 
experience a significantly shorter period of exclusion from private capital markets. 
104 Looking at the allocation of bilateral ODA from the member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 
the largest donors (such as the US, Japan, and France) drive the main empirical results on the allocation, showing that donors 
favor trade partners, former colonies, and political allies (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Berthélemy, 2006a), while smaller 
donors such as the Nordic countries to a larger extent emphasize recipient needs (Gates and Hoeffler, 2004). On average, 
Berthélemy (2006b) finds that multilateral ODA is more responsive to recipient needs than bilateral ODA, and Dollar and 
Levin (2006) show that multilateral organizations to a larger extent reward democracy and better rule of law than bilateral 
donors. 
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restructurings and defaults. There are, however, a few papers that are relevant for our 
analysis. Brandt and Jorra (2012) test how aid is related to debt restructuring through 
the Paris Club and find that defaults on average increase aid by 6.4%.105However, they 
do not look at non-concessional lending from official creditors or the effect of defaults 
in the private capital market. Rodrik (1995) provides some empirical results on the 
determinants of net bilateral transfers and net multilateral transfers, both measured in 
percent of GDP.106 The results are in line with the literature on aid allocations, 
showing that bilateral and multilateral creditors differ with respect to the importance of 
political considerations in the allocation of financial flows. Evrensel (2004) analyzes 
the determinants of both official and private capital flows to developing countries. She 
finds that the low-income countries’ access to private capital markets has been 
substantially reduced in favor of official lending during the post-debt crisis period 
(1989-1998). Bonds, portfolios, and FDI flows have replaced the decline in 
commercial bank lending in middle-income countries. Neither Rodrik (1995) nor 
Evrensel (2004) look at the effects of defaults on official lending.   
In the case of defensive lending, creditors would provide new loans when the debt 
ratio and/or debt service of the debtor country increase, so that the debtor country is 
able to avoid default. If that were the case, one would observe an increase in lending as 
debt ratios and the debt service increase. However, Marchesi and Missale (2012) show 
that bilateral and multilateral creditors reduce their loans as the debt they hold 
increases. Thus, they do not find support for defensive lending among official 
creditors, but they do find evidence of defensive granting, indicating that grants are 
substituted for loans when debt increases. Geginat and Kraay (2012) analyze whether 
the International Development Association (IDA) engages in defensive lending, and 
conclude that new disbursements of loans are not provided simply for the debtor 
country to repay existing loans.  
                                              
105 The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors whose role is to find coordinated and sustainable solutions to the 
payment difficulties experienced by debtor countries. The measure of aid used in their analysis is gross ODA minus debt 
forgiveness grants and rescheduled debt. 
106 Rodrik includes both grants, concessional and non-concessional lending from bilateral or multilateral creditors in the 
dependent variable. 
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2.3. Multilateral lending  
Rodrik (1995) argues that multilateral creditors have two main advantages compared 
to bilateral and private lenders. First, assuming that multilateral development banks are 
independent, they will be less politicized and so be better suited to exercise policy 
conditionality in a borrowing country. In a discussion on loans versus grants, Bulow 
and Rogoff (2005) emphasize that the superior enforcement technology of 
multilaterals is outweighed by the risk of debt crisis, as it would lead to more lending 
and moral hazards for the government in the borrowing country.107 Second, IFIs have 
access to substantial information on developing countries that can be beneficial for 
investors undertaking new investments in these countries. As stated by Hagen (2009), 
“multilaterals are better posed to monitor borrowers due to privileged access to 
information from their members” (p.127).  
Based on the arguments for multilateral lending presented above, a commonly held 
view, although controversial, is that multilateral lending works as a catalyst for private 
lending. The role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), especially, has received a 
lot of attention in the literature on the possibly catalytic effect of multilateral lending. 
Conditionality signals policy reforms aimed at improving economic performance, and 
as multilaterals have better access to information, they can act as a gatekeeper, 
certifying more creditworthy borrowers, thus alleviating the problem with adverse 
selection (Hagen, 2009). Focusing on the role of the IMF, Hagen (2009) shows that 
signaling good policies through certification only improves the global allocation of 
investment if the interests of private lenders are given more weight than the welfare in 
the country.  
One can also argue that the IFI programs send out pessimistic signals about upcoming 
economic performance. Bird and Rowlands (1997) contend that there could be a 
negative effect of multilateral lending on other capital flows if countries only turn to 
the IFIs when the country is in economic distress. In such a case official lenders may 
                                              
107 They also argue that multilateral institutions have internal pressure to push out loans, persuading politically fragile 
developing countries to take on unwanted debt. Countries with weak institutions are likely to be serial defaulters and one 
should be careful in using external enforcement to expand the borrowing capacity of these countries. 
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react positively to a commitment made by the borrowing country, while private 
lenders react to actual results in macroeconomic indicators. Even though financing 
from the IMF is supposed to be short-term, for poorer countries the involvement has 
been more or less continuous (Hagen, 2012). This observation suggests that an IMF 
program probably signals needs more than good policies.  
The empirical literature on the catalytic effect of IMF lending is mixed. Hagen (2009) 
summarizes the empirical literature on IMF programs and states that it shows a neutral 
effect on the whole, a negative effect on private flows, and a positive effect on official 
flows. Bauer et al. (2012) argue that the catalytic effect depends on the countries’ 
domestic institutions. They argue that democracies are able to commit to 
implementation of new policies, and show that IMF agreements have a positive effect 
on FDI inflows for democracies, while the effect is negative for autocracies.  
Another aspect is creditor seniority. According to Eichengreen (2003), IMF loans are 
typically repaid, and examples of arrears on IMF loans are the exception to the rule. 
Saravia (2010) confirms this observation, arguing that “countries have shown a higher 
aversion to default on IMF loans than on loans from private creditors” (p.1025). The 
seniority clause has been criticized because it could reduce the incentives of private 
lenders to provide loans to countries with IMF programs. A senior official loan would 
also increase the interest rate on new private loans that are made in the same 
environment (Chamley and Pinto, 2012). Since loans from the IMF are more likely to 
be repaid than others, the costs of loans are lower, and it is assumed that this allows 
the IMF to provide loans to countries in financial distress when other creditors are not 
willing to do so (Saravia, 2010).  
3. Lending to developing countries 
In this section, we briefly present some descriptive statistics for disbursements of loans 
and net transfers (NTR) from official and private creditors to developing countries. 
Disbursements are drawings made by the debtor country on loans committed. NTR are 
disbursements minus principal and interest repayments, and thus capture the real 
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resources transferred to the borrowing country.108The sample includes data on 118 
low- and middle-income countries for the period from 1972 to 2011. A list of the 
countries is provided in the appendix. Due to missing observations for some of the 
variables and because some countries drop out of the sample if GNI per capita exceeds 
4035 USD, the dataset is unbalanced. In addition to illustrating the development in 
lending over time for the full sample, we separate low- and middle-income countries to 
highlight some differences between the two income groups. 
Developing countries are often grouped in debtor “clubs” based on various 
characteristics, including different indicators for creditworthiness (Reinhart et al., 
2003) and their frequency of market access (Gelos et al., 2011).109  Low-income 
countries usually rely on grants and concessional loans, while middle-income 
countries receive non-concessional loans from official creditors and have periodic 
access to the international credit market. Thus, many countries receiving loans from 
official creditors are often excluded by private creditors.  
Figure 1 provides graphs of the average disbursements to low- and middle-income 
countries from private and official creditors, as measured in percent of GDP. Official 
lending is the main source for international lending for low-income countries, clearly 
exceeding lending from private creditors, especially since the late 1970s. The relative 
sizes of disbursements from private and official creditors to low-income countries are 
not surprising given that they are often excluded from the private capital market. It is 
also possible that low-income countries prefer concessional loans from official 
creditors over loans from private creditors because of the lower costs of borrowing. 
However, there are often conditions attached to concessional loans, so countries with 
alternative sources for capital might still prefer either non-concessional loans or capital 
from private creditors.  
                                              
108 See Eaton (1992) for an introduction to accounting of sovereign debt.  
109 Reinhart et al. (2003) classify three different debtor “clubs” depending on their access to private capital. While one group 
of countries usually has no access to capital markets and is dependent on grants and concessional official loans, other 
countries tend to have access to capital even during recessions and crisis. In the third debtor club, there are large variations 
between the countries, and access to capital is volatile and depends on different external and internal factors. Also see Gelos 
et al. (2011) for a discussion on different debtor “clubs.” 
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For middle-income countries, there is a much larger volatility in disbursements from 
private creditors. The trend is, however, downward sloping from around 1980, just as 
for low-income countries. While disbursements from private creditors exceeded those 
from official creditors in the 1970s, this has changed over time. With the debt crisis in 
the 1980s, disbursements, especially from private creditors, were reduced.  
Figure 1 – Disbursements from private and official creditors 
 
   
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the World Bank. 
 
In Figure 2, we separate total official lending into concessional and non-concessional, 
bilateral, and multilateral lending. For concessional lending to low-income countries, 
the importance of multilateral lending increased substantially from the 1970s to the 
mid-1990s. It appears that the fall in lending from private and bilateral creditors in the 
1980s has been offset by an increasing involvement of multilateral lending. By the end 
of the Cold War, disbursements from multilateral organizations surpassed 
disbursements from bilateral creditors. A similar trend is also observed for non-
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concessional lending, but the difference between multilateral and bilateral lending is 
smaller.  
Figure 2 – Disbursements from official creditors 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the World Bank. 
 
Net transfers from official creditors are graphed in Figure 3. The development in NTR 
is influenced both by changes in disbursements and repayments of principal and 
interest. The drop in net transfers for the full sample and low-income countries in 2007 
is due to one extreme observation for multilateral net transfers to Liberia. Excluding 
this observation from the sample, average net transfers from official creditors are 
higher than NTR from private creditors throughout the period from 1972 to 2011.  
For concessional lending, bilateral NTR are reduced substantially in the post-Cold War 
period, while multilateral net transfers are only modestly decreasing. At the end of the 
time period observed, bilateral and multilateral concessional NTR converge, as 
bilateral NTR have increased after the beginning of the 2000s.  
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Splitting the sample by income groups, the picture looks different. NTR of non-
concessional lending are lower on average than for concessional lending and are often 
negative for both income groups. However, the difference between non-concessional 
and concessional NTR is larger for low-income countries. In addition, non-
concessional net transfers are frequently higher than concessional NTR for middle-
income countries. This is as expected, and could be explained by the same logic as the 
difference in official and private lending observed in Figure 1. Low-income countries 
are perhaps more dependent on concessional lending (and grants) for the simple reason 
that they are poorer. Thus, they may prefer concessional lending despite the conditions 
that normally follow this type of lending, because non-concessional loans have higher 
interest rates and/or shorter grace periods. They may also be excluded from non-
concessional loans because they are less creditworthy.  
Figure 3 – Net transfers from official creditors 
  
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the World Bank. 
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4 Empirical analysis 
4.1. Hypotheses 
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to investigate how official creditors respond to 
sovereign defaults. In addition to reduced access to loans from private creditors, a 
default may affect capital flows from official creditors, and thus the costs of default. 
Concessional loans with low interest rates and/or relatively long grace periods are 
targeted to low-income countries, while non-concessional loans are offered at market 
terms or near-market terms to more creditworthy countries. Due to the objectives 
behind concessional loans, we expect no effect of sovereign defaults on concessional 
loans (or maybe even a positive effect) and a negative effect on non-concessional 
loans. Thus, the hypotheses tested are: 
H1: Net transfers of concessional loans from official creditors are not affected by 
defaulting on sovereign debt, and:   
H2: Net transfers of non-concessional loans from official creditors are negatively 
dependent on sovereign defaults.   
To test our hypotheses we estimate the model given in Equation 1: 
ܮ௜௧ ൌ ߙܣݎݎ௜௧ ൅ ߚᇱ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߟ௜ ൅ ݑ௜௧  ,      (1) 
where the dependent variable ୧୲ represent disbursements to country i at time t 
measured in percent of GDP. The main independent variable in the model is the sum 
of arrears on interest and principal measured in percent of external debt.110  ௜ܺ௧ is a 
vector of control variables, ߣ௧ indicates time fixed effects,  ߟ௜ are the country fixed 
effects, and ݑ௜௧ represents the error terms.111  
We test the model using data disaggregated by creditor groups (multilateral or 
bilateral) and the type of loan (concessional or non-concessional). Thus, we allow for 
                                              
110 Arrears in percent of external debt are used to measure defaults as it captures both being in default and the size of the 
default relative to the debt stock. As a robustness test we also use arrears in percent of GDP. 
111 The variables included in the main model specification and their sources are listed in the Appendix. 
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the effect on lending from bilateral and multilateral creditors to differ. If multilateral 
creditors have seniority, the negative effect on lending from bilateral creditors may be 
stronger compared to the effect for multilateral creditors, on average.  
4.2. Data 
The main data source is the World Bank database World Development Indicators 
(WDI), but we also include data from other sources for some of the control 
variables.112 Based on the annual data, we construct a panel data set with eight five-
year periods used in the analysis. Averaging data across periods we reduce possible 
problems related to measurement errors and noise in the data.113 Due to missing 
observations, and because some countries are only included in the sample when they 
are classified as either low- or middle-income countries, the dataset is unbalanced. 
From the literature on defaults and exclusion by private creditors we know that the 
duration of exclusion varies from around 2 to 8 years (Gelos et al., 2011; Richmond 
and Dias, 2009). Estimating Equation 1, we look at whether countries in default 
experience a change in disbursements of loans from official creditors, controlling for 
all other relevant variables. In order to say something about the timing of the effects, 
we also test the model lagging all independent variables one period using both annual 
data and averages across five year periods.  
The dependent variable is lending from official creditors, including public and publicly 
guaranteed loans from international organizations (multilateral lending) and 
governments (bilateral lending).114 Using data on net transfers, we would avoid the 
possibility of the debtor countries rolling over their debt, as net transfers reflect the 
real resources transferred. An obvious problem when estimating the effect of arrears 
on official loans on the net transfers of loans from official creditors is that, once 
                                              
112 See Table A.1. in the Appendix for a complete list of variables and sources. 
113 The main results are not sensitive to the length of time periods. Results using annual data  are reported in the Appendix. 
114 The data include both long-term and short-term debt. Multilateral loans include loans and credits from multilateral and 
intergovernmental agencies. Bilateral loans include loans from governments and their agencies, autonomous bodies and 
direct loans from official export credit agencies. 
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arrears are being accumulated, net transfers will increase by definition.115 Thus, we use 
data on disbursements measured in percent of GDP.  
The main independent variable is sovereign defaults proxied by the stock of arrears on 
long-term debt measured in percent of total external debt.116 The data on arrears are 
available for debt to private creditors and official creditors separately and, as can be 
seen in Table 1, the two variables are highly correlated. When defaulting on 
commercial loans, it is very likely that a country defaults on official loans, and vice 
versa. The high correlation between arrears in the two markets for capital is also 
evident when looking at the development in arrears over time in Figure 4, which may 
indicate that countries do not default strategically. In order to avoid problems with 
multicollinearity, we therefore test the model using data on the sum of arrears to 
private and official creditors; but as a robustness test, we also include either arrears to 
private creditors or official creditors, one at a time. 
Table 1 – Arrears 
Full sample 
  N Mean SD Min Max 
Arrears (% of external debt) 816 4.23 9.04 0 58.91 
Arrears to official creditors (% of external debt) 816 3.64 7.47 0 58.93 
Arrears to private creditors (% of external debt) 816 7.87 16.31 0 117.85 
Arrears (% of GDP) 813 11.73 68.43 0 1437.79 
Correlation (arrears to official creditors, arrears to private creditors)   0.95 
            
Low-income countries 
  N Mean SD Min Max 
Arrears (% of external debt) 510 9.72 18.13 0 117.85 
Arrears to official creditors (% of external debt) 510 5.26 9.94 0 58.91 
Arrears to private creditors (% of external debt) 510 4.46 8.33 0 58.93 
Arrears (% of GDP) 527 16.17 84.15 0 1437.79 
Correlation (arrears to official creditors, arrears to private creditors)   0.97 
                                              
115 Net transfers are disbursements minus principal and interest repaid. 
116 Benczur and Ilut (2009) also use arrears to identify defaults/repayment history, while Kraay and Nehru (2006) use arrears 
to identify debt distress. 
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Arrears are measured in percent of external debt. Thus, in addition to indicating a 
default, the variable also reflects the severity of the default relative to the size of the 
debt stocks. By using arrears, we avoid problems with timing, which is present in data 
on debt restructurings. As it may take several years to resolve a default (Benjamin and 
Wright, 2009), the effect of a default on lending is likely to occur prior to debt 
restructuring. Figure 4 presents a graph of the development of arrears in percent of 
external debt for the countries in our sample. As for lending, the development is 
somewhat different depending on whether we look at low- or middle-income 
countries. For the full sample, arrears reached a peak in 1995 and have slightly 
decreased since. The slight reduction in arrears has thus occurred after the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative started in 1996. This is not surprising, as 
one of the requirements to reach the decision point in the HIPC Initiative is clearance 
of arrears. For the HIPCs, both arrears and external debt will be reduced as a result of 
clearance of arrears followed by debt relief. Thus, if we look at the development in 
arrears measured in percent of GDP, the picture looks quite different with arrears in 
percent of GDP moving towards zero at the end of the period observed. The relatively 
stable development in arrears in percent of debt is simply a result of a considerable 
reduction in debt ratios in the same period. While the average external debt for the full 
sample was around 80% of GDP at the end of the 1990s, ten years later it is less than 
40% of GDP. Thus, it seems as though decades of debt relief has both led to a decrease 
in the external debt ratio as well as arrears in percent of GDP, on average.  
Of the 118 countries in our sample, only three (China, Lithuania, and Papua New 
Guinea) have no positive observations for arrears. Thus, even though there is a 
relatively large share of observations with no arrears, most of the countries have 
defaulted on principal and/or interest due at some point during the period from 1972 to 
2011. 
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Figure 4 – Development in stock of arrears (% of external debt) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the World Bank. 
 
4.3. Control variables 
The control variables included in the model are mainly those found to be relevant for 
access to capital/creditworthiness in the literature on access to international capital 
markets and on aid allocation. First, we control for the average income in the debtor 
countries by including the logarithm of GDP per capita. The expected effect of average 
income on disbursements from official creditors is dependent on the type of loans 
analyzed. Concessional lending is assumed to be targeted toward low-income 
countries. Still, the poorest countries also receive more grants, which could reduce the 
negative effect of average income on concessional lending. Non-concessional lending 
is expected to be positively dependent on average income, as an increase in income is 
likely to have a positive effect on the creditworthiness of the countries. We also control 
for the size of the country by including the logarithm of population.  
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Further, we follow the literature on default and exclusion from private creditors and 
control for economic performance using macroeconomic variables expected to affect 
the size of disbursements to developing countries. The growth rate in GDP per capita 
controls for the fact that debtor countries are likely to repay in good times and borrow 
in bad times, given the assumption that lending is used for consumption smoothing.1 
External debt in percent of GDP (debt ratio) is included to control for the indebtedness 
of the debtor countries. In the case of defensive lending, one would expect to see a 
positive effect of debt ratios on lending.2 We also control for the current account 
balance in percent of GDP. In addition to the average income, all three variables 
indicate whether the country is considered to be creditworthy.  
In order to control for the political environment in the debtor countries, we use the 
Polity IV index for autocracy/democracy from the Center for Systemic Peace (2013), 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) indicator for political risk provided by 
the PRS Group (2012), and an index for the similarity in voting patterns in the UN 
General Assembly (UNGA) between the debtor country and the US. The latter is an 
indicator for the similarity in voting patterns with the US in the UNGA from Gartzke 
(2010). From the aid allocation literature, we know that being a political ally is 
positively related to aid flows. The US is a major aid donor and has a strong influence 
on the policies in multilateral organizations like the IMF and the World Bank 
(McKeown, 2009). Finally, we include the degree of openness (trade in percent of 
GDP) to control for the dependence on access to international markets.3 
In Sections 2 and 3, the change in international markets over time has been discussed. 
Different events, such as the debt crisis in the 1980s, the end of the Cold War, and the 
financial crisis starting in 2008, are likely to have significant effects on lending from 
official creditors. In order to deal with global events, we also include time fixed 
                                              
1 Contrary to the theoretical predictions, Panizza et al. (2009) find that private lending is pro-cyclical, while 
official lending is not significantly dependent on the output gap. 
2 The results in Marchesi and Missale (2012) show that loans from official donors do not increase when debt 
increases. 
3 The robustness of the results to adding additional variables is discussed in Section 5.  
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effects. Country fixed effects control for country specific characteristics, such as 
colonial past, religion, and ethnic and geographical variables.   
4.4. Methodology 
We control for a large number of variables, as well as country and time fixed effects, 
and there should not be a problem of any omitted variables bias.4 However, we cannot 
conclude on the direction of causality of our results without addressing the possible 
endogeneity problem. Reduced access to capital (a reduction in new loans) may 
increase the risk of defaulting on loans, thus accumulating arrears. However, 
Bjørnskov and Schröder (2013) find that foreign aid reduces incentives to repay 
existing debt, suggesting that the effect of official (concessional) lending in fact has 
the opposite effect on arrears: an increase in (concessional) lending will lead to an 
increase in arrears.  
An alternative to fixed effects estimation in the absence of valid external instruments 
is to use a GMM model with internal instruments (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Arellano 
and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Even though 
the GMM models are popular, the instruments are often weak, leading to biased 
estimates (Bazzi and Clemens, 2013; Bound et al., 1995), and the tests for validity are 
sensitive to the (often) high number of instruments (Roodman, 2009b). For the 
instruments to be valid, the exclusion restriction must hold. Thus, the instrument (e.g., 
the lagged differences in arrears) must not have a direct effect on lending, but only 
affect lending through the instrumented variable (arrears in levels lagged one period) 
controlling for the other variables in the model.5 From the literature on defaults and 
reputational costs in commercial international capital markets, we know that defaults 
can have a direct effect on lending for up to nine years after defaulting (Richmond and 
Dias, 2009). The probability of default is also closely related to past incidents of 
                                              
4 An F-test confirms that there is unobserved heterogeneity, and fixed effects should be controlled for in order to obtain 
unbiased estimates. 
5 It is assumed that “past changes in y (or other instrumenting variables) are uncorrelated with the current errors in levels, 
which include fixed effects” (Roodman, 2009b, p.138). 
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defaults (Reinhart et al., 2003). Thus, using the lagged differences as instruments, the 
lags used should be restricted to lags 2 and up. 
Estimating the model using the system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998), 
which is more efficient than the difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and is 
less likely to suffer from weak instruments (Bun and Windmeijer, 2010; Bazzi and 
Clemens, 2013), the independent variables in levels are instrumented for using lagged 
differences. 6 Thus, any country fixed effects are transformed away, and possible 
endogeneity is dealt with if the lagged differences are valid and strong instruments. 
The Windmeijer finite-sample correction in the two-step estimation is used to correct 
for the downward bias in the standard errors for small samples (Windmeijer, 2005). In 
order to restrict the number of instruments, we collapse the instrument matrix and 
restrict the lags for our two variables for default to lag 2 to 8. 7 Thus, our identification 
relies on the assumption that defaults that occurred more than 10 years ago do not 
influence lending today, but having a history of default (even more than 10 years ago) 
does influence defaults today. 
Overall, the results from the Hansen J-test fail to reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are valid, supporting our assumption that the exclusion restriction holds. 
However, following Bazzi and Clemens (2013), we test the strength of the instruments 
by running the model using 2SLS as a standard test for instrument strength, which is 
not available for the difference and system GMM models. The results of the 
Kleibergen-Paap LM test for underidentification, and Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistics 
show that the instruments are weak, and we therefore focus on the fixed effects results 
                                              
6 Bun and Windmeijer (2010) confirm that the system GMM has a smaller bias than the difference GMM when series are 
persistent. However, they also show that when the variance of the country fixed effects increases relative to the variance of 
the error term, the bias in the system GMM increases. 
7 As a general rule, Roodman (2009b) argues that the instrument count should at least be lower than the number of countries 
in the sample. In addition to making the Hansen J-test unreliable, a large number of instruments also lead to a bias. The cost 
of reducing the number of instruments by using laglimits or collapsing the instrument matrix is a loss of efficiency. In the 
presence of second-order autocorrelation, we restrict the lags used to lags 3and longer. 
135 
 
in our discussion. 8 However, the results from the system GMM estimation and test of 
the instruments are provided in the Appendix for comparison. 
5. Results 
5.1. Introduction 
In this section, the main results from the analysis are presented. In Table 2, we present 
results for the fixed effects model using data on disbursements for the full sample. We 
also report the results using data on only low-income countries in Table 3, to have a 
more homogeneous group of countries in the sample. Low-income countries depend 
on capital from official sources, and we therefore present results only including 
countries with GDP per capita below 1026 constant 2011 USD since the creditors’ 
response to default may differ depending on the average income. The main 
independent variable, arrears, is measured in percent of external debt. This makes our 
measure of default sensitive to debt reductions. Thus, we also present the results with 
arrears measured in percent of GDP (Table 4). In Table 5, we present the results using 
data on arrears to loans from official creditors and arrears on loans from private 
creditors separately. To further explore possible heterogeneity, we also estimate the 
model controlling for being in the HIPC Initiative (Table 6) and using data on only 
World Bank lending (Table 7). 
5.2. Baseline results 
Contrary to what we expected, the results presented in Table 2 show that the effect of 
defaults is negative and significant at the 5% level for concessional lending, while for 
non-concessional lending, the coefficients are negative but not always significant at 
conventional levels. Adding additional variables to the model in columns 5 to 8, the 
number of countries in the sample drops considerably. Still, the negative coefficients 
                                              
8 A Cragg-Donald Wald test can also be used to test the strength of the instruments, but because it assumes iid errors, we 
prefer the Kleibergen-Paap Wald test. 
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for the stock of arrears when looking at concessional lending remain significant at 
conventional levels.  
An increase in arrears of one standard deviation (16.3 percentage points) is related to a 
decrease in bilateral concessional lending of around 0.8 percentage points. Average 
disbursements of bilateral concessional loans in the full sample are 1.10%. Thus, the 
estimated reduction in bilateral concessional loans related to a default is quantitatively 
large. The equivalent effect for multilateral concessional lending is around 0.5 
percentage points.  
Comparing the estimated coefficients for arrears in columns 5 to 8 using a Wald test, 
we find that the coefficients for default when looking at concessional lending are not 
significantly different from each other at the 10% level. The same holds for non-
concessional lending. However, the effect of defaults on concessional loans and non-
concessional loans are significantly different from each other at the 5% level. Thus, we 
find that bilateral and multilateral creditors do not respond differently to sovereign 
default when providing loans to low- and middle-income countries, as could have been 
the case due to seniority. However, as some large donors (especially the US) have 
great influence over the policies of multilaterals, such as the IMF and the World Bank 
(McKeown, 2009; Fleck and Kilby, 2006; Kilby, 2009), it may also be that 
multilaterals will react to defaults on bilateral loans. 
The negative effects of defaults on concessional lending are not sensitive to controlling 
for a possible substitution effect from loans to grants and access to capital from private 
creditors. Thus, the access to capital from official creditors is reduced following a 
default on sovereign debt, on average. Neither lending from private creditors nor 
grants is significant at conventional levels when looking at concessional lending 
(indicating that there is no substitution between grants and concessional loans) and 
private and official concessional lending, once the income level and other economic 
characteristics of the debtor country are controlled for. We have also controlled for the 
137 
 
possibility of catalytic effects by including lending from other official creditors, but 
again the main results remain the same.9 
Using disbursements, the results may be affected by the possibility of rolling over 
debt. When a country is in default, a creditor may increase disbursements to make the 
debtor country able to serve its debt. The fixed effects results show a negative 
relationship between arrears and disbursements from both bilateral and multilateral 
creditors. If rolling over debt is present, we then underestimate the negative effect of 
default. In other words, the negative effect would be stronger if we were able to 
control for this behavior and the estimated effect can thus be interpreted as a lower 
bound. The literature on defensive lending investigates how debt ratios or total debt 
service affects new lending. Looking at both loans and grants to low-income countries, 
Marchesi and Missale (2012) find support for the hypothesis of defensive granting, but 
not for defensive lending, by bilateral and multilateral donors. This is in line with the 
results presented here, where the external debt ratio is not significant when looking at 
concessional lending. In the presence of defensive lending and a substitution from 
loans to grants as countries become more indebted, this could lead to an insignificant 
effect of the external debt ratio, as the two mechanisms have the opposite effects on 
lending. Controlling for grants, however, does not affect the results for arrears or 
external debt.10 
The lack of statistical significance is probably due to the fact that most of the countries 
in the sample are low-income countries with limited access to non-concessional 
lending. However, it could also be caused by the implicit assumption of a linear 
relationship between default and disbursements of new loans. If the effect of sovereign 
defaults increases with the size of arrears, we would overestimate the effect for low 
levels of arrears and underestimate the effect for high values of arrears. Thus, we have 
                                              
9 The results when including grants and lending from other official creditors or private creditors are not reported for brevity, 
but are available upon request. 
10 Using data on net transfers rather than disbursements, we still find a statistically significant negative effect of defaults on 
concessional lending at the 5% level. For non-concessional lending, however, the effect is still negative but not significant at 
the 10% level. The results are not reported in the paper due to space limitations, but are available upon request. 
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also tested the model, adding a squared term for arrears to allow for a non-linear 
relationship, but have found no empirical support for this.11  
The control variables mostly have the expected sign but are not always significant at 
conventional levels. Only bilateral concessional lending is significantly dependent on 
the political stability in the debtor country at the 10% significance level, proxied by 
the ICRG indicator for political risk. It is also interesting to see that the variable for 
voting in line with the US in the UNGA has a significantly positive effect on 
multilateral lending. This is in line with the literature on US influence on multilateral 
organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF (McKeown, 2009; Fleck and 
Kilby, 2006; Kilby, 2009).  
The coefficients for the time dummies are not reported in any of the tables for brevity, 
but it is worth noting that they are mostly significant at conventional levels and have a 
relatively strong effect on lending. Thus, a great share of the variation in 
disbursements of both concessional and non-concessional loans from official creditors 
is explained by global changes over time. 
                                              
11 The results are not reported in the paper but are available upon request. 
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5.3. Low-income countries 
Only including low-income countries in Table 3, the results roughly remain the same 
as the full sample in Table 2.  Sovereign defaults now have a negative effect on 
bilateral non-concessional lending at the 10% level for both model specifications, 
while the effect on multilateral non-concessional lending is never significant at the 
10% level. Non-concessional lending is mainly provided to middle-income countries, 
so the lack of significance when looking at this type of loans is as expected.  
A notable difference when comparing the results in Tables 2 and 3 is the importance of 
similarity in the voting patterns to the US when looking at multilateral lending. For the 
full sample, the variable for being a political ally of the US is only significant for 
multilateral non-concessional lending. An increase of one standard deviation (which is 
equivalent to comparing a situation where no votes are similar to the votes of the US to 
a situation having 12.5% similarity) increases disbursements by almost 0.4 percentage 
points. Restricting the sample to only low-income countries, the effect is similar for 
multilateral non-concessional lending. For multilateral concessional lending, on the 
other hand, the effect is now significant at the 1% level, indicating an increase in 
disbursements of 1.4 percentage points from an increase in similarity of voting 
patterns in the UNGA of one standard deviation. Again, the results are in line with the 
literature on the major influence of U.S. interests on the policies of multilateral 
organizations.  
While we would expect the results to change when excluding lower middle-income 
countries, the robustness of the results may not be that surprising after all. As can be 
seen in Figures 1 to 5, the development in the dependent variables and the stock of 
arrears is mainly driven by lending to and defaults by low-income countries, indicating 
that lending from official creditors, to a large extent, is directed at low-income 
countries.  
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5.4. Measure of arrears 
Measuring arrears in percent of external debt, there is a possibility that the results 
simply capture an effect of debt relief. Reducing external debt would lead to an 
increase in our preferred measure of default. If debt relief is positively correlated with 
disbursements of new loans, the negative effect of default we find could simply be a 
result of this. However, using arrears in percent of GDP rather than total external debt, 
the negative effect of defaults on concessional lending does not change (Table 4). For 
non-concessional lending, on the other hand, the effect of defaults on multilateral non-
concessional lending is now negative and significant at the 1% level. An increase in 
arrears equivalent to one standard deviation (68.4 percentage points) is related to a 
decrease in disbursements of new loans between 0.3 and 0.9 percentage points, 
depending on the creditor group and type of loan analyzed. Thus, defaults now seem to 
cause a reduction in new loans from both bilateral and multilateral creditors, and in 
both concessional and non-concessional lending. This could indicate that total external 
debt has a positive correlation with multilateral non-concessional lending, which 
reduces the negative relation between arrears and disbursement when measuring 
arrears in percent of external debt. 
Table 4 – Arrears in percent of GDP (FE) 
  Concessional Non-concessional 
  Bilateral Multilateral Bilateral Multilateral 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Arrears (% of GDP) -0.013* -0.011** -0.007* -0.005*** 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001)    
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.367 0.257 0.393 0.268 
Number of observations 350 350 350 350 
Number of countries 71 71 71 71 
Years 82-11 82-11 82-11 82-11 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variables are disbursements in percent of GDP. The model is 
estimated using fixed effects on data averaged across five-year periods. Standard errors clustered at the country 
level are reported in parentheses.  
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Separating arrears to loans from official and private creditors in Table 5, we gain some 
additional insight to what is driving the main results. First, non-concessional lending 
bilateral creditors respond negatively to defaults on official loans, while multilaterals 
respond negatively to defaults on loans to private creditors. However, comparing the 
effects of arrears by type of loan and creditor group, the effects are never statistically 
different from each other at the 10% significance level.  
5.5. HIPC 
The results indicate reduced access to capital from official sources when the debtor 
countries are in default. However, the results could simply reflect an increase in 
lending to countries qualifying for the HIPC Initiative. Starting in 1996, the initiative 
was targeted at poor countries with unsustainable debt ratios. One of the prerequisites 
of qualifying was clearance of arrears. Thus, as arrears were reduced, countries 
received debt relief through the program. However, in addition to clearance of arrears, 
the countries also had to fulfill several other requirements. Decreasing arrears could 
then result in better access to capital from official creditors due to the commitment to 
the policy requirements for the HIPC. In order to test whether the results simply reflect 
an increase in lending when countries reach the decision point for the HIPC Initiative, 
we add a dummy variable for HIPC and an interaction term between the HIPC dummy 
and arrears. The results are presented in Table 6. 
Only the three main independent variables are reported, as we are interested in whether 
or not the constitutive term for arrears remains significant. Thus, we would like to see 
whether the negative effect of default holds given that the debtor countries are not 
HIPC. The results for arrears are almost identical to the main results provided in Table 
2. Concessional lending is negatively related to defaults, and this effect holds when 
including only the dummy for HIPC and the interaction between HIPC and arrears. For 
non-concessional lending, the coefficients are still negative, but the statistical 
significance varies as for the main results.  
 
14
5 
 
Ta
bl
e 
6 
– 
H
IP
C
 
  
C
on
ce
ss
io
na
l 
N
on
-c
on
ce
ss
io
na
l 
C
on
ce
ss
io
na
l 
N
on
-c
on
ce
ss
io
na
l 
  
B
ila
te
ra
l 
M
ul
til
at
er
al
 
B
ila
te
ra
l 
M
ul
til
at
er
al
 
B
ila
te
ra
l 
M
ul
til
at
er
al
 
B
ila
te
ra
l 
M
ul
til
at
er
al
 
 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(6
) 
(7
) 
(8
) 
A
rr
ea
rs
 (%
 o
f e
xt
er
na
l d
eb
t) 
-0
.0
48
**
* 
-0
.0
27
**
 
-0
.0
20
* 
-0
.0
07
   
 
-0
.0
45
**
 
-0
.0
23
**
 
-0
.0
20
 
-0
.0
08
* 
  
  
(0
.0
18
) 
(0
.0
12
) 
(0
.0
12
) 
(0
.0
04
)  
  
(0
.0
20
) 
(0
.0
10
) 
(0
.0
12
) 
(0
.0
04
)  
  
H
IP
C
 d
um
m
y 
-0
.6
95
**
* 
0.
14
3 
-0
.1
54
 
-0
.2
50
**
  
-0
.4
04
 
0.
60
1*
* 
-0
.2
00
 
-0
.3
27
**
  
  
(0
.2
57
) 
(0
.2
76
) 
(0
.1
25
) 
(0
.0
98
)  
  
(0
.3
26
) 
(0
.2
78
) 
(0
.1
57
) 
(0
.1
52
)  
  
In
te
ra
ct
io
n,
 H
IP
C
, a
nd
 a
rr
ea
rs
 
  
  
  
  
-0
.0
18
 
-0
.0
28
 
0.
00
3 
0.
00
5 
   
  
  
  
  
  
(0
.0
19
) 
(0
.0
21
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
05
)  
  
Ti
m
e 
fix
ed
 e
ffe
ct
s 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Fu
ll 
se
t o
f c
on
tro
ls
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
 w
ith
in
 
0.
41
 
0.
24
 
0.
39
 
0.
24
  
0.
41
 
0.
26
 
0.
39
 
0.
25
   
 
N
um
be
r o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
35
0 
35
0 
35
0 
35
0 
   
35
0 
35
0 
35
0 
35
0 
   
N
um
be
r o
f c
ou
nt
rie
s 
71
 
71
 
71
 
71
 
71
 
71
 
71
 
71
 
Y
ea
rs
 
82
-1
1 
82
-1
1 
82
-1
1 
82
-1
1 
82
-1
1 
82
-1
1 
82
-1
1 
82
-1
1 
* 
p<
0.
1,
 *
* 
p<
0.
05
, *
**
 p
<0
.0
1.
 D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
re
 d
is
bu
rs
em
en
ts
 in
 p
er
ce
nt
 o
f G
D
P.
 T
he
 m
od
el
 is
 e
st
im
at
ed
 u
si
ng
 fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
s o
n 
da
ta
 a
ve
ra
ge
d 
ac
ro
ss
 fi
ve
-y
ea
r 
pe
rio
ds
. S
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 c
lu
st
er
ed
 a
t t
he
 c
ou
nt
ry
 le
ve
l a
re
 re
po
rte
d 
in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
.  
 146 
5.6. World Bank lending 
In Table 7, we only look at World Bank lending, which is divided into IDA and IBRD. 
We do this in order to compare the results with the results for total multilateral 
lending. The decision to look at World Bank lending instead of disaggregated data for 
other creditors was made based on data availability, and the nature of the IDA and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) are suitable for 
testing our hypotheses. The IDA and the IBRD, where the former provides 
concessional loans (and grants) and the latter non-concessional loans, are financed in 
different ways. The IBRD raises its funds from international financial markets, and is 
meant to be self-sustained, and thus provides non-concessional loans to middle-income 
countries and creditworthy low-income countries. The IDA, on the other hand, is 
replenished by the richer member states every three years, and also receives some 
funds from the IBRD and repayments from debtor countries. Thus, while the IBRD is 
meant to make a profit, the objective of the IDA is to provide loans and grants to 
reduce poverty and increase economic growth.  
The results for World Bank lending are similar to the results for aggregate 
disbursements of loans from multilateral creditors. The estimated coefficient for 
arrears is always negative, but once the full set of control variables are included, the 
effect is only significant at conventional levels for loans from IDA.  
The influence of the US on World Bank lending is again evident, with a strong 
positive effect on disbursements of new loans if the debtor countries vote in line with 
the US in the UNGA. Country fixed effects are controlled for, so the effect revealed is 
based on variation within countries only. Thus, by voting similarly to the US, countries 
can significantly increase their access to capital from the World Bank.  
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Table 7 – World Bank lending 
  IDA IBRD IDA IBRD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Arrears (% of external debt) -0.014*** -0.004* -0.022*** -0.002 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) 
ln GDP per capita -0.493** -0.038 -0.264 0.049 
  (0.236) (0.181) (0.385) (0.154) 
Growth in GDP per capita 0.020** -0.006 0.035** -0.001 
  (0.009) (0.005) (0.015) (0.007) 
Current account balance -0.014 -0.006* -0.021 -0.002 
  (0.010) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) 
External debt stocks 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Openness 0.004** 0.000 0.006*** -0.000 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln population 0.043 -0.237 -0.330 0.374 
  (0.404) (0.335) (0.855) (0.413) 
Political risk (ICRG)     0.002 -0.003 
      (0.012) (0.004) 
Democracy     -0.024 0.008 
      (0.015) (0.008) 
UNGA voting similarity with the US     1.448* 0.742** 
      (0.800) (0.352) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.25 0.17 0.28 0.28 
Number of observations 688 688 350 350 
Number of countries 118 118 72 72 
Years 72-11 72-11 82-11 82-11 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variables are disbursements in percent of GDP. The model is 
estimated using fixed effects with clustered standard errors reported in parentheses.  
 
 
5.7. Timing of effects 
In Table 8, results with lagged independent variables for both annual data and data 
averaged across five year periods are presented. The main results hold for concessional 
lending when using annual data, but the significant negative effect of defaults on 
official lending disappears when using five year averages. Thus, the results suggest 
that disbursements from official creditors in year t are negatively related to defaults in 
year t-1, while disbursements in the current five year period are not dependent on 
defaults occurring six to ten years ago.  
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The negative effect of defaults on bilateral non-concessional lending found in Tables 2 
and 3 is no longer statistically significant at the ten percent level when lagging the 
independent variables. This could indicate a problem with reverse causality in the 
estimated effects for non-concessional lending presented so far, where non-
concessional lending decreases prior to the default.  
6. Concluding remarks 
The paper contributes to the empirical literature on the cost of default by analyzing 
how official creditors respond to defaults on sovereign debt to both private and official 
creditors. The results show that both bilateral and multilateral creditors respond 
negatively to defaults on sovereign debt when providing concessional loans. The effect 
is not due to substitution from loans to grants or an increase in loans to countries 
clearing their arrears to qualify for the HIPC Initiative. The effect of arrears on 
concessional lending has been shown to be very robust to changes in model 
specification and sample size. In addition to the results discussed so far, the results are 
also robust to controlling for total reserves, oil rents, and the residuals from a 
regression of Institutional Investor country credit ratings on the full set of independent 
variables.128 Thus, there are some reputational costs of default in the market for official 
loans as well as in the private capital markets, indicating that developing countries in 
default cannot simply turn to official creditors for capital. This is crucial when 
discussing capital flows to developing countries, and to low-income countries 
especially, as they rarely have access to bonds and bank loans from private creditors, 
and should strengthen the debtor countries’ incentives to repay their sovereign debt. 
Lagging the independent variables one period using both annual data and data 
averaged across five year periods, we find that the negative coefficient for defaults is 
statistically significant at conventional levels for concessional lending using annual 
                                              
128 The residuals are used when controlling for credit ratings in order to capture the effect of market perceptions not explained 
by other variables included in the model (Garibaldi et al., 2001; Gelos et al., 2011). 
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data only.  The results suggest that the negative relation between defaults and 
concessional lending from official creditors only holds in the short run.  
For non-concessional lending, the results are not robust to changes in the model 
specification and measure of default. The lack of support for the hypothesis that access 
to non-concessional lending is reduced following a default is somewhat surprising. 
However, the lack of robust results could be explained by the fact that most of the 
countries in the sample are low-income countries with limited access to non-
concessional lending.  
There are several aspects of the link between sovereign default and lending from 
official creditors that should be investigated further. In addition to analyzing the 
relation between arrears on sovereign debt and disbursements of new loans from 
official creditors, our dataset includes lending from private creditors in addition to 
lending from bilateral and multilateral creditors, making it possible to control for 
possible substitution or catalytic effects from official to private creditors or vice versa. 
Still, we do not focus on how the two sources for capital are related, which is a 
question that should be pursued in future research. Kraay and Nehru (2006) claim that 
the failure to repay concessional loans reduces the ability of multilateral creditors to 
provide new loans to other developing countries. We do not analyze the effect of other 
countries defaulting on the disbursements of new loans, but it would be an interesting 
hypothesis to test empirically. A third question that would be interesting to investigate 
closer is the role of the IMF, and whether the reputational costs of sovereign default 
are contingent on whether or not the debtor country accepts the terms of IMF lending 
programs following the default.  
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Appendix  
A.1. Variables included in the model 
Explanatory variable Description Source 
Bilateral concessional 
disbursements 
Disbursements of concessional loans from bilateral 
creditors, % of GDP. World Bank (2012) 
Multilateral concessional 
disbursements 
Disbursements of concessional loans from 
multilateral creditors, % of GDP. World Bank (2012) 
Bilateral non-concessional 
disbursements 
Disbursements of non-concessional loans from 
bilateral creditors, % of GDP. World Bank (2012) 
Multilateral non-concessional 
disbursements 
Disbursements of non-concessional loans from 
multilateral creditors, % of GDP. World Bank (2012) 
Private disbursements Disbursements from private creditors, % of GDP. World Bank (2012) 
Bilateral concessional NTR Net transfers of concessional loans from bilateral creditors, % of GDP. World Bank (2012) 
Multilateral concessional NTR Net transfers of concessional loans from multilateral creditors, % of GDP. World Bank (2012) 
Bilateral non-concessional 
NTR 
Net transfers of non-concessional loans from 
bilateral creditors, % of GDP. World Bank (2012) 
Multilateral non-concessional 
NTR 
Net transfers of non-concessional loans from 
multilateral creditors, % of GDP. World Bank (2012) 
Private NTR Net transfers from private creditors, % of GDP. World Bank (2012) 
Arrears  The sum of arrears to private and official creditors, either in percent of debt or GDP. Worlds Bank (2012) 
Arrears to official creditors Arrears of principals and interests in percent of total external debt Worlds Bank (2012) 
Arrears to private creditors Arrears of principals and interests in percent of total external debt World Bank (2012) 
Grants Total grants, % of GDP. World Bank (2012) 
ln GDP per capita. ln GDP per capita. World Bank (2012) 
ln population ln population. World Bank (2012) 
Growth in GDP per capita Annual growth in GDP per capita. World Bank (2012) 
External debt stocks External debt stocks, % of GDP. World Bank (2012) 
Current account balance Current account balance, % of GDP. World Bank (2012) 
Total reserves Total reserves, % of total external debt. World Bank (2012) 
Credit ratings Institutional Investor country credit ratings. Institutional Investor (2013) 
HIPC Dummy for HIPC Initiative and MDRI IMF (2013) 
US affinity Index for similarities with the US in voting patterns in the UNGA.  Gartzke (2010) 
Democracy Polity IV index ranging from -10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy) 
Center for Systemic 
Peace (2013) 
Openness Trade, % of GDP. World Bank (2012) 
Oil rents Oil rents, % of GDP. World Bank (2012) 
Political risk (ICRG) ICRG indicator for political risk. PRS Group (2012) 
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A.2. List of countries 
Albania Dominica Lesotho Senegal 
Algeria Dominican Republic Liberia Seychelles 
Angola Ecuador Lithuania Sierra Leone 
Argentina Egypt, Arab Rep. Macedonia, FYR Solomon Islands 
Armenia El Salvador Madagascar South Africa 
Azerbaijan Eritrea Malawi Sri Lanka 
Bangladesh Ethiopia Malaysia St. Lucia 
Belarus Fiji Maldives St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Belize Gabon Mali Sudan 
Benin Gambia, The Mauritania Swaziland 
Bolivia Georgia Mauritius Syrian Arab Republic 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Ghana Mexico Tajikistan 
Botswana Grenada Moldova Tanzania 
Brazil Guatemala Mongolia Thailand 
Bulgaria Guinea Morocco Togo 
Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau Mozambique Tonga 
Burundi Guyana Nepal Tunisia 
Cambodia Haiti Nicaragua Turkey 
Cameroon Honduras Niger Turkmenistan 
Cape Verde India Nigeria Uganda 
Central African Republic Indonesia Pakistan Ukraine 
Chad Iran, Islamic Rep. Panama Uruguay 
Chile Jamaica Papua New Guinea Vanuatu 
China Jordan Paraguay Venezuela, RB 
Colombia Kazakhstan Peru Vietnam 
Comoros Kenya Philippines Yemen, Rep. 
Congo, Rep. Kyrgyz Republic Romania Zambia 
Costa Rica Lao PDR Russian Federation Zimbabwe 
Cote d'Ivoire Latvia Rwanda   
Djibouti Lebanon Samoa   
Bold: Countries included when running the model with the full set of control variables. 
Italic: Countries in the HIPC Initiative at some point in the period from 1972 to 2011. 
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A.3. Summary statistics (full sample) 
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max. 
Disbursements, official creditors, % of GDP 782 3.45 3.35 0.00 32.52 
Disbursements, bilateral concessional, % of GDP 782 1.10 1.86 0.00 23.14 
Disbursements, multilateral concessional, % of GDP 782 1.39 1.80 0.00 15.19 
Disbursements, bilateral non-concessional, % of GDP 782 0.35 0.79 0.00 11.62 
Disbursements, multilateral non-concessional, % of GDP 782 0.61 0.73 0.00 4.01 
Disbursements, private creditors, % of GDP 782 1.38 2.33 0.00 19.34 
NTR, official creditors, % of GDP 782 1.60 3.17 -20.02 31.55 
NTR, bilateral concessional, % of GDP 782 0.65 1.78 -4.93 22.33 
NTR, multilateral concessional, % of GDP 782 1.05 1.55 -3.10 12.88 
NTR, bilateral non-concessional, % of GDP 782 -0.05 0.84 -4.70 10.10 
NTR, multilateral non-concessional, % of GDP 782 -0.07 0.92 -17.02 4.01 
NTR, private creditors, % of GDP 782 0.11 1.39 -5.52 12.88 
Grants, % of GDP 813 6.31 8.45 0.00 96.80 
Arrears, % of external debt 816 7.87 16.31 0.00 117.85 
Arrears on debt to private creditors, % of external debt 816 3.64 7.47 0.00 58.93 
Arrears on debt to official creditors, % of external debt 816 4.23 9.04 0.00 58.91 
Arrears, % of GDP 813 11.73 68.43 0.00 1437.79 
ln GDP per capita 817 6.74 1.01 4.27 8.89 
ln population 908 1.81 1.86 -2.84 7.19 
Growth in GDP per capita 809 1.73 4.70 -20.41 57.99 
External debt stocks, % of GDP 782 63.64 83.22 0.00 1493.38 
Current account bal., % of GDP 721 -4.92 7.36 -48.69 27.29 
Total reserves, % of external debt 775 56.71 218.02 -0.17 4446.23 
Openness 799 73.93 38.89 8.68 367.02 
Democracy 751 -0.30 6.35 -10 10 
UNGA voting similarity with the US 743 -0.32 0.26 -0.81 0.45 
Political risk (ICRG) 451 56.40 11.11 17.17 79.68 
Institutional Investor country credit rating 547 28.50 14.60 4.88 75.60 
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A.4. Summary statistics (low-income countries) 
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max. 
Disbursements, official creditors, % of GDP 510 4.00 3.39 0.00 32.52 
Disbursements, bilateral concessional, % of GDP 510 1.25 1.84 0.00 18.30 
Disbursements, multilateral concessional, % of GDP 510 1.78 1.90 0.00 15.19 
Disbursements, bilateral non-concessional, % of GDP 510 0.41 0.92 0.00 11.62 
Disbursements, multilateral non-concessional, % of GDP 510 0.57 0.72 0.00 3.85 
Disbursements, private creditors, % of GDP 510 1.17 2.02 0.00 15.72 
NTR, official creditors, % of GDP 510 2.17 3.23 -20.02 24.33 
NTR, bilateral concessional, % of GDP 510 0.80 1.78 -4.93 17.53 
NTR, multilateral concessional, % of GDP 510 1.41 1.66 -3.10 12.88 
NTR, bilateral non-concessional, % of GDP 510 0.02 0.91 -4.34 10.10 
NTR, multilateral non-concessional, % of GDP 510 -0.06 1.02 -17.02 2.69 
NTR, private creditors, % of GDP 510 0.12 1.21 -4.30 8.73 
Grants, % of GDP 527 7.94 9.45 0.00 96.80 
Arrears, % of external debt 510 9.72 18.13 0.00 117.85 
Arrears on debt to private creditors, % of external debt 510 4.46 8.33 0.00 58.93 
Arrears on debt to official creditors, % of external debt 510 5.26 9.94 0.00 58.91 
Arrears, % of GDP 527 16.17 84.15 0.00 1437.79 
ln GDP per capita 527 6.26 0.85 4.27 8.45 
ln population 527 2.00 1.76 -2.84 7.17 
Growth in GDP per capita 521 1.53 5.00 -20.41 57.99 
External debt stocks, % of GDP 510 71.59 96.07 0.55 1493.38 
Current account bal., % of GDP 458 -5.64 6.94 -46.07 16.68 
Total reserves, % of external debt 496 32.89 49.61 -0.17 553.81 
Openness 516 67.35 34.28 8.68 184.23 
Democracy 488 -1.12 5.89 -10 10 
UNGA voting similarity with the US 471 -0.31 0.27 -0.76 0.41 
Political risk (ICRG) 269 52.80 10.71 17.17 72.60 
Institutional Investor country credit rating 319 23.59 13.13 4.88 72.90 
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A.7. Test for strength of instruments 
 Bilateral concessional 
Multilateral 
concessional 
Bilateral non-
concessional 
Multilateral 
non-
concessional 
Number of observations 350 350 350 350 
Number of countries 72 72 72 72 
Number of instruments 16 16 16 16 
Collapsed instruments Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lags used 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd 
Kleibergen-Paap LM test (p-value) 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistics 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald stat:         
Relative OLS bias > 30% (p-value) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 

